VZCZCXYZ0022
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #0390 0761658
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171658Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5787
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7105
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6976

UNCLAS PARIS 000390 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM AND EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KOMC FR
SUBJECT:  FRENCH EXPORT CONTROLLER ON END USE ASSURANCES 
 
REFS:  PM/RSAT/TUCKER Email 2/25/2009 4:57 PM 
 
¶1. This is an Action Cable for PM/RSAT 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: The GOF is prepared to provide end-use assurances 
(EUA) for encryption products temporarily transferred to private 
French manufacturers and service providers, in the context of the 
NATO accord covering special treatment for encryption products.  GOF 
reluctance to sign the required assurances has stemmed from 
uncertainty about the scope of this requirement, e.g., whether it 
will be requested for other ITAR items.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Prompt clarification on the items for which 
the GOF must sign an EUA is requested, as GOF will review this 
matter March 20. 
 
ENCRYPTION IS A SPECIAL CASE 
---------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) On March 17, we paid a call on the French MOD Export 
Control Coordinator, BG Patrick Fermier, to obtain background on 
French reluctance to provide end-use assurances for the MDS chips 
contained in UK A400M aircraft during French subcontractor work on 
the system.  Fermier said the French MOD is prepared to provide 
end-use assurances for encryption/encryption products transferred to 
private French manufacturers and service providers, in the context 
 
of the NATO accord covering special treatment for encryption 
products.  It accepts its obligation under the accord and has a 
comprehensive tracking and accountability system in place that makes 
GOF assurances concrete and meaningful. 
 
ASSURANCES ON OTHER ITAR ITEMS ONLY IF GOF IS END-USER 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶5. (SBU) The GOF will continue to provide assurance of non-transfer 
and use (DSP-83) for all ITAR-equipment for which it is the 
end-user.  However, it is not prepared to provide assurances for 
other ITAR equipment handled by private manufacturers and service 
providers in France.  The GOF lacks the statutory and logistical 
basis for tracking all such U.S.-controlled items, Fermier 
explained.  In cases not pertaining to encryption, it is up to the 
private companies to provide the end-use assurances. 
 
SIDE LETTER (OR LANGUAGE) NEEDED 
-------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) Fermier acknowledged that a former French defense 
cooperation attach in Washington had signed assurance texts, but 
without explicit authorization of the GOF.  Signatures of EUAs were 
suspended, he said, when Paris became aware of this "new formality" 
because its scope was unclear to the GOF.  Fermier stated that if 
there were a side letter or other mechanism to clarify that the EUA 
document was signed in the context of the NATO encryption agreement, 
under which NATO countries agreed to track controlled encryption 
items on their territory regardless of their use, the GOF would be 
able to sign the EUA.  It would be "illegal" to sign such assurances 
for other ITAR items where the GOF was not the end-user, he said. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Fermier informed us that the General Secretariat for 
National Defense, at the Prime Minister's Office, would be reviewing 
this matter in a meeting on Friday, March 20.  He asked that we seek 
clarification of the scope of application of the EUA requirement. 
He said he wants a resolution to this matter and, if necessary, is 
ready to come to Washington to discuss it. 
 
PEKALA