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DE RUEHQT #0160/01 0641619
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FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0140
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8020
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4098
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3442
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3086
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RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL SNAR EINV PGOV ETRD KJUS EC IR
SUBJECT: ECUADOR'S NEW VISION FOR RELATIONS WITH U.S. 
 
REF: QUITO 122 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hea...

id: 195473
date: 3/5/2009 16:19
refid: 09QUITO160
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09QUITO122
header:
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0160/01 0641619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051619Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0140
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8020
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4098
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3442
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3086
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4166
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 2271
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC


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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL SNAR EINV PGOV ETRD KJUS EC IR
SUBJECT: ECUADOR'S NEW VISION FOR RELATIONS WITH U.S. 
 
REF: QUITO 122 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather Hodges for reason 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a March 4 meeting, MFA U/S Orbe, 
speaking on instructions from FM Falconi, set the stage for 
Ecuador's vision for future relations with the U.S.  He then 
called for a meeting between President Obama and President 
Correa to set a strategic agenda for future cooperation on 
the basis of mutual interests.  The Ambassador reminded him 
of the harm that GOE expulsions of Embassy personnel had done 
to the relationship, and protested Minister Carvajal's 
continuing public rhetoric against one of the expelled 
officials.  She informed Orbe about problems with continuing 
cooperation in several areas and suggested we move ahead on 
planning the Manta FOL's withdrawal and future 
counternarcotics cooperation under the gas-and-go model as 
next steps in the relationship.  Other MFA officials raised 
the Bilateral Dialogue and a planned protest note on the 
Serrano case.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ambassador met with MFA Under Secretary for 
Bilateral Affairs Jorge Orbe on March 4 at his request.  The 
new North American Affairs Director General Juan Salazar, 
Advisor to the Foreign Minister Marco Albuja, and PolCouns 
also joined the meeting. 
 
MFA REACHING OUT IN ITS OWN WAY 
 
¶3.  (C) In a wide-ranging introduction to the purpose of the 
meeting, U/S Orbe sought to establish the parameters for 
future bilateral cooperation by highlighting what he called 
profound changes in Ecuador under President Correa and the 
new constitution.  He said the Correa administration found 
weak government institutions when it came into office, so it 
was strengthening the regulatory, planning and control 
functions.  Orbe stressed that investment must now give 
priority to development of microenterprises and small and 
medium companies, rather than to large ones.  In that 
context, he said the GOE provided investment guarantees and 
recognized the private sector's role; it wished to control 
only strategic economic sectors and would not repeat the 
errors of the past in its "21st Century Socialism."  Orbe 
said that to counter crime and narcotics trafficking, the GOE 
focused not only on security measures, but also addressing 
the public health impact and border region underdevelopment. 
 
¶4.  (C) Orbe described Ecuadorian foreign policy as seeking 
good relations with all countries, particularly those in 
Latin America, but also with developed countries.  He 
stressed that ties (including those with the U.S.) must be 
developed on the basis of shared interests in strengthening 
democracy, promoting development, increasing employment, 
reducing inequality, treating migrants humanely, controlling 
narcotics trafficking, and fighting trafficking in persons. 
Orbe cited the will of the Ecuadorian people who voted 
against pro-FTA candidates, saying that commercial agreements 
must be concluded on new terms.  In an aside on Iran, he 
claimed that the GOE did not support Iran's nuclear 
initiatives. 
 
¶5.  (C) Orbe then proposed to the Ambassador that the two 
governments agree on a strategic agenda for wide-ranging 
bilateral cooperation and a political dialogue.  He suggested 
that the point of departure for improved relations with the 
U.S. should be a meeting between our presidents.  He noted 
the efforts of the Ecuadorian Ambassador in Washington to 
secure a meeting for FM Falconi with the Secretary and one 
between POTUS and Correa, "if not at the Summit (of the 
Americas), then before or after."  Orbe believed such a 
dialogue would allow us to reconstruct and revitalize our 
relationship on new terms. 
 
AMBASSADOR LAYS OUT CONTINUING PROBLEMS 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador responded by recalling our long 
history of good bilateral relations, despite occasional 
moments of friction, and our many current areas of 
cooperation.  She highlighted the Bilateral Dialogue, which 
finally kicked off with the participation of various agencies 
in November 2008, after GOE delay in responding to our 
proposal.  The Ambassador then made clear that events of the 
last month (reftel) had harmed the perception of Ecuador in 
the U.S., to an even greater extent than Correa's anti-U.S. 
rhetoric in the preceding months had.  She emphasized that 
the absence to date of any U.S. reprisal for GOE actions did 
not mean there would not be one if Washington so decided. 
The Ambassador stated that she was not sure that Coordinating 
Minister for Internal and External Security Miguel Carvajal 
understood what the U.S. needed to continue supporting 
specialized police units.  She protested Carvajal's public 
comments on March 3, again calling one of the expelled 
Embassy officers the CIA Chief of Station and alleging that 
he held the same role in other countries. 
 
¶7.  (C) Orbe rolled his eyes, saying he and Falconi had 
spoken with Carvajal to remind him that only the President 
and Foreign Minister should speak on foreign policy matters. 
He argued that declaring an innocent Ecuadorian diplomat in 
Washington persona non grata would be unfair.  He also 
continued to maintain that Ecuador was justified in its 
actions.  The Ambassador swiftly retorted that expelling the 
U.S. Embassy officers was unjustifiable and that PNGing 
another diplomat in response was diplomatic practice, and 
therefore one option Washington was considering. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador lamented the consequences of the GOE's 
actions.  She pointed out that Ecuadorian police at the 
moment are reluctant to exchange information with the Drug 
Enforcement Administration and that the U.S. Southern Command 
was no longer allowed to put its logo on projects it funds. 
Orbe acknowledged that government officials at the working 
level were afraid to cooperate with the U.S., but insisted 
they should not be.  On the logo issue, he had no specific 
response, but noted that in his previous position at the 
National Planning Secretariat, he had difficulties with USAID 
not adhering to the Paris Declaration on development 
assistance.  The problem had only been cleared up to the 
extent that USAID had said it could not conform and that U.S. 
aid has proceeded. 
 
OUR CALL FOR SMALL STEPS FORWARD 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador emphasized that meetings with POTUS 
were generally preceded by preparations at the working level, 
and that we might need to start with small steps rather than 
at the top.  She suggested that securing the meetings Orbe 
sought would be difficult, but assured Orbe she would report 
his requests to Washington. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador asked if Orbe had any concrete ideas 
for bilateral cooperation.  He reiterated the GOE's desire 
for a presidential-level meeting.  The Ambassador then 
suggested we should move forward in discussions with the MFA 
on counter-narcotics cooperation under a gas-and-go model 
once the Manta Forward Operating Location (FOL) closes.  She 
also informed Orbe that the Embassy would be meeting again 
with the Defense Ministry to plan the FOL withdrawal.  When 
DG Salazar raised the working groups to prepare for a next 
Bilateral Dialogue meeting, the Ambassador expressed a 
willingness to move forward. 
 
SERRANO PROTEST 
 
¶11.  (C) Advisor Albuja then informed the Ambassador that the 
MFA would be sending an official note of protest in the case 
of Nelson Serrano, an Ecuadorian-American found guilty of 
murder and imprisoned in Florida.  The subject of protest was 
the role of U.S. officials in securing the deportation of 
Serrano from Ecuador, which Albuja called contrary to the 
Ecuadorian constitution.  The note would include a request 
for Serrano's return to Ecuador.  He said the note would be 
sent to fulfill the requirements of the Inter-American Court, 
which had considered the case.  Albuja said the GOE was 
hoping to make a financial settlement with the family.  The 
Ambassador noted that the U.S. was unlikely to extradite 
Serrano.  All nodded as if they fully understood.  The 
Ambassador thanked Albuja for informing her in advance about 
the note. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶12.  (C) We are struck by the MFA's lack of understanding of, 
or refusal to acknowledge, the depth of damage to the 
bilateral relationship caused by expelling our employees, 
based on trumped up sensitivities.  Virtually simultaneous to 
our meeting with U/S Orbe, Foreign Minister Falconi was 
giving a press conference on the U.S.-Ecuador relationship, 
calling for a "solid and stable" relationship based on mutual 
cooperation and respect, blaming the U.S. for unacceptable 
interference, and expressing hope that things would "not get 
more complicated."  Falconi's comments, while his underlings 
were giving us their Alice-in-Wonderland version of the 
future bilateral relationship, is a continuation of the GOE's 
refusal to engage in real dialogue.  The Correa game plan 
continues to be publicly scoring domestic political points, 
while "making nice" with us in private. 
 
HODGES 

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