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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177 
 
C O R R E C T E D    C O P Y  (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS 
UNYIELD...



id: 196401
date: 3/11/2009 23:43
refid: 09QUITO177
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08QUITO783|09QUITO103
header:
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RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177 
 
C O R R E C T E D    C O P Y  (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS 
UNYIELDING 
 
REF: A. 08 QUITO 783 
     ¶B. QUITO 103 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Correa government ramped up its 
rhetoric against Colombia in recent weeks, spurred by a 
desire to defend itself against accusations of 
narco-politics, the first anniversary of the March 2008 
Colombian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, and Colombian 
remarks.  The GOE was delighted by OAS SYG Insulza's 
statement that there was no basis for accusations of GOE ties 
with the FARC.  To reinforce that perception, the Correa 
administration agreed to an opposition proposal for an 
investigative commission.  End Summary. 
 
CONDITIONS FOR RESTORING TIES 
 
¶2.  (SBU) A January 23 MFA press release listed five 
conditions Colombia must meet before Ecuador would 
re-establish diplomatic relations, which were broken 
following the March 1, 2008, Colombian attack on a 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp near the 
town of Angostura in northern Ecuador: 
 
-- Ending the "information campaign" that charged the GOE 
with ties to the FARC, 
-- Committing to an effective military presence in the border 
area, 
-- Providing the information the GOE requested regarding the 
March 2008 attack, 
-- Proceeding with the handover of information from the 
computers found at the site of the attack, and 
-- Supporting UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
efforts to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador. 
 
¶3.  (C) These conditions are consistent with the GOE's past 
position.  President Correa had set forth three conditions, 
which effectively covered the first four above, when he met 
with OAS Secretary General Insulza on July 30, 2008 (Ref A). 
GOE officials have mentioned the demand for Colombian support 
of UNHCR on other occasions. 
 
¶4.  (C) The third condition above, the demand that Colombia 
provide information on the attack, is based on GOE suspicion 
of U.S. involvement.  Correa alluded to this when he 
discussed the conditions vis-a-vis Colombia in his February 
28 TV/radio address, "We do not know what planes dropped 
those bombs, which were North American bombs."  In a press 
interview published March 10, FM Fander Falconi was more 
explicit, saying that the reason for setting this condition 
was to establish whether there was involvement of a third 
country (read the U.S.).  He did not reject the idea that the 
GOE would have to break relations if a third country were 
involved, depending on the extent of the involvement. 
 
GOE RHETORIC SPIKES AGAIN 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The allegations over GOE officials' and former 
officials' ties to the FARC (Ref B), which some of the 
Ecuadorian media and opposition are referring to as 
narco-politics, prompted President Correa in mid-February to 
defend the GOE by casting dispersion on Colombia.  Implicitly 
recalling Colombian accusations last year that the GOE was 
linked to the FARC, Correa said those Ecuadorians who speak 
of narco-politics in Ecuador harmed the country and weakened 
its dignified position against the abuses of an aggressor 
neighbor country, where there was narco-politics. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) As the one-year anniversary of the attack in 
Angostura approached, President Correa emphasized the GOE 
conditions for re-establishing relations with Colombia.  In 
his February 28 TV/radio address, he said that Ecuador "wants 
to renew relations (with Colombia), but only on a foundation 
of dignity and respect."  Correa added one more condition: 
that Colombia pay compensation to the family of Ecuadorian 
Franklin Aisalla, who was killed in the attack. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GOE tone hardened further after Colombian 
Defense Minister Santos on March 1 defended attacks on 
terrorists in other countries as a legitimate act of 
self-defense, and a Colombian radio station reported that two 
FARC leaders lived in northern Ecuador.  During a March 2 
 
press conference with three cabinet ministers defending the 
GOE position, Coordinating Minister for Internal and External 
Security Miguel Carvajal condemned Santos' comment and blamed 
problems between the two countries on the GOC's reliance on 
"the Bush doctrine."  Also on March 2, Correa reportedly 
stated that if Colombia continued with the policies voiced by 
its defense minister, that this time it would find Ecuador 
prepared; he told Colombia not to mess with Ecuador, saying 
the GOC should start in its own country if it wanted to 
pursue and attack terrorists.  The MFA sent a diplomatic note 
to the OAS March 3 asking that Insulza express to the GOC the 
necessity of providing Ecuador precise information about the 
location of the FARC high command members allegedly enjoying 
safe haven in Ecuador.  (Note:  Reportedly without the 
benefit of specific Colombian information, the Ecuadorian 
National Police on March 11 announced a major success, the 
detention of FARC leader Sixto Cabanas, alias Domingo Biojo, 
in Esmeraldas province.  End Note.)  The GOE seemed somewhat 
mollified by the fact that President Uribe did not back 
Santos' statements, with Carvajal calling Uribe's move a 
positive gesture. 
 
ECUADOR PLAYS UP INSULZA STATEMENT 
 
¶8.  (C) Meeting separately on February 26 with President 
Correa and FM Falconi, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel 
Insulza sought to find a way to maintain a channel of 
dialogue between the GOE and GOC, but apparently made no 
progress.  During an event the evening of February 27 with 
OAS ambassadors, Insulza called the mediation effort 
complicated, noted that the "cartilla de seguridad" 
(guidelines for cooperation between the two militaries) was 
still functioning at certain levels, and suggested a bigger 
power (apparently referring to the U.S.) bring the GOE and 
GOC together.  He told the Ambassador privately that he 
judged the two countries could get past some of the GOE's 
conditions, but not others, and that the GOE still insisted 
that the bombs used last March had to have come from another 
country (meaning the U.S.). 
 
¶9.  (C) Insulza appeared to side with the GOE earlier on 
February 27 at a press conference during a visit to 
Esmeraldas province in northern Ecuador, accompanied by FM 
Falconi and Minister Carvajal.  According to MFA press 
statements, Insulza told the press he did not believe the GOE 
was, or had been, linked to an irregular armed group, be it 
the FARC or any other, and that everything that had happened 
since the March 2008 attack had only served to confirm that 
conclusion.  The MFA press statements quote Insulza as 
stating, "This is a subject that should not be in discussion. 
 Unfortunately, I see in this country those who still put 
this in doubt, but I believe it is an error.  President 
Correa has given clear signs of his attitude and point of 
view with respect to the FARC and all of this type of 
subversive organization."  According to the MFA, Insulza also 
credited Ecuador with making a very significant security 
effort in its northern border area.  During the trip to the 
border, Insulza received a military briefing, met with a 
group of refugees, and overflew the region in a helicopter. 
 
¶10.  (C) The GOE sought to highlight the refuge it provided 
Colombian refugees during the February 19-20 visit of U.N. 
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Craig Johnstone, who 
met with the GOE and traveled to the northern border region. 
According to an MFA press bulletin, Johnstone announced that 
UNHCR would provide $22 million in assistance in 2009 for relief 
programs for Colombian refugees in Ecuador. (Note: This appears 
to be an MFA error, since the UNHCR Ecuador budget is significantly 
less.  We have asked UNHCR to clarify funding levels for the MFA. 
End Note.) Johnstone also noted that between 2000 and 2008, Ecuador 
received over 56,000 requests for refugee status, 
primarily from Colombians, of which 20,956 have been approved. 
Johnstone expressed appreciation for USG contributions during 
 a February 19 meeting with the Ambassador. 
 
NEW INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION AND NEW CONTROLS 
 
¶11.  (C) In an effort to reduce further its political 
vulnerability in light of the alleged narco-political 
scandal, the GOE has agreed to form a new investigative 
commission.  The idea was proposed by Cesar Montufar of the 
opposition National Democratic Agreement movement, who 
recommended formation of an independent commission of 
nonpartisan citizens who would investigate the March 2008 
Colombian attack and alleged ties of government officials and 
former government officials to illegal armed groups. 
 
Candidates are to be presented by universities, the media, 
the Roman Catholic Church, indigenous organization, retired 
military, etc.  President Correa will then appoint the 
citizens commission from among these candidates. 
 
¶12.  (C) Meanwhile, the GOE has announced steps to reinforce 
security in the northern border area.  Minister Carvajal said 
March 6 that carrying arms in the five northern provinces 
would be forbidden until new licenses were issued, with 
tougher criteria to qualify.  In addition, fifteen new 
security posts (five military and ten police) are to be 
established, and the number of military in the region 
increased significantly.  The worst security situation, 
according to Carvajal, is in Esmeraldas province.  In making 
this announcement, Carvajal blamed the region's security 
problems on individuals linked to Colombian paramilitary 
groups and criminal gangs, not the FARC.  (Comment:  The GOE 
likely lacks the resources to carry out the plan Carvajal 
announced.  End Comment.) 
 
¶13.  (C) Some Ecuadorians, even those on the left, have urged 
a change in policy toward Colombia.  One is former FM 
Francisco Carrion, who supported the GOE position on Colombia 
violating its sovereignty, but now calls for direct dialogue 
between the two governments.  Another is Socialist Party 
member and Andean Simon Bolivar University professor Enrique 
Ayala Mora, who argues that the break in relations has been 
prolonged too long and that it threatens to irreversibly ruin 
relations with a neighbor and historical partner in the 
Andean Community.  But these voices are few and easily 
ignored by the GOE. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶14.  (C) The animosity President Correa and his ministers 
exhibit toward Colombia underlines how intractable this 
diplomatic conflict remains.  The renewed allegations of FARC 
ties to the Correa government are adding more fuel to the 
fire.  We doubt that the Correa government will make any 
effort to achieve reconciliation while it is campaigning for 
the April 26 election, and see appointment of the 
investigative commission as only another attempt to convince 
voters that the GOE is not hiding anything.  Given that the 
two governments have largely isolated trade (which continues 
unimpeded) from other problems, Correa appears to believe he 
has more to gain by drawing out the dispute than seeking a 
meaningful resolution. 
 
HODGES 

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