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Viewing cable 09PARIS403, FRANCE PLEDGES CAUTION ON CUBA, LAMENTS MISFIRE ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PARIS403 2009-03-19 13:30 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO3877
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #0403/01 0781330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191330Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5808
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000403 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM CU MX BR FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE PLEDGES CAUTION ON CUBA, LAMENTS MISFIRE ON 
MEXICO TRIP 
 
REF: 2008 PARIS 2226 
 
Classified By: POL MC Kathleen H. Allegrone for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Sarkozy appointed former Socialist 
Minister Jack Lang to be Special Envoy on Cuba in order to 
drive forward French and EU dialogue with Cuba but also, on 
the domestic front, as outreach to a prominent French 
opposition party member, according to French Presidential 
Advisor for the Americas Damien Loras in a March 17 meeting 
with POL MC.  France did not aspire to mediate between Cuba 
and the U.S.  Although Havana had invited Sarkozy to visit, 
there were no such plans in play, Loras insisted; neither 
would Paris host a Cuban Presidential visit.  Lang came away 
from meetings February 25 in Havana with Raul Castro and 
then-Foreign Minister Perez Roque believing that the GOC, 
while heartened by the change of administration in 
Washington, nonetheless doubts a shift in U.S.-Cuba policy is 
likely.  In a brief assessment of Sarkozy's March 9 trip to 
Mexico, Loras regretted the otherwise routine visit had 
misfired with the Mexican public due to controversy over the 
possible extradition of a French national convicted as an 
accomplice to kidnapping.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Socialist Jack Lang as Special Envoy to Cuba 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Presidential Advisor Damian Loras played down the 
significance of a French Special Envoy for Cuba during a 
March 17 meeting with Pol M/C and poloff (notetaker). 
Domestic French politics were a primary consideration in the 
appointment of former French Socialist Minister of Culture 
Lang, with Sarkozy eager to appropriate the prominent figure 
of the Left to his administration.  Equally important, Loras 
argued, was the desire for a renewal of French and EU 
dialogue with Cuba (ref).  "Since (France) has historically 
had strong relations with Cuba, why should we sit on the 
sidelines since the EU restrictions were lifted," Loras 
commented.  Other than Spain and France, Cuba lacked strong 
supporters within the EU.  Past EU policies aimed at 
marginalizing the Castro regime had "failed," he commented, 
advocating a policy of engagement with continued focus on 
human rights and democracy. 
 
Lang not to mediate between U.S. and Cuba 
----------------------- ----------------- 
 
3. (C) Contrary to public suggestions by Lang that France 
could help mediate between Washington and Havana, France did 
not aspire to serve as a "go-between," Loras insisted.  He 
hoped nonetheless for positive moves by Cuba on human rights 
and freedom of the press and speech that could help unblock 
U.S.-Cuban relations.  Loras acknowledged that Havana had 
invited Sarkozy to visit, but there were no such plans in the 
offing; neither would Paris host a Cuban Presidential visit. 
That said, Lang would return to Cuba in the near future, 
focusing chiefly on cultural and educational exchanges. 
(Note: France still operates one of the only remaining 
foreign cultural centers in Cuba, the Alliance Francaise.) 
 
Heartened by U.S. Elections, Doubtful of Major Policy Shift 
------------------- -------------- ------------ ----------- 
 
4. (C) Lang came away from meetings February 25 in Havana 
with Raul Castro and then-Foreign Minister Perez Roque 
believing that the GOC, while heartened by the change of 
administration in Washington, nonetheless doubts a shift in 
U.S.-Cuba policy is likely. Roque, who met with Lang the day 
before his dismissal, said the new U.S. President was the 
first in 50 years with a credible chance to change U.S. 
policy towards Cuba.  Nonetheless, Havana interlocutors 
believed there were significant obstacles within the U.S. 
Government to change.  The Cubans continue to believe the 
ball is in the U.S. court, said Loras, noting it was 
illogical, but nonetheless their position.  Lang, for his 
part, had concluded that the Havana regime was risk-averse, 
concerned with self-preservation, and thus leery of a process 
with the U.S. that could involve Cuban concessions. 
 
5. (C) The GOC sought to link unrelated matters to moving 
forward with the U.S.  For example, they seemed to be trying 
to link an agreement with the U.S. to a prisoner exchange, an 
idea the French firmly stated was a "non-starter."  "We 
warned (the GOC) but we're sure they'll put it forward 
anyway."  The GOC also wants Cuba removed from the U.S. lists 
of nations that support terrorism and trafficking in persons. 
 
 
6. (C) While the GOC was largely resistant to change, the 
Cuban Army was already making preparations.  The military 
controls the tourism industry, Loras emphasized, and had 
already asked permission to build a new marina to host up to 
 
PARIS 00000403  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
1,200 ships.  They are preparing for future interest from a 
U.S. market, Loras judged, since there was no equivalent 
demand within the EU.  "The Army is already looking north and 
preparing for change," he said. 
 
France-Brazilian Pressure? 
------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Elaborating next steps, Loras suggested concerned 
allies, naming Brazil specifically, could foster a strong 
dynamic of change for Cuba.  "Carrots" are now needed, said 
Loras, and those carrots should properly come from the U.S., 
though not necessarily in the public domain.  In French 
exchanges with Brazil, including President Lula, there is 
talk of how to influence Cuba.  Lula, in the French view, has 
unique clout with Havana. 
 
Laments Misfires on Mexico Trip 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) President Sarkozy's March 9 trip to Mexico was 
complicated by a Mexican public outcry at France's efforts to 
seek the extradition of French national Florence Cassez. 
(Note: Cassez is currently serving a 60-year sentence in a 
Mexican prison for her role in the kidnapping of three 
Mexican nationals in 2006.  She contests the verdict and the 
case has generated some sympathy among the French public and 
media.)  Loras admitted the French delegation had sought to 
negotiate the extradition on the margins of the visit, but 
the Mexican press got hold of the story and the Mexican 
public reaction was vehement.  The trip's objectives were 
otherwise routine, showcasing Franco-Mexican commercial and 
cultural ties.  All investment projects were on hold, 
however, given the crippling impact on Mexico of the global 
financial crisis, Loras said, while declining to specify 
details of any pending transactions. 
 
9. (C) COMMENT: However the French Presidential diplomatic 
staff may try to define and narrow Lang's mandate, we will 
need to watch if this flamboyant Socialist figure stays in 
the box.  Lang's appointment serves Sarkozy's continued 
personal efforts to co-opt Socialist Party (PS) luminaries 
into his fold.  Like FM Bernard Kouchner, also formerly a 
Socialist by political affiliation, Lang, a widely popular 
former Culture Minister under Mitterand, actually voted for 
Sarkozy's Socialist opponent Segolene Royal in the 2007 
presidential elections. END COMMENT. 
 
 
PEKALA