VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0231/01 0831847
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241847Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9827
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS RABAT 000231 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEFENSE FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE LEMKIN 
STATE FOR NEA DAS SPIRNAK, NEA/PI, DRL/NESCA AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP PGOV MARR MCAP PHUM PTER ECON MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF THE DEPUTY 
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
MR. BRUCE S. LEMKIN 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Mr. Lemkin, we are looking forward to 
your visit to Morocco.  Morocco has been an exemplary partner 
in the struggle against terrorism, and it serves as a 
regional model for economic change and democratic reform. 
Our military and political cooperation is growing, and as a 
result, Morocco has been designated as a "Major non-NATO 
Ally."  Morocco's principal foreign tie is with Europe and 
has advanced status with the European Union (EU).  Morocco is 
one of our strongest allies in the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa (BMENA) region, and its top priority is U.S. 
support for its position on the Western Sahara territorial 
dispute and for integration in North Africa. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Morocco is a country "on the move", in the throes, 
albeit unevenly, of change and reform.  Economic growth has 
averaged about six percent per year and investment, tourism 
and remittances have boomed, although they could be 
threatened by the global financial crisis.  Slums are coming 
down, and according to official statistics, so is 
unemployment.  Freedom of the press has expanded to a level 
not seen here ever before and beyond the rest of the region, 
but there are still some restrictions, and those who 
challenge them can suffer heavy fines, libel judgments and 
more rarely, jail.  Political freedoms have grown as well, 
although they remain constrained by a system with roots going 
back hundreds of years.  Neither the Parliament nor the 33 
political parties with seats in it have much power.  Most 
voters stayed away from the last parliamentary election, in 
2007, which saw the first international observation ever, 
largely achieved and funded by the USG.  Additionl reforms 
could lead to democracy, but, with staility a priority, it 
could take decades. 
 
¶3.  (BU) The relationship between the U.S. and Moroccanair 
forces is a model of engagement between the wo militaries. 
Military engagement is integral t almost all mission 
priorities, including economc growth, countering extremism 
and terrorism, parnership, and regional stability.  The 
agreement o purchase F-16 fighter aircraft and T-6 traineraircraft is at the forefront of a broader frce modernization 
effort by the Moroccan military that can serve as the engine 
not only of modernizing military equipment but continuing the 
modernization and professionalization f Morocco,s entire 
armed forces.  The sales also ill provide an opening for 
increased engagement y Africa Command,s 17th Air Force. 
Your visit wil serve to reinforce the strong U.S. commitment 
o providing the Moroccan Air Force the very best cpability 
for the dollar in an F-16 program that cntinues to have 
small setbacks that contribute t low-grade friction.  Wealso seek to revitalize our military training and exercise 
regimen, underline our interest in the Moroccan military as 
an international peacekeeper, and help move the pending 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Acquisition and 
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  The Moroccans are mulling 
over a near-finalized text of the latter and are giving 
serious consideration to our proposed SOFA.  Since King 
Mohammed VI serves as his own Minister of Defense, we expect 
that you will meet Minister-Delegate Sbai, who largely serves 
as a comptroller, CHOD Bennani and Air Force commander 
Boutaleb, who has been invited to the U.S. by the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force for a counterpart visit.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Air Force Engagement and the Mission Strategic Goals 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Mission strategic goals are, in order, economic 
growth and reform, countering terror, promoting U.S.-Moroccan 
partnership, enhancing democracy and governance, and 
resolving regional conflicts while maintaining close 
strategic cooperation.  Military-to-military engagement in 
general and air force engagement specifically contribute to 
progress for at least four of these goals.  With regard to 
economic growth and reform, we believe expanding Morocco,s 
economic base will do as much to address popular 
dissatisfaction with the political system as will 
strengthening democratic institutions.  The purchase of F-16 
and T-6 aircraft, and the enhanced engagement they will 
trigger, will likely promote modernization in a military 
already fully under civilian control.  With regard to 
countering and combating terrorism, U.S. military engagement 
is focused on professional training and education programs. 
With regard to partnership, our engagement with the Air Force 
is among the strongest peer-to-peer relationships we 
maintain, and this can only improve with the addition of the 
F-16 and T-6 to their baseline.  The continued and expanded 
 
 
robust interaction between our two militaries is an important 
example of institution building that is a centerpiece of our 
relationship  Finally, with regard to regional stability, the 
reinforcement of the Moroccan military helps to maintain the 
regional balance of power, in a context of even greater 
Algerian modernization expenditure, assures the Government of 
Morocco that it truly is a strong, long-term Major non-NATO 
Ally, and facilitates U.S. regional objectives not only in 
Africa but in the Middle East. 
 
---------------------- 
Military Modernization 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Moroccan military has undertaken a sweeping 
effort to modernize a military force that fields 
predominantly Korean and Vietnam War era equipment.  While 
the F-16 and T-6 sales form the vast bulk of the dollar 
figure for this modernization, the total Foreign Military 
Sales and Foreign Military Financing portfolio totals some 
120 cases in excess of USD 3 billion.  The list of pending or 
prospective sales includes 200 M1A1 main battle tanks, CH-47D 
and SH-60 rotary wing aircraft, Gulfstream and Beechcraft 
operational/Distinguished Visitor (DV) support aircraft, 
Hawk, Chaparral, and Stinger anti-aircraft systems, and 
solicitations for surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft 
and unmanned aerial vehicles.  Morocco is the second largest 
recipient of excess defense articles (EDA) from the U.S. 
These sales and transfers are necessary to permit the 
Moroccan military to both hold its position as a regional 
power and be able to interoperate and participate as a 
coalition partner.  They further serve to solidify the 
substantial U.S. inclination by the Moroccan military, 
although there are competitors that can dramatically underbid 
U.S. offerings, and Morocco does not limit itself to U.S. 
equipment. 
 
------------------------------- 
Modernization Drives Engagement 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Military modernization further strengthens the 
institution of the Moroccan military by continuing and 
expanded exposure to U.S. doctrine, tactics, techniques, 
procedures and personnel.  The expanded requirement to train 
operators and maintainers for the F-16 and T-6 aircraft alone 
will practically equal the current annual training allocation 
for all Moroccan personnel across all the services and 
government organizations.  Moreover, the integration of a 
fourth generation fighter into the Royal Moroccan Air Force 
must stimulate a modernization of the full-spectrum approach 
to operating and sustaining such aircraft, from facilities to 
logistics to aerial employment to command and control.  This 
provides an unparalleled opportunity )- and a challenge )- 
to shape our engagement with the Royal Air Force.  However, 
we think the challenge can be ably met by a combination of 
our traditional security cooperation efforts and the addition 
of the 17th Air Force (AF), the USAF component command to 
Africa Command.  A superb boost this year is the selection of 
Morocco to participate in the CSAF Counterpart Visit program, 
as well as Morocco,s decision to send an observer to AMC,s 
Airlift Rodeo.  These engagement activities add to a robust 
exercise program that includes AFRICAN LION, PHOENIX EXPRESS, 
and FLINTLOCK, in addition to at least two annual JCETs.  The 
Royal Moroccan Air Force has also requested the revival of 
MAJESTIC EAGLE, an annual air exercise that the U.S. 
suspended due to OIF and OEF commitments in 2003. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Modernization Can Drive Regional Leadership 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Royal Moroccan Air Force enjoys a well-deserved 
status as a regional leader in training, humanitarian 
assistance and peacekeeping.  With regard to training, 
Morocco has provided technical and operational training to 
more than 300 officers and 1,400 non-commissioned officers, 
primarily from francophone sub-Saharan Africa over the last 
25 years, with much of that occurring in the last three 
years.  Morocco has further provided humanitarian assistance 
to 13 countries in the same time frame, especially airlift 
but also cloud-seeding.  Finally, Morocco has been a 
consistent provider of peacekeepers to UN and NATO-led 
missions, with forces currently in Kosovo, Cote d,Ivoire, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Morocco 
continually seeks the expansion and improvement of capacity 
 
 
to train peacekeepers and perform these missions, and the 
USAF can assist with both materiel and intellectual support 
for the concepts of a C-130 refurbishment center of 
excellence and a UN-sponsored peacekeeping center of 
excellence. 
 
------------------------------ 
Support for Longer Term Issues 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Embassy is currently engaged in negotiations 
with the GOM on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and 
Inspector General of the Armed Forces General (CHOD) Bennani 
has indicated interest in signing the Acquisition and Cross 
Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the USG.  However, the 
negotiations over the SOFA have been ongoing for years, and 
the ACSA signature has been stalled for months; we have most 
recently heard the draft is under review by the military. 
The Moroccans, who hosted U.S. bases throughout the Cold War, 
may not be convinced a full-fledged SOFA is needed. 
Unfounded rumors of prospective U.S. basing in connection 
with Africa Command have been publicly controversial here. 
Nonetheless, both of these agreements stand to benefit air 
forces in particular, and your support for these two efforts 
would be appreciated. 
 
------------- 
Your Meetings 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Your meeting with Minister-Delegate to the Prime 
Minister in Charge of the Administration of National Defense 
Abdurrahman Sbai could be used to deliver Amendment 1 to the 
F-16 Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and further discuss 
the continuing effort to establish an interest-bearing 
account on Morocco,s behalf that could close the disconnect 
between desired capabilities and budget in the F-16 program. 
Your meetings with Generals Bennani and Boutaleb afford an 
opportunity to discuss the F-16 and T-6 programs, as well as 
military modernization in general.  You should stress to the 
Moroccans how much these aircraft will change the way they 
operate and urge them to allow adequate time and effort to 
prepare their bases and their forces.  Of particular interest 
will be emphasizing the importance of base activities at the 
main operating base of Ben Guerir and the pending COMSEC LOAs 
as part of the recent NSA approval for Link 16 and other F-16 
technologies.  With the first aircraft set to be delivered in 
July 2011, the GOM has many challenges ahead to prepare 
infrastructure from both the operational and security 
perspectives.  In all your meetings, we believe that you 
could also usefully advance the ACSA and the SOFA and obtain 
a better understanding of Morocco,s planning for 
peacekeeping and for exercises. 
 
--------------- 
External Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Border Troubles with Algeria:  The Moroccan 
relationship with Algeria is difficult, and the border 
between the two countries was closed by Algeria and remains 
closed.  While the King and other GOM officials have publicly 
proposed opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations 
between the two countries, their entreaties have been 
repeatedly rebuffed.  The GOA has linked progress on the 
border to "all issues," particularly the Western Sahara. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking international recognition 
of its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue 
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria, 
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest 
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum. 
 The issue led Morocco to leave the African Union and has 
been an obstacle to regional integration through the Arab 
Maghreb Union.  In April 2007, Morocco proposed a new 
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of 
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in 
Manhasset, New York.  The Moroccan proposal, deemed "serious 
and credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis, the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy in 
administering local affairs while respecting Moroccan 
sovereignty over the territory.  There have been four rounds 
of talks but none since March 2008.  After the April 2008 
renewal of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission, the 
USG announced it considered independence for the territory 
 
 
"not realistic." 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Following the 
controversial lapsing of the contract of the former UN 
Secretary General's Personal Envoy, the UN selected retired 
U.S. Ambassador Chris Ross to be the new Personal Envoy, and 
he made his first visit to the region in February. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Western Sahara 
experienced gross violations of human rights from 1975 until 
the end of the Hassan II regime and repression intensified 
after the short-lived Sahrawi "intifada" of 2005.  Since late 
2006, Morocco has slowly improved the human rights situation 
in the territories.  Arbitrary arrests have sharply 
diminished and beatings and physical abuse by security forces 
have all but disappeared.  Even dissenters now can travel 
freely.  They cannot, however, publish or speak publicly in 
support of independence, or a vote on self-determination.  In 
2008, known abusers were transferred, further easing the 
situation.  However, we saw an uptick in abuses in early 2009. 
 
--------------- 
Internal Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Current Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El 
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007 
legislative elections, is built on a minority coalition. 
There has been periodic speculation that it might not last 
for the full five-year mandate of Parliament.  El Fassi's 
government, filled with young technocrats from within and 
outside his Istiqlal party, has performed better than many 
expected, however, and it now looks capable of a full term. 
El Fassi has participated extensively in international events 
and diplomacy.  Internal democracy is growing within 
political parties.  A political formation founded by Fouad 
Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has evolved into a new 
Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) by grouping several 
smaller parties.  It has now constituted the largest 
political bloc in Parliament, and could be prepared to lead 
should the current coalition falter.  We currently see no 
prospect for a significant shift in Morocco's foreign and 
security policies.  However, neither Parliament nor the Prime 
Minister has much say in these issues, which are managed by 
the Throne directly with concerned ministries. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Morocco's political parties 
and the bicameral parliament are weak and structurally 
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or strongly 
articulating dissent.  The Parliament provides no effective 
check on the monarchy or government.  Changing the 
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power 
imbalance and institute formal democracy, but both Parliament 
and parties will have to improve their capacity and 
performance first.  Nonetheless, both parties and Parliament 
have made some technical improvements, largely thanks to 
USG-funded programs from the National democratic Institute 
(NDI) and the State University of New York (SUNY), which have 
modestly improved the body's administrative capacity.  These 
include establishment of a budget analysis office, a verbatim 
transcription service, and a consistent forum for training 
and debate among parliamentary members and staff. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform Continued:  Although the 
September 2007 parliamentary elections were the most 
transparent in the country's history, record low 
participation (i.e., 37 percent of registered voters) 
reflects the lack of voter confidence in the institution. 
The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) funded NDI to run the first ever international 
observation.  MEPI is now funding an ambitious training 
program for women running for municipal councils in June. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Human Rights and Reform:  King Mohammed VI has 
embarked on an ambitious and continuous program of human 
rights reforms that includes the Arab world's first truth 
commission, a revised family code and growing governmental 
transparency and accountability.  2008 saw some incidents of 
concern related to freedoms of expression and press. 
Although Morocco is a paragon of reform in the region, the 
reforms are still not deeply rooted in law or Constitution 
and could be rolled back.  Continued support and 
encouragement from partners like the United States and Europe 
are essential. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan Constitution 
 
 
provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although 
Islam is the official state religion.  The GOM prohibits the 
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials, bans all 
proselytizing, but tolerates several small religious 
minorities.  It also occasionally restricts Islamic 
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of 
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in 
nature ) lately targeting Shi,a.  Morocco has become 
protective and even positive toward the tiny remnant of its 
once substantial Jewish minority. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  The terrorism threat in Morocco 
emanates especially from small grassroots radical Islamic 
cells, which have shown some capacity to attack.  Security 
forces disrupted six terrorist and foreign fighter cells in 
2008, arresting 105.  The biggest threat is that attacks 
could deter tourists, an important component of the economy. 
The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy emphasizing vigilant security measures, 
counter-radicalization policies, and robust international 
cooperation has been largely successful in containing the 
threat to date.  Economic disruption, whether from attacks or 
the global economic crisis, remains the principal threat to 
stability here, but most observers believe Morocco will 
manage absent catastrophic collapse. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Counterterrorism Continued:  Under the King who as 
"Commander of the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims and Jews, 
Morocco has standardized religious doctrine, consolidated 
control over religious schools, and sent specially trained 
Imams to Europe to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan 
diaspora.  The vast majority of Morocco's population rejects 
Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam and so does not 
support terrorist groups. 
 
------------------------------- 
Economics, Trade and Assistance 
------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Economics and Trade:  The economy is relatively 
healthy, with growth expected to be above five percent this 
year, but marred by increasing disparities in wealth.  Since 
implementation of our Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on January 
1, 2006, bilateral commerce has more than doubled.  U.S. 
firms are increasing their investment in Morocco, seeing new 
markets develop as a result of the FTA.  The Department of 
Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program and the U.S. 
Trade and Development Agency conduct capacity building and 
technical assistance projects to assist Morocco to create an 
open and transparent trading environment and fully develop 
its trading potential.  However, significant export growth to 
U.S. and other markets will also depend on Morocco's ability 
to capture a larger share of value added in its export 
products.  Targeted assistance programs from USAID and MEPI 
aim at improving Morocco's ability to produce and market its 
exports in key sectors. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) U.S. Assistance:  We are focusing our assistance 
to Morocco on youth and women, targeting four priorities: 
economic growth, counterterrorism, democracy and governance, 
and supporting quality education.  U.S. assistance includes 
projects under the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID, 
and MEPI. 
 
¶23.  (U) The Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a 
five-year, USD 697.5 million Millennium Challenge Account 
Compact with Morocco in 2007 to reduce poverty and increase 
economic growth.  The five-year clock started ticking on 
September 15, 2008 with the Entry into Force of the Compact. 
The MCA will support five major projects selected for their 
potential to increase productivity and improve employment in 
high potential sectors of Morocco's economy.  The MCA 
projects include:  Fruit Tree Productivity, Small Scale 
Fisheries, Crafts, Financial Services, and Enterprise Support. 
 
¶24.  (U) Morocco benefits from several MEPI programs, 
including country-specific projects and inclusion in regional 
efforts.  Some recent and ongoing programs include the 
program for women candidates, breast cancer awareness, 
support for civil society and youth organizations, developing 
freedom of expression via the Internet, supporting 
development of democratic leaders, technical assistance to 
meet environmental obligations under the FTA, political party 
training and capacity building, and the Financial Services 
Volunteer Corps.  In 2007, MEPI funded the first-ever 
international observation of the Moroccan parliamentary 
 
 
elections.  Other USG-funded projects support anti-corruption 
efforts (with the American Bar Association) and prison reform 
to undermine the foundations of extremism. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson