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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 000631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SA
SUBJECT: SAG'S FOREIGN POLICY: TRADING PRINCIPLES FOR POWER? 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  In a March 25 forum assessing South Africa's foreign 
policy from the standpoint of global human rights, prominent 
political commentator Professor Adam Habib acknowledged that 
the SAG's stances in multilateral fora often disappointed 
local and international rights advocates.  The underlying 
cause, he asserted, was the ANC's overriding concern for 
promoting a more equitable balance of world power -- to the 
point of a willingness to trade off real-time human rights 
concerns (e.g. in Myanmar, Sudan, or Zimbabwe) for structural 
reform in global institutions like the U.N.  Habib 
characterized the SAG's agenda as a 'realist' strategy, of 
the developing South taking on the developed North for a 
greater share of power even ahead of rights, a strategy that 
was misunderstood by the rights community and admittedly 
often ineffective.  A visiting officer from Human Rights 
Watch ruefully described South African foreign policy as 
"naive, self-defeating, and ultimately unhelpful to victims." 
 End Summary. 
 
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Context: SA's Controversial Stances 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  On March 25, the South African Institute for 
International Affairs (SAIIA) held a forum questioning the 
country's fidelity to global human rights in its formulation 
of foreign policy.  Entitled "South Africa's Foreign 
Engagement: Whither Human Rights?" the program hosted 
speakers who critiqued South Africa's key votes in the U.N. 
Security Council (UNSC) 2006-8 such as on Myanmar and Iran, 
former President Mbeki's long-running mediation of the 
political crisis in Zimbabwe, and other positions taken 
within the African Union (AU) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), such as nuanced defense of 
Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir and the call for sanctions 
against the new regime in Madagascar.  As if calculated to 
reinforce the theme, on the day of the event the SAG was 
facing real-time howls of protest in the press against its 
denial of a visa to the Dalai Lama, allegedly under Chinese 
pressure. 
 
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Great Expectations, Not Met 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  Prominent policy analyst Professor Adam Habib led off the 
forum by citing the world's high hopes, later dashed, for the 
newly democratic South Africa as a vigorous voice of 
conscience.  For the human rights community, the SAG's seat 
on the UNSC was "the ultimate culmination of the liberation 
struggle."  There was anticipation that South Africa would be 
"the great advocate."  Two years later, however, rights NGOs 
feel betrayed, after the SAG has consistently "sided with 
autocrats."  (From the audience, the Danish Ambassador echoed 
this disappointment, saying Nordic nations were surprised not 
to see the SAG act as a middle power, bridging North and 
South.  "We wanted to build alliances with South Africa, but 
the preference was for G-77, at any cost, always.")  Some 
commentators, noted Habib, believe the SAG is driven by 
appeasement of Russia and China, past allies in its fight for 
freedom.  The SAG counters that it acts to oppose 
manipulation of multilateral fora by the Western powers. 
Habib proceeded to explore that claim as pivotal to 
explaining the SAG's policymaking, which has so frustrated 
the human rights community. 
 
Q 
----------------------------------------- 
Power Re-balancing Trumps Rights Concerns 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Habib explained that while human rights are a core 
element of SAG policy, they compete with a stronger impulse 
to redress structural imbalances of power between developing 
countries and the G-8.  To grasp the SAG's agenda, stressed 
Habib, rights advocates must (but seldom do) understand the 
historically-rooted motivations of the ruling ANC party. 
While the ANC is indeed aligned with the pro-rights, 
anti-colonialist thrust of the first generation of liberation 
leaders, it "has also observed the unraveling of nationalist 
 
PRETORIA 00000631  002 OF 003 
 
 
experiments in Africa -- due to the machinations of the big 
powers," creating an overriding focus on global power 
dynamics.  In Habib's view, Mbeki attempted to balance the 
two impulses in a form of 'principled pragmatism,' neither 
kow-towing nor openly antagonizing the West but seeking a 
middle road of reform through engagement.  "The goal is a 
more equal world order -- but subverted from within," said 
Habib.  Such a "realist" strategy, of the developing South 
taking on the developed North for power even more than for 
rights, is one that inevitably fuels resentment among rights 
advocates. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SAG: Pro-Africa, Pro-South; UN "Brinkmanship" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  Habib outlined how the ANC's 'realist' drive to level the 
world's playing field manifests itself in initiatives on 
multiple levels -- within Africa, in developing countries' 
fora, and on the broad U.N. stage.  Stabilization of Africa 
through conflict mediation and military peace-keeping was 
high on Mbeki's agenda, along with regional governance 
architectures (e.g. AU, NEPAD, SADC, etc.) and investment 
incentives, all "to put Africa on the map" of world 
institutions.  At the next tier, the SAG is a strong 
proponent of "South-South collaboration" such as via the 
non-aligned movement (NAM), in the area of nuclear 
nonproliferation, and on issues like Iran and Palestine. 
South Africa conceived the India-Brazil-South-Africa (IBSA) 
bloc that served as a kernel of the G-20, which in turn 
marshalled the collective strength of smaller nations to 
bring world trade talks to a standstill.  Finally, at the 
global multilateral level, the SAG pursues a "brinkmanship" 
strategy in the U.N., targeting causes which are dear to the 
big powers and obstructively using those as wedges to accrue 
bargaining power for the South. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
SA Agenda: Explicable, but Often Counterproductive 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  In response to audience attacks on SAG policy as 
reprehensible and "inexplicable," Habib was at pains to 
emphasize that he was explaining the ANC's approach but not 
defending it wholly.  The Dalai Lama refusal was "outrageous, 
and of course, stupid -- and it created exactly the kind of 
controversy the government wanted to avoid."  The SAG's 'no' 
vote on Myanmar sanctions was ostensibly an objection to the 
resolution's being tabled in the UNSC, an arena the SAG feels 
is prone to manipulation by the lead powers -- but instead of 
only blocking it, South Africa could have led the charge to 
introduce the measure in the U.N. Human Rights Council.  In 
effect, the SAG "was wrong to trade Burmese civil liberties 
for the sake of systemic reform."  Brinkmanship to rebalance 
power had worked to constructive effect in trade talks, 
however, and with respect to Al Bashir it was defensible: "Is 
Bashir a thug? Yes! But do we temper justice to advance 
peace? Yes! South Africa is perhaps the prime example of 
that." 
 
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Power vs. Rights -- an "Artificial Divide" 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  Summing up, Habib said he was equally critical of the 
SAG's policies and the human rights community's "simplistic" 
advocacy, which between them had created an artificial divide 
Qadvocacy, which between them had created an artificial divide 
between nationalism and liberalism, or between structural 
issues of global power and fundamental civil liberties.  "The 
human rights community ignores the systemic angle... (It) 
doesn't understand equity or power.  We need an equal playing 
field through U.N. reforms and resources."  The ICC was 
important, indeed, to encourage accountability over and above 
the mechanisms of the nation state, but it was even more 
crucial that justice apply equally to all.  Bashir must be 
brought before the ICC, said Habib, but only if George W. 
Bush and Condaleeza Rice were included as well. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
HRW: SAG Policy is Naive and Unhelpful 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Human Rights Watch (HRW) officer Jon Philip countered 
Habib's presentation with the consensus view of rights NGOs, 
 
PRETORIA 00000631  003 OF 003 
 
 
that SAG policy was misguided in intent and harmful in its 
effect of projecting mixed messages.  "We see naivete in 
South Africa's foreign policy," he said, "in this notion that 
by reforming international institutions they will somehow 
advance the human cause."  Systemic reform was a long-term 
goal, and a hopeful ideal, whereas human rights abuses were 
occurring real-time to real people.  The SAG was laden with 
baggage from its apartheid past, when it should be more 
progessive and forward-looking.  SAG policymakers were unduly 
suspicious of rights groups, "as if we were somehow 
co-sponsors of the abuses of the West."  Soft on Sudan and 
Zimbabwe, but tough on Madagascar, the AU risked looking 
hypocritical and biased in the world's eyes.  In sum, to HRW, 
South Africa's approach to foreign policy was "naive, 
self-defeating, and ultimately unhelpful to victims." 
 
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