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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSA #0553/01 0831118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241118Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7793
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1283
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 5451
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3821
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 2314
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 6053

UNCLAS PRETORIA 000553 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SF
SUBJECT: STUDY FINDS XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS DRIVEN BY LOCAL 
POWER POLITICS 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  On March 11, a Wits University team unveiled the results 
of their research into the direct triggers of last year's 
xenophobic attacks in South African townships.  Interviews 
and focus groups with over 300 residents of seven areas found 
the attacks were premeditated and organized by community 
leaders for their own political and economic gains.  Police 
and other neighbors were largely passive during the attacks, 
either out of sympathy with the vigilantes, or out of fear of 
challenging them.  Nine months later, the SAG has undertaken 
no substantive initiatives for reintegration of displaced 
foreigners, nor put in place any measures to prevent the 
recurrence of violence, nor put a single perpetrator on 
trial.  In the current election season, there is little 
political will to champion migrants' rights.  End Summary. 
 
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CONTEXT: Broad Social Drivers of Xenophobia 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  Waves of xenophobic attacks against foreign migrants and 
ethnic minorities in May-June 2008, causing 62 deaths and the 
displacement of tens of thousands, shocked South Africa and 
belied its inclusive 'rainbow nation' ethos.  Analysts 
generally attributed the attacks to broad economic and social 
ills -- such as poverty, extreme economic inequality, 
unemployment, and inadequate delivery of public services 
(e.g. housing, utilities, health care), creating competition 
for jobs and resources in squatter settlements.  Foreigners 
were further blamed for the spread of crime and drugs. 
Apartheid's legacies of intolerance of alien groups, of 
distrust of police and formal authority structures, and of 
vigilante violence all were considered to have fed impulses 
to eject non-nationals by means of mob action. 
 
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STUDY: Direct Local Triggers of Violence 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  On March 11, Wits University's Forced Migration Studies 
Programme (FMSP; http://migration.org.za) unveiled its 
research into the xenophobic attacks, the first to delve 
beneath macro social factors to the direct localized triggers 
of violence.  The research was underwritten by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), in turn 
funded by the UK's Department for International Development 
(DFID).  While agreeing with the broad-brush explanations, 
Wits' lead researcher Jean Pierre Misago said the study 
asked: if xenophobic sentiments and tensions were pervasive 
in South Africa, why did violence occur only in selected 
areas?  To find the answer, researchers surveyed 305 persons 
(218 in one-on-one interviews, 87 in 10 focus groups) in 
seven areas of Gauteng and Western Cape provinces -- five 
areas that experienced violence, and two areas that did not. 
Respondents spanned local residents, community leaders, 
police, NGOs, foreigners targeted in attacks, and even 
perpetrators of the violence. 
 
----------------------------------- 
FINDING: Leaders Gained from Purges 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Wits' MSRP team found the attacks were premeditated, not 
spontaneous, and organized by township leaders for their own 
political and economic gains.  These leaders were both formal 
and informal authorities -- such as ward councilors, ANC 
party "comrades," members of "street committees," and 
neighborhood-watch Community Policing Forums (CPFs).  Some 
were directly involved in organizing attacks, as a way of 
Qwere directly involved in organizing attacks, as a way of 
winning the support of residents and consolidating their 
control of contested neighborhoods.  Such power, in turn, 
commonly conferred illicit economic rents and rackets, such 
as under-table fees for access to government housing, 
'protection' fees, or other bribes.  Some local authorities 
participated in illegal practices such as limiting the number 
of foreign-owned businesses.  In other cases, authorities 
indirectly enabled violence by being detached and passive, 
failing to exert authority in areas of weak control.  In such 
areas, vigilantism filled a leadership vacuum, usurping 
elected leaders. 
 
¶5.  Alexandra township, where attacks first erupted, provides 
a succinct case study of how local leaders were pivotal in 
opting for or against violence.  Sector Two in 'Alex' was one 
of the areas worst affected by xenophobic attacks, whereas 
its Sector Five was spared altogether.  The Wits team learned 
that Sector Two ringleaders in fact traveled to Sector Five 
to carry forward the attacks.  Sector Five leaders, however, 
were wary that the Zulu visitors might turn on them as 
non-Zulu ethnic minorities after they had jointly purged the 
non-nationals.  Instead of allying with Sector Two in 
violence, Sector Five instead negotiated to persuade 
foreigners to leave by peaceable means, thereby arresting the 
spread of violence. 
 
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Police and Residents Stood By 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  Police and other residents were largely passive during 
the attacks.  In some cases they were sympathetic with the 
vigilante mobs, in other cases too outnumbered, intimidated, 
or fearful to intervene.  The identities of perpetrators -- 
both men and women -- were an open secret in the townships. 
Misago said his team was able to list them within a few days 
in each new area, and they unabashedly participated in 
interviews.  Police were aware of xenophobic planning 
meetings in Alex hostels.  Although police later claimed they 
were helpless to stop the violence, Misago said attackers 
claimed "they were with us all the way."  Media images 
encouraged the spread of attacks, as police and local leaders 
were shown to be passive. 
 
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SAG: Still No Real Action 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  Looking ahead, the Wits team notes that the SAG has 
undertaken no substantive initiatives for reintegration of 
displaced foreigners, nor put in place any measures to 
prevent the recurrence of violence.  Indeed, the SAG's 
blanket encouragement to foreigners to return to their former 
homes could reignite violence where local leaders were 
complicit in attacks or where neighbors have already 
appropriated foreigners' property.  Above all, Misago 
lamented that police and government officials publicly 
describe their responses as effective, in (eventually) 
quelling violence (albeit helped by President Mbeki's 
emergency deployment of the army after two weeks of turmoil). 
 Government arrested over 1,000 accused perpetrators and 
established specialized courts, but not a single case has 
gone to trial. 
 
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COMMENT: No Political Will for Change 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  The Wits draft report offers a host of constructive 
recommendations to avert future xenophobia -- e.g. creation 
of a commission of inquiry to formulate interventions, 
effective migration management systems, positive leadership 
models, and early warning systems.  IOM's regional 
representative Hans-Petter Boe noted that impunity for 
criminals must end, and children must receive civic education 
in tolerating differences.  Despite much well-intentioned 
guidance from civil society and international community 
organizations, however, the SAG is unlikely to act.  In 
townships where removal of foreigners was seen as a method of 
currying residents' favor, there is little political will in 
the current election season to champion migrants' rights. 
 
LA LIME