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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS EC
SUBJECT: SLOW-ROLLING THE GOE REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-16S 
 
REF: QUITO 178 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons ...





id: 199357
date: 3/27/2009 19:48
refid: 09QUITO216
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO178
header:
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS MOPS EC
SUBJECT: SLOW-ROLLING THE GOE REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-16S 
 
REF: QUITO 178 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Ecuadorian Air Force (FAE) Commander 
signed an official memorandum on November 25, 2008 requesting 
a quote from the U.S. on the cost of purchasing 24 F-16 C/D 
Block 50 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) aircraft, with the intention 
of replacing its outdated fighter fleet.  Post delayed 
forwarding the request due to bilateral tensions and the 
expectation that the GOE would decide to direct its resources 
elsewhere; however, the FAE has continued to express an 
interest in a response.  Although the request is only for a 
quote at this time, initiating discussions on the sale of 
advanced fighter aircraft to Ecuador raises the question of 
how such a sale would meet USG policy goals and the potential 
for a negative reaction by other countries in the region. 
The sale of F-16s would help maintain a longer term 
U.S.-Ecuador military to military relationship, and keep 
Ecuador from making the purchase from Russia, France, or 
China.  However, Ecuador's historic instability, current 
leftist government, recent tensions with the U.S., and 
economic woes also raise the question of its ability to pay 
and the wisdom of the purchase, as well as its ultimate 
objectives.  The Embassy seeks guidance from Washington on 
whether providing a price quote, with the potential for a 
future sale, supports USG policy goals.  (End Summary) 
 
The GOE Makes Its Request 
 
¶2.  (C) The Embassy received an official memorandum dated 
November 25, 2008.  from the FAE requesting a price quote for 
the potential purchase of two squadrons of F-16 C/D Block 50 
MLU (24 total) aircraft.  Although Post thought the GOE might 
lose interest in the aircraft, subsequent verbal inquiries 
have confirmed that the FAE still wants the information.  In 
meetings with several FAE generals, we are told that the 
Ecuadorian military is looking to replace fully its current 
Israeli KFIR and French Mirage fleet, which are both over 30 
years old.  The FAE currently has 33 out-of-commission 
Mirages and KFIRs and three functional KFIRs.  Initial 
estimates of price are in excess of $800 million.  The 
request for a price quote would allow the FAE to include this 
information in its proposal for 2010 and subsequent budgets. 
 
Policy Concerns 
 
¶3.  (C) It is not clear whether U.S. policy will allow the 
transfer of associated weapons systems for use by F-16s in 
Ecuador.  F-16 Block 50 aircraft are capable of employing the 
US Air Force,s (USAF) most sophisticated and advanced 
weapons technology, such as Joint Direct Attack Munition 
GPS-guided bombs and laser guided munitions, as well as our 
most advanced air-to-air missiles.  Although it is extremely 
unlikely that the GOE would use the aircraft or technology 
against the U.S., Ecuador has a history of political 
instability which could present a concern for regional 
conflicts. 
 
¶4.  (C) Selling the F-16 to Ecuador, due to the high cost of 
the package and subsequent need for maintenance, would help 
in maintaining FAE-USAF ties for the next 30 years. 
Furthermore, if the U.S. does not sell the F-16 and if the 
GOE decides to move forward on the purchase of fighter 
aircraft, the GOE could engage Russia, France or China, who 
would have no issues in selling their aircraft.  The Embassy 
notes that it may be in the USG,s interest to strengthen the 
military relationship through sales in general, rather than 
having the GOE go elsewhere, but the significance of F-16s 
merits careful consideration.  Selling the F-16 also would 
enable the U.S. to control the weapons capability used on 
Ecuador's fighter aircraft. 
 
Regional Impact 
 
¶5.  (C) Ecuador,s regional neighbors may perceive Ecuador,s 
acquisition of the F-16s as a change in the regional balance 
of power.  Specifically, the history of conflict with Peru, 
plus the March 1 Colombian attack in Ecuador and Ecuador,s 
refusal to re-establish diplomatic relations with Colombia, 
could cause regional U.S. allies to question the sale. 
However, Peru has one of Russia,s most advanced fighters, 
the SU-27, in its inventory, and Colombia recently completed 
the acquisition of the most advanced Israeli KFIR. 
 
Where,s the Money? 
 
¶6.  (C) Reflecting reduced oil revenues, Defense Minister 
Javier Ponce announced on December 22 that the GOE will 
reduce military spending by updating existing equipment, 
setting a ceiling on military retirement pay, and selling off 
non-defense related companies currently owned by the 
military.  Yet, the GOE has already made several commitments 
for the acquisition of military equipment.  The GOE spent 
$631 million in almost two years ($463 million in 2008) to 
acquire a Legacy 600 presidential plane, 24 Brazilian Super 
Tucanos, seven Indian HAL Dhruv helicopters, jeeps, 14 boats, 
two Leander class frigates, and other equipment and 
munitions.  The GOE has also told Embassy officials of its 
strong interest in the purchase of two C-130Js at an 
estimated cost of $240 million.  The Ecuadorian military 
announced the potential purchase of radars from the Chinese 
government-owned Chinese Electronics Technology Corporation 
(CETC) for use in the northern border region, at a cost of 
$60 million (reftel).  With all these announced purchases of 
weapons, and with the global economic crisis and the price of 
Ecuadorian oil at approximately $48 per barrel, it is unclear 
whether the GOE would have sufficient funds to make the 
purchase of F-16s.  The priorities for the GOE during the 
economic downturn also raises the question of whether this 
money should be best spent elsewhere. 
 
¶7.  (C) High level Ecuadorian military officials have 
privately told Embassy officials that the Minister of Defense 
has instructed the Ecuadorian Joint Command to pursue any 
acquisitions of military equipment from China, Russia or 
Iran.  However, FAE leadership continues to stress the 
strategic benefits of purchasing the F-16s from the U.S. 
 
Comment 
 
¶8.  (C) The purchase of the Super Tucanos and C-130s makes 
more strategic sense for Ecuador in the patrol and protection 
of its borders.  The Embassy would like to avoid, however, 
having to deny Ecuador,s request for only a price quote, 
noting that an ultimate sale could take up to three years, 
and that a price quote represents no commitment to make a 
sale.  The Embassy will attempt to guide the Ecuadorian 
military in making strategic decisions on the purchase of 
military equipment.  Meanwhile, with the economic challenges 
faced by the GOE and already announced reductions of military 
spending, it is likely that the GOE will determine that 
pursuing the purchase of fighter aircraft is not in its own 
best interest at this time.  The Embassy requests guidance 
from Washington on whether providing a price quote, with the 
potential for a future sale, supports USG policy goals. 
 
HODGES 

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