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DE RUEHPU #0245/01 0631743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041743Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1804
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9695
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 2237
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 0325
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1979
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS PORT AU PRINCE 000245 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USUN FOR AMBASSADOR RICE 
DEPT FOR WHA/FO AND WHA/CAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC HA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICE'S MARCH 11-14 
VISIT TO HAITI 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Your visit comes as democratic 
consolidation and economic progress have stalled, as the 
Haitian President and his new Prime Minister face difficult 
challenges in the aftermath of the April 2008 food riots and 
a devastating 2008 hurricane season.  Although President 
Preval allocated nearly USD 200 million to disaster relief 
late last year and international donors have stepped up their 
assistance, relief efforts have only partially alleviated the 
dramatic damage to Haiti's infrastructure and its 
agricultural sector.  The security situation has improved 
significantly since the presidential and legislative 
elections in 2006, thanks in large part to MINUSTAH's 
clampdown on gangs and improved capability and initiative by 
the Haitian National Police.  Haiti's electoral authority is 
preparing long-overdue partial Senate elections, from which 
it has disqualified on flimsy grounds all candidates of the 
party of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  Neither 
President Preval nor the electoral council have been swayed 
by U.S., Canadian, MINUSTAH and OAS arguments that the April 
elections should be more inclusive.  Preval is trying to 
generate consensus to reform the constitution, but this 
initiative remains controversial.  Your visit will allow the 
Security Council to show strong support for MINUSTAH and its 
vital stabilization role.  You should encourage President 
Preval to utilize the security gains provided by MINUSTAH to 
consolidate the rule of law and democratic institutions, 
build Haiti's capacity to provide for its own security, 
implement an economic recovery and development plan, and take 
advantage of trade preferences with the U.S. provided by HOPE 
2 legislation.  End summary. 
 
MODEST PROGRESS INTERRUPTED BY RIOTS, FLOODS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest and most 
politically troubled country.  After the collapse of the 
Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has experienced a 
succession of military governments, a popularly elected 
president overthrown by a military coup and then returned to 
power by U.S. military intervention, and successive elected 
regimes that have used violence against opponents and failed 
to hold constitutionally mandated elections.  All these 
factors have exacerbated political instability and economic 
stagnation.   Although the two years following the departure 
of then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 were marked 
by political violence, the government that resulted from the 
presidential and legislative elections of 2006 gave Haiti a 
new chance to consolidate political stability and stimulate 
investment and economic growth.  However, food and energy 
inflation leading to the rioting in April 2008 brought 
political progress to a halt.  While there was genuine social 
grievance behind the April protests, much of the associated 
violence was organized by political forces seeking to oust 
then-PM Jacques-Edouard Alexis and capitalize on the 
resulting instability. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Senate voted to dismiss PM Alexis on April 12. 
In the five months following his dismissal, the Haitian 
government was paralyzed by political gridlock.  Parliament 
rejected two Prime Ministerial candidates on specious 
grounds, in no small part because President Preval refused to 
bargain with parties and parliamentarians seeking lucrative 
positions in government.  Preval finally lobbied hard for his 
third nominee, Michele Pierre-Louis, and made promises of 
party representation in the cabinet and in ministries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In the midst of political turmoil, a series of 
hurricanes and floods in August and September dealt the 
economy a heavy blow.  The flooding killed almost 800 people, 
left hundreds of thousands without their homes or 
livelihoods, crippled the country's transportation 
infrastructure, and devastated livestock and crops. 
According to estimates, the storms caused at least USD 800 
million in damage.  In the face of strong public pressure to 
confirm a government able to respond to the hurricane damage, 
Parliament confirmed Pierre-Louis on September 5.  You and 
your Security Council colleagues should urge the Government 
of Haiti to continue to consolidate political stability by 
seeking a better working relationship between the Executive 
and Legislature, and by continuing to work with donors to 
strengthen key institutions, especially the judiciary. 
 
 
ECONOMY STAGNATING 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The two decades of political instability following 
the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship caused economic 
regression and stagnation to the point that Haitian GDP per 
capita, today around USD 700 per year, is barely higher than 
it was in the late 1950s.  More than 80 percent of the 
population lives below the poverty level, and at least 60 
percent of the population is unemployed or underemployed. 
The Preval government has focused primarily on security but 
largely failed to implement policies to facilitate foreign 
and domestic investment and create jobs.  Current perceptions 
of security levels, inadequate infrastructure, and an 
inhospitable business climate deter investment in Haiti 
today.   The August storms caused almost USD 1 billion in 
damage and reduced the 2008 growth rate to 1.3 percent, below 
the 2.5 percent population growth rate.  Projected growth for 
2009 is barely 2 percent.  You should urge the President and 
the Government to implement business- and investment-friendly 
policies that will create jobs.  The GOH should also help 
Haitian and foreign investors take maximum advantage of trade 
opportunities with the U.S. created by the second installment 
of the Haiti Opportunity Through Partnership Encouragement 
Act (HOPE 2). 
 
MINUSTAH: CRUCIAL GUARANTOR OF HAITI'S SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (SBU) MINUSTAH is the product of unprecedented hemispheric 
security cooperation among regional partners of the U.S. 
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru 
contribute over half of MINUSTAH's 7,000 troops.  MINUSTAH is 
thus a strong security plus for the U.S.   Some Latin 
countries have been sympathetic to Haitian President Preval's 
repeated request to replace a portion of MINUSTAH troops with 
military engineers who would improve infrastructure and aid 
Haiti's development.  During last year's mandate renewal 
debate, Preval requested a transfer of MINUSTAH's mandate 
from Chapter VII to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, claiming 
that a Chapter VII peacekeeping forces scare off foreign 
investors.  For now, the Latins have held firm that their 
troops need Chapter VII rules of engagement to remain an 
effective security deterrent.  But the Latins are more 
reluctant to exert political pressure on the Government of 
Haiti, as in the current issue of allowing broad 
participation in Senate elections (para. 11), out of fear of 
being perceived domestically as interfering in Haiti's 
internal affairs. 
 
¶7. (SBU) While President Preval sometimes says that he hopes 
MINUSTAH will be able to leave by the end of his term in 
early 2011, the presence of MINUSTAH's peacekeeping troops 
and formed police units remains critical to maintaining the 
minimal security Haiti needs to move forward.  Under the 
leadership of SRSG Hedi Annabi and Force Commander Major 
General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, over 7,000 MINUSTAH 
troops and 2,000 police have worked closely with the Haitian 
National Police (HNP) to maintain order.  MINUSTAH fills the 
gap left by inadequate force levels and capabilities of the 
HNP.   MINUSTAH troops continue to provide security in areas 
such as the Cite Soleil slum, liberated from overt gang rule 
in early 2007.  They are also the country's ultimate riot 
control force, which in times of unrest protects strategic 
government installations, including the National Palace and 
the airport.  In MINUSTAH's UN police operations pillar, 
Formed Police Units (FPU - gendarmerie-type police units from 
individual contributor countries) aid the HNP with security 
operations and performing riot control, such as during the 
April 2008 disturbances.  UN Police (UNPOL) advisors from 
various countries, including the United States, provide 
support to HNP operations.  The UNPOL development pillar 
works with the HNP to develop its capabilities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A premature drawdown or withdrawal of MINUSTAH 
security forces could undermine the stability we have worked 
so hard to maintain, and promote the resurgence of gang 
violence, kidnappings, political violence (including the 
renewed use of gangs for political warfare), and drug 
trafficking.  Such an environment could be more than Haiti's 
 
weak political and security institutions can cope with.  It 
could encourage large numbers of Haitians again to take to 
boats or otherwise migrate abroad. 
 
¶9. (SBU) MINUSTAH is already thinking of a drawdown strategy 
linked to the buildup of Haitian National Police force 
levels.  MINUSTAH has defined the year 2011 target of 14,000 
HNP officers as sufficient to allow drawdown or withdrawal of 
MINUSTAH's security forces.  You should express strong 
support for MINUSTAH's continuing security role in Haiti 
until Haitian police are prepared to assume full 
responsibility, at least until 2011-2012.  You should 
emphasize that MINUSTAH's core role remains stability and 
security, and that it needs the strong mandate provided by 
coverage under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
 
LONG-DELAYED ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (SBU) Amidst the country's rebuilding efforts, Haitian 
authorities are preparing to hold elections for the 12 vacant 
seats in the 30-member Senate, a void that has made it 
difficult for that body to muster a quorum.  The elections 
were to have taken place in November 2007, but President 
Preval insisted the previous electoral authority (Provisional 
Electoral Council - CEP) was dysfunctional and had to be 
replaced.  The April 2008 riots, the ensuing five-month 
search for a new government, and the August hurricanes 
provided further reasons for holding off the elections.  The 
new Provisional Electoral Council is organizing the April 19 
balloting, although some observers question President 
Preval's commitment (or the CEP's organizational capacity) to 
hold them on time.  The USG has already made USD 4 million 
available to help fund the elections, and international 
donors will contribute approximately USD 11 million of the 
budgeted USD 16 million in election-related expenses.  The 
terms of another third of the Senate, along with the entire 
Chamber of Deputies, will expire in January 2010, 
necessitating yet another round of elections in November of 
this year. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The April elections have generated considerable 
controversy, especially surrounding the exclusion all 
candidates representing Fanmi Lavalas, the fractured 
political party of former President Aristide.  CEP officials 
announced February 5 that Lavalas candidates had all failed 
to provide an explicit authorization by Aristide to represent 
the party in the coming elections.  Aristide, currently in 
self-imposed exile in South Africa, declined to provide any 
of the local Lavalas partisans jockeying for power with a 
delegation of authority.  That two competing factions of 
Fanmi Lavalas presented competing lists of candidates further 
undermined the case of the party.  The CEP has not relented 
to calls from the major international donors to make the 
elections more inclusive.  Protests organized by Lavalas 
activists have so far failed to inspire significant 
grassroots support. 
 
¶12. (SBU) One element of uncertainty surrounding the 
elections concerns President Preval's longstanding call for 
constitutional reform.  Preval argues that Haiti's current 
constitution, with its staggered presidential and legislative 
elections and a complicated series of indirect elections to 
determine the composition of key bodies, is a source of 
instability.  Others cite the constitution's prohibition on 
dual nationality as a deterrent to foreign investment and 
greater involvement of Haiti's large diaspora.  Preval 
recently established a working group to study the question 
and present reform proposals to Parliament.  There has been 
some speculation that President Preval will revive the idea 
of a "constitutional pause" to temporarily halt the elections 
cycle, perhaps after the April elections, to push for a 
nationwide consensus on the outlines of a new constitution. 
You and your Security Council colleagues should strongly urge 
the government to hold the April 19 partial Senate elections 
on time, and to allow all parties that want to participate to 
do so.  Excluding major parties will call the credibility of 
the elections into question, with negative consequences for 
Haiti's political stability. 
 
DONOR CONFERENCE SET FOR APRIL 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) A donor conference is scheduled for April 13-14 in 
Washington to help Haiti address the significant damage 
wrought by the 2008 riots and hurricane season, and to shore 
up a difficult budget year for the Haitian government. 
Senior Haitian officials were initially reluctant to agree to 
a conference, fearing that returning home without a solid 
funding commitment would exacerbate their already difficult 
situation.  Haiti is likely to use the conference to press 
for direct budget support, although international donors 
generally prefer to work through international NGOs, public 
international organizations, or UN agencies in view of the 
limited technical capacity of GOH institutions.  President 
Preval asked Secretary Clinton for USD 75 million in direct 
budget support February 5; the Secretary promised she woul 
study the proposal. 
 
PREVAL MAY ASK FOR DEBT ELIEF, HALT TO DEPORTATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Due toHaiti's budgetary problems, Preval 
frequently pushes for debt relief in his meetings with 
international interlocutors.  Haiti owes about USD 1 billion 
in external debt, largely owed to multilateral institutions, 
and President Preval argues that money currently spent on 
debt service would be better spent on repairing Haiti's 
damaged agricultural sector and transportation 
infrastructure.  Observers expect the IMF to determine that 
Haiti has reached Highly Indebted Poor Country "completion 
point" status by July, freeing up as many as USD 5 million 
per month for other purposes. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In addition, the issue of deportations from the 
United States has been on President Preval's agenda in recent 
weeks.  Stung by the late 2008 denial of his request for 
Temporary Protected Status for Haitian nationals illegally in 
the United States, President Preval has renewed his request 
to the new Administration.  Recent press reports that some 
30,000 Haitians in the United States are under deportation 
orders have again brought U.S. immigration policy into focus 
here.  However, the GOH agreed to resume special deportation 
flights as soon as March 11, after a six-month U.S. 
suspension due to the 2008 hurricanes. 
 
THE ASSISTANCE PICTURE: RULE OF LAW/GOVERNANCE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶16. (U) Our assistance efforts in Haiti -- financed by USAID, 
CDC, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL/NAS), and the U.S. Coast 
Guard -- seek to implement reforms, build public 
institutions, improve law enforcement and corrections 
capability, and help deliver basic services.  Rule of Law 
programs target Haiti's justice system by helping increase 
judicial authorities' administrative, management and 
technical capacity.  Good Governance programs provide 
technical assistance and training to Haiti's Parliament in 
the areas of legislative drafting, legal and judicial reform, 
and rules of procedure.  Programs aimed at conflict 
mitigation address poverty and gang-related violence through 
creation of short- and long-term employment and transfer of 
job skills trough labor-intensive reconstruction of social 
and productive infrastructure.  Another program targets the 
Provisional Electoral Council to help it solidify its 
organization and modernize the voter registration process. 
Civil society programs assist a variety of local media, 
regional journalist associations, and public service 
associations, including those that monitor corruption. 
 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
----------------------- 
 
¶17. (U) The steep rise in food prices in 2008 followed by the 
four hurricanes sharply exacerbated Haiti's chronic food 
insecurity, to which approximately 3 million Haitians are now 
exposed.  USAID contributed USD 45 million in emergency food 
aid and another USD 14 million for post-hurricane recovery. 
USAID is continuing its programs to build disaster early 
warning, response and mitigation capacity.  The Ambassador 
officiated in November at the ground-breaking ceremony for an 
 
Emergency Operations Center for Haiti's disaster response 
agencies.  Following the hurricanes, Congress appropriated an 
additional USD 96 million over three years for the 
restoration of public services, repairs to public use 
infrastructure, provision of income-generating activities, 
asset restoration, and support to affected families. 
 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION/ECONOMIC GROWTH 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (U) Basic health programs help increase access to 
essential health services in 72 public sector clinics and 80 
NGO clinics.  Nearly 50 percent of Haiti's population 
receives at least some health services financed by the USG. 
USAID-financed education programs include a new basic 
education project to strengthen the Ministry of Education's 
management and supervisory system, help it extend supervision 
over the vast private-sector education system, and provide 
scholarships.  Social assistance programs support Haiti's 
most vulnerable citizens.  Economic growth programs target 
trade and investment, financial sector programs for small and 
medium enterprises, and programs for agricultural 
productivity and marketing.  Reducing environmental 
degradation is the goal of USD 25 million in programs that 
focus on restoring watersheds to thwart periodic flooding. 
 
HIV/AIDS RELIEF 
--------------- 
 
¶19. (U) Haiti has the highest rate of HIV/AIDS infection in 
the Western Hemisphere.  The President's Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) will provide just short of USD 100 
million in FY 2009 to prevent infections and place 
HIV-positive persons into treatment.  Implemented by USAID 
and CDC, PEPFAR programs target HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, 
but also benefit large parts of Haiti's health care system. 
The PEPFAR program in Haiti is the largest in the hemisphere. 
 
POLICE REFORM/CORRECTIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The U.S. is the lead donor in implementing the 
MINUSTAH/Haitian National Police (HNP) reform plan, which 
foresees building up the HNP from its current strength of 
9,600 to 14,000 officers by the end of 2011.  In concert with 
MINUSTAH's mandate to enhance Haiti's border security, the 
U.S. Coast Guard provides training for the Haitian Coast 
Guard, financed by INL/NAS.  Facility renovations, additional 
boats, and a new operating base on the north coast will be 
funded by INL/NAS in 2009.  The U.S. made a commitment in 
2007 to assist in improving the conditions and respect for 
human rights in Haiti's prison system, and remains the lead 
donor to Haiti in this sector. 
TIGHE