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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3211
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UNCLAS PANAMA 000265 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO H 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP EWWT OVIP PREL PGOV ECON ETRD EINV PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL HOYER 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Summary. Since the 1989 restoration of democracy, 
Panama has established and consolidated a democratic, stable 
and responsive government; accelerated economic growth 
through open markets; and strived to ensure that the benefits 
of that growth reach all citizens. While a hemispheric leader 
in progress on these fronts, Panama today stands at a 
crossroads. Its political establishment is approaching its 
fourth presidential election since 1990 - in May 2009, yet 
cynicism abounds. Panama has leveraged its superb stewardship 
of the Canal and central location to create an economic and 
logistical architecture that is yielding now comparatively 
stellar economic growth and a substantial reduction in 
poverty. However, opportunities created by the growth remain 
elusive to the poor and middle class due to continued income 
inequality fostered by lack of access to quality education, 
inadequate public infrastructure (especially transportation) 
and the disproportionate effect of inflation on lower income 
citizens. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S./Panama Free Trade Agreement (FTA) dominates 
the bilateral relationship. President Torrijos, who leaves 
office July 1, asserts he fulfilled all major campaign 
promises, but one - the FTA. Since the FTA is a legacy issue, 
President Torrijos and his administration are willing to 
spend political capital to legislatively address potential 
issues brought up by opponents of the FTA. After July 1, a 
new Administration assumes power. While both major 
candidates, Ms. Herrera and Mr. Martinelli, support the FTA, 
their willingness and ability to push through the legislative 
changes for implementation are uncertain. End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) This scenesetter includes Post's input for the 
requested one-page fact sheets.  After paragraph 5, each 
section is a standalone fact sheet.  Biographies were emailed 
separately. 
 
-------------------------- 
MEETING PRESIDENT TORRIJOS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) During your meeting and dinner with President 
Torrijos, the FTA will be the most important topic. President 
Torrijos (a Texas A&M graduate and formerly a regional 
McDonalds Manager in Chicago) speaks and understands English, 
but is often more comfortable speaking English in less formal 
settings; as a result, the President may engage in more 
substantive discussions outside of the formal meeting. A 
Trade Summary is provided below. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Your tour of the Panama Canal and initial excavation 
of the $5.25 billion Expansion Project will demonstrate the 
Panama Canal Authority's (ACP) world class managerial 
prowess, a source of great pride to the Panamanian people. 
Since the handover of the Canal from the United States to 
Panama at the end of 1999, the safety record, number of 
yearly transits, and revenue have improved through FY2008. 
(The global economic recession may cause transits and 
revenues to drop in FY2009.) In 2007, the ACP started a $5.25 
billion expansion project to add a third lane for large 
post-Panamax ships to transit the Canal. Currently, Colorado 
based engineering firm CH2MHill is the Project Manager for 
the expansion. Three consortia submitted bids to design and 
build the $3.35 billion locks and a winner is expect to be 
declared in late June. U.S. based Bechtel leads a consortium 
while Spanish firms lead the other two. The winning 
consortium is expected to purchase up to $1 billion of goods 
in the United States, such as equipment and construction 
materials. Panama imported $4.9 billion dollars of U.S. goods 
in 2008 (vice exporting $380 million to the United States). 
Under the FTA, obligations covering government procurement 
will apply to the independently run ACP as well as the 
Government of Panama at large. 
 
------------------- 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Panama will hold general elections on May 3, 2009, 
to choose a president and to fill every elected seat in 
Panama's National Assembly. We fully expect this date to 
herald the fourth free and fair election since Operation Just 
Cause in December 1989 restored democracy in Panama. 
According to polls, a population focused on insecurity from 
the rising rate of crime and lingering economic insecurity 
from the now abating rate of inflation has grown cynical 
about its government's ability to deliver security and 
sustained social and economic progress. The race is now 
basically a two-person race, with opposition Democratic 
Change (CD) party candidate Ricardo Martinelli enjoying a 
steady 12-15% lead in the polls over the candidate of 
President Torrijos' Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), 
former Housing Minister Balbina Herrera. Martinelli has thus 
far successfully positioned himself as the candidate for 
change, in part as a result of an impressive campaign 
financed in part from his substantial fortune (Martinelli 
owns a major supermarket chains in Panama.) Herrera has been 
campaigning on a platform of continuity with Torrijos' 
successful administration, but has suffered from several 
political missteps by the Torrijos administration, and by her 
past association with Manuel Noriega, and her reputation as a 
left wind firebrand in the past. The explosion of the Murcia 
case has roiled the political landscape in the wake of his 
assertion of funneling $6 million to the PRD (including 
Herrera) and Herrera's assertion that Martinelli through his 
business laundered money for Murcia. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The outgoing Torrijos administration has maintained 
excellent relations with the United States throughout the 
last five years, marked by the negotiation of the FTA, and by 
improved security cooperation. Panamanian public opinion is 
pro-American, but also strongly sovereigntist and 
nationalistic. The Torrijos administration has been able to 
expand its security and trade ties to the U.S. without 
significant political opposition due to Torrijos tight 
control over the PRD, his own government, and the National 
Assembly (NA) where the PRD has an absolute majority. None of 
these will hold under a hypothetical Martinelli 
administration, though Martinelli is strongly pro-American. 
His government would be based on a small and weak party (CD), 
and will have to deal with an unwieldy four party coalition 
to govern. It is also unlikely Martinelli's Alliance for 
Change coalition can win a NA majority. Thus, Martinelli will 
face significant challenges pursuing his agenda. Should 
Herrera win, it is likely that she will strive to maintain 
the same good relations with the U.S. as Torrijos has, though 
her advisors tend to be more left-wing and anti-American than 
Torrijos'. However, she would also probably have more 
effective control of her government and the NA then 
Martinelli, and so might be able to form a more effective 
government that could carry through on agreements. 
 
---------------- 
PANAMA'S ECONOMY 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Behind the construction cranes and traffic jams lies 
an expanding economic/logistical architecture. Its foundation 
is the Canal through which passes roughly 5% of world 
commerce. The Panama Canal Authority (ACP) has embarked on a 
$5.25 billion dollar expansion, the centerpiece of which is a 
third set of locks capable of handling the largest class of 
container vessels. A growing network of ports, including 
Manzanillo International Terminal in Colon (partially owned 
by U.S. firm Carrix), facilitates trans-isthmian logistics 
along with revitalized Kansas City Southern Railway between 
Panama City and Colon. Panama Ports (Hutchison Port Holdings, 
Inc. of Hong Kong) launched a $240 million expansion of its 
Pacific and Caribbean terminals, augmenting the GOP' s 
construction of the $2 15 million Panama- Colon Highway. The 
Colon Free Zone generated over $19 billion in trade last 
year. It serves as a hemispheric "one-stop shop" for 
sourcing, financing, and delivering products (mostly from 
Asia) to Latin American markets. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Panama's robust financial center, with 90 banks and 
$63 billion in assets fuels the purchase and movement of 
cargo and facilitates the absorption of robust foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows that totaled $2.4 billion for 2008. 
Through generally prudent management, it has been able to 
finance construction projects and consumer spending, key 
drivers of GDP growth - 11.5% last year and roughly 9% in 
¶2008. Although the global financial crisis will impact 
Panama, growth is expected to be 1-3% - one of the only 
countries in the hemisphere expecting positive growth. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In recent years, Panama has reached beyond its 
traditional maritime and financial networks to build 
connectivity of data and knowledge, and people. Panama lies 
at the junction of five high bandwidth submarine fiber optic 
cables, placing Panama City second only to New York City in 
bandwidth availability. This feature was key in the decisions 
of Dell and Hewlett-Packard to locate regional headquarters 
at the former Howard Air Base, which is undergoing a $705 
million transformation as a regional manufacturing and 
distribution hub. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Panama's tourism industry has similarly mushroomed 
in the past five years, with tourist arrivals increasing from 
600,000 to 1.6 million between 2000 and 2008. Arrivals at 
Tocumen International Airport reflect a similar trend, 
climbing from over 2.1 million in 2000 to an estimated 4.5 
million in 2008. Tocumen recently completed an $85 million 
expansion of its international terminal, complimented by the 
concurrent growth in its flag carrier, Copa (which codeshares 
with Continental Airlines). 
 
¶12. (SBU) A recent United Nations report highlighted true 
progress in poverty reduction from 2001 to 2007 - overall 
poverty fell from 37% to 29% and extreme poverty fell from 
19% to 12%. Yet, the distribution of Panama's wealth and 
income remains highly skewed, and Panama has one of the 
highest degrees of inequality in the Americas. This situation 
creates palpable resentment as BMWs and Land Rovers zip past 
hot, crowded, buses that subject riders to unreliable 
multi-hour commutes. Most inhabitants of Panama City have 
never visited an indigenous area or the Darien where poverty 
predominates, and government services are minimal. 
 
-------------------------- 
UNITED STATES/PANAMA TRADE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The U.S. goods trade surplus with Panama was $4.5 
billion in 2008. U.S. goods exports in 2008 were $4.9 
billion. U.S. exports to Panama have grown by 130% from 2005 
to 2008. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Panama was $6.2 billion in 2007 (latest data available). U.S. 
FDI in Panama is concentrated largely in the nonbank holding 
companies and finance sectors. 
 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (formerly known as Trade Promotion 
Agreement) 
 
¶14. (SBU) On June 28, 2007, the United States and Panama 
signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Panama approved the FTA 
on July 11, 2007. The FTA is a comprehensive free trade 
agreement. When/if implemented, the FTA will result in 
significant liberalization of trade in goods and services, 
including financial services. The FTA also includes important 
disciplines relating to: customs administration and trade 
facilitation, technical barriers to trade, government 
procurement, investment, telecommunications, electronic 
commerce, intellectual property rights, transparency and 
anti-corruption, financial services, and labor and 
environmental protection. Under the FTA, Panama will be 
obligated to liberalize the services sector beyond its 
commitments under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services by adopting a negative list approach where all 
sectors are covered except where it has made specific 
exceptions. Moreover, in connection with the FTA, Panama 
agreed to become a full participant in the WTO Information 
Technology Agreement, and entered into an agreement with the 
United States that resolved a number of regulatory barriers 
to trade in agricultural goods ranging from meat and poultry 
to processed products, including dairy and rice. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Panama's maximum tariff on industrial goods is 20 
percent. Panama's tariffs on agricultural goods range from 10 
percent to more than 250 percent. When/if the FTA enters into 
force, 88 percent of U.S. exports of consumer and industrial 
goods will enter Panama duty free, with remaining tariffs 
phased out over periods of 5 years or 10 years. The FTA 
includes "zero-for-zero" immediate duty free access for key 
U.S. sectors and products, including agricultural and 
construction equipment, information technology products, and 
medical and scientific equipment. Other key U.S. export 
sectors such as motor vehicles and parts, paper and wood 
products, and chemicals also will obtain significant access 
to Panama's market as duties are phased out. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The FTA provides for immediate duty free treatment 
for more than half of U.S. agricultural exports to Panama, 
including high quality beef, certain pork and poultry 
products, cotton, wheat, soybeans and soybean meal, most 
fresh fruits and tree nuts, distilled spirits and wine, and a 
wide assortment of processed products. Duties on other 
agricultural goods will be phased out within 5 years to 12 
years, and for the most sensitive products within 15 years to 
20 years. The FTA also provides for expanded market access 
opportunities through tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for 
agricultural products such as pork, chicken leg quarters, 
dairy products, corn, rice, refined corn oil, dried beans, 
frozen French fries, and tomato products. These TRQs will 
permit immediate duty free access for specified quantities 
that will increase as over-quota duties are phased out over 
the course of the implementation period. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Apparel products made in Panama will be duty free 
under the FTA if they use U.S. or Panamanian fabric and yarn, 
thereby supporting U.S. fabric and yarn exports and jobs. 
Strong customs cooperation commitments between the United 
States and Panama under the FTA will allow for verification 
of claims of origin or preferential treatment, and denial of 
preferential treatment or entry if claims cannot be verified. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PANAMA COUNTER-NARCOTICS OVERVIEW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Panama is one of the USG's most important partners 
in the fight against the drug trade, and its close 
counter-narcotics cooperation with the U.S. in 2008 led to 
the seizure of 5l metric tons of cocaine, following seizures 
of 60 tons in 2007 and 40 tons in 2006. These were the 
highest seizure figures in the region by far. Police also 
seized over $3 million in cash linked to drug trafficking, 
confiscated $1.5 million from 42 bank accounts, and arrested 
126 people for international drug-related offenses. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The seizure rates reveal that Panama continues to 
be a major trans-shipment country for illegal drugs to the 
United States and Europe, as a result of its geographic 
position in the drug trafficking "transit zone." Drugs are 
shipped by go-fast outboard-motor boats through Panama's 
territorial waters on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts an 
area that is two times the size of Panama's land mass - and 
overland through the dense forests of Panama's Darien 
province. The drugs arc trafficked by Colombian and Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), and by elements of the 
FARC and the remnants of paramilitary organizations. These 
organizations have protagonized a significant increase in 
violent crime in Panama this year, a fact that has led to 
increasing social alarm in Panama. As a result of this, the 
Government of Panama called a meeting of the presidents of 
Panama, Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala in late 2008 to 
promote greater cooperation in the struggle against 
international organized crime and drug trafficking. As a 
result, the four governments are working on concrete plans to 
confront the DTOs through law enforcement cooperation and 
information sharing. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Panama has limited resources to confront the drug 
traffickers. Having disbanded its military in 1989, following 
the U.S. invasion, Panama has a National Police (PNP) force 
of approximately 15,000. Security reforms were implemented in 
2008 to try to increase Panama's ability to confront the drug 
traffickers, including the creation of a coast guard-like 
National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), and breaking off a 
National Frontier Service from the police to cover the 
boarders. These forces are in their infancy, however, and 
Panama still has very limited air and sea assets with which 
to adequately control its territorial waters. The U.S. Coast 
Guard has the right to enter Panama's territorial waters in 
pursuit of drug traffickers, and has had success seizing 
go-fasts. However, USCG does not have sufficient available 
assets to shut down the coastal route either. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Post plans to use Merida Initiative funds to build 
up Panama's capacity to deal with this serious 
drug-trafficking threat, and its growing gang problem. NAS 
funds will be used to retrain the PNP in community policing 
techniques, while USAID administered Economic Support Funds 
(ESF) are used to develop an effective community-based gang 
violence prevention program. The prevention program will 
focus on the two major urban centers, Panama City and Colon, 
and on the rural communities of the Darien, which suffer from 
significant drug trafficking activities. Post's program will 
work to build ties between the community based organizations 
and the police, so that the two parts of the strategy support 
one another, and create a self-reinforcing circle of success. 
At the same time, Post will continue with our traditional 
assistance to Panama's counter-narcotics efforts, including 
highly effective vetted-units, Coast Guard-SENAN cooperation, 
and support for Panamanian efforts to tighten control of its 
borders, ports and airports. 
 
------ 
MERIDA 
------ 
 
¶22. (SBU) Panama is a major transit location for the drug 
trade between Colombia and the U.S. and Europe. Huge amounts 
of cocaine transit through its territorial waters and over 
the Pan-American Highway everyday. Panama is taking decisive 
action against traffickers, and is one of the top countries 
in Latin America in terms of drug seizures. This is due 
primarily to its excellent collaborative Counter-Narcotic 
relationship with the U.S., and the work of a small group of 
elite police officers. 
 
¶23. (SBU) While Panama's security apparatus rakes up 
impressive drug seizures, the Panamanian public is alarmed by 
a perceived wave of crime and insecurity. This is largely a 
result of Panama's nascent gang problem. Indigenous youth 
gangs are developing in all of Panama's slums, especially in 
Panama City, Colon and David in the west. This gang activity 
is the result of enduring poverty and poor education leaving 
young people without the skills to succeed in Panama's 
rapidly growing economy. Meanwhile, Colombian and Mexican 
drug traffickers offer increasing opportunities for criminal 
groups to make money by stealing from drug dealers (tumbos), 
selling drugs on the local market and by acting as paid 
killers. While Panamanian authorities insist that the recent 
wave of killings is mostly among youth gangs and drug 
dealers, the public is nevertheless seriously concerned about 
the perceived erosion of security in Panama's streets. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Embassy Panama believes that it is essential to 
help the GOP confront the gang problem now. The gangs are 
becoming more entrenched and sophisticated all the time 
according to local prosecutors, and could eventually offer 
the drug cartels a ready made local structure, should they 
decide to move their operations to Panama. Panama is 
potentially a very attractive location for the drug cartels 
to re-locate to once the Merida Initiative makes operating in 
Mexico more difficult, due to its world-class banking system, 
miles of unpopulated coastline in the middle of the transit 
zone, and highly developed shipping and cargo infrastructure 
sitting on one of the most important shipping lanes in the 
world. Getting the gang problem under control now is the best 
way to prevent the cartels from eventually bringing their 
brand of terror and violence to Panama, potentially 
threatening one of the most important commercial hubs in the 
world. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Embassy Panama proposes a holistic, integrated 
inter-agency approach to the problem, using Merida funding to 
give life to a strategy, rather than building a strategy 
around funding streams. The foundation for our strategy is 
community policing. Post believes that the gang problem 
cannot be brought under control unless and until the police 
and the community come together to reclaim the streets of 
Panama's poor neighborhoods. Many of these neighborhoods have 
suffered for years from a scarce police presence. When 
present, police are a foreign presence, due to short tours of 
duty meant to avoid corruption. Post is working with the 
Panamanian National Police (PNP) to implement a Community 
Police strategy, in conjunction with the Miami Dade Police 
Department, to indoctrinate the highest level of the police 
leadership in the concept of community policing. At the same 
time we are implementing a "culture of lawfulness" program to 
build up the PNP's ability to police itself. Community 
organizations are also being re-established to interact with 
the police, not just to identify criminal activities, but to 
report on police corruption and malfeasance. Post will use 
additional funds allotted through Merida to strengthen the 
PNP's ability to investigate and discipline internal 
corruption as a prerequisite for effective community 
policing. ILEA funds will also be used to strengthen the 
PNP's leadership, and prepare them to lead an organization 
which is ready to work with the community to aggressively 
target criminal gangs, without violating the democratic 
foundations of the state, and the rule of law. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Post will also work with the courts and prosecutors 
to increase their ability to investigate, prosecute and try 
gang activities. This will be increasingly difficult as 
Panama transfers to the accusatorial system over the next 
five years. While in the long run this transformation will be 
positive, and help to avoid the long and unnecessary 
incarcerations of suspects which frequently lead to the 
creation of youth gangs in prison for self-protection, it 
will be a traumatic change over if the justice system is not 
adequately prepared. The Central American Finger Print 
Exchange will be a valuable tool for prosecutors, as they 
face the need to provide independent evidence besides police 
testimony to gain convictions. Post will work to see if 
creative use of this system can meet requests we have 
received for help setting up a "tattoo" data bank to help 
prosecute gang suspects. Post will also use available USG 
assets, including training seminars by TDY federal agents, to 
help Panama establish the basic tools for successful 
prosecutions, including forensic investigation and a witness 
protection program. 
 
¶27. (SBU) While improvements in policing and prosecution of 
gang cases can help deter gang activity, and take gang 
leaders off the streets, Post believes that Panama is in a 
unique situation to establish an effective youth engagement 
program which prevents youth from joining gangs. Unlike many 
of the countries affected by gang activity, Panama is 
experiencing an economic boom, in which qualified workers are 
in short supply. Here the resources of the Merida Initiative 
are vital to implement a strategy of gang prevention. USAID 
Panama has developed an excellent plan to develop youth 
centers in high risk areas, in conjunction with Panamanian 
NGOs and faith-based organizations, which will provide 
vocational training, extra-curricular activities, safe-haven 
recreational activities. These activities will take place in 
coordination with a GOP Integral Security Program, financed 
by the Inter-American Development Bank. Post has already had 
preliminary talks with the GOP and the IDB about 
collaborating on this issue. ECA educational programs, 
especially the English Access Micro-scholarships, would play 
a key role in anchoring these centers, and providing real 
opportunities for youth to get the kinds of skills which can 
give youth a path to productive employment. Post also plans 
to partner with the active American business community to 
develop business education programs, internship programs, and 
even first-job programs with companies who are not just 
socially responsible, but also badly in need of qualified 
workers. 
 
¶28. (SBU) While Post is strongly committed to this strategy 
for success, there is no intention to abandon the extremely 
successful model of intelligence sharing, and small elite 
unit operations which have made Panama a great success in the 
interdiction effort, and will hopefully give the cartels 
cause to pause before moving their operations to Panama in 
the future. Merida Initiative aid for vetted units, 
information sharing, border inspection and maritime 
interdiction will be used to further strengthen Panama's 
successful programs, and to disrupt drug trafficking routes 
in Central America. 
 
----------------- 
COUNTER-TERRORISM 
----------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Panama's main terrorism concern is an attack 
against the Canal. The Panama Canal Authority and the 
Government of Panama work closely together to protect the 
Canal, and the ODC has trained several elite squads of 
security forces to protect the Canal in the event of an 
attack. Panama co-hosts the annual PANAMAX exercise, a 
multinational security training exercise tailored to the 
defense of the Panama Canal. The exercise replicates real 
world threats to the Canal in order to develop appropriate 
responses and guarantee safe passage to the approaches to the 
canal and through the waterway. 20 nations, including the 
United States, participate. On the margins of PANAMAX, Panama 
hosts a tabletop exercise specifically designed to enhance 
its ability to address asymmetric threats. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Panama's other main terrorism concern is the 
presence of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and 
elements of the FARC in the Darien. With a population of no 
more than 50,000 and only one main road, the Darien is a very 
underdeveloped region on the border with Colombia, which is 
physically and psychologically remote for most Panamanians. 
Elements of the FARC have long used the parts of this region 
closest to the border as a rest and relaxation zone, in 
addition to organizing drug trafficking and logistical 
operations in support of other FARC units inside of Colombia. 
In trying to confront this threat, Panama is limited by the 
fact that it has no military forces, following their 
dissolution after Operation Just Cause in 1989. Panama's 
security is the responsibility of the National Police (PNP), 
the National Aero-Naval Service (SENAN), the National 
Frontier Service (SENAFRONT), and the Institutional 
Protection Service (SPI Secret Service equivalent). The 
Torrijos government spun SENAFRONT off from the PNP late last 
year in an attempt to stand up a more capable force on the 
border that could keep the DTOs and the FARC under control. 
While this was a good first step, SENAFRONT is still far away 
in terms of size, training and equipment from being able to 
take on the FARC. Post, through our Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS) and our Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC - SouthCom) 
has been working with limited funds to assist the development 
of SENAFRONT with training and equipment. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Post is developing a proposal for DOD 
counter-insurgency funds that would stress a "whole of 
government" strategy, based on the idea that the real danger 
of the FARC and DTOs in the Darien is that they may be able 
to usurp the legitimacy of the state in an area where the 
state had little effective presence beyond the main road and 
a few SENAFRONT bases, and the FARC and DTOs are able to buy 
consciences by paying premium prices for goods and assistance 
with the drug trade. The funds would be used to leverage GOP 
funds and spearhead an effort to develop effective techniques 
for improving government services in remote areas. This 
program would go hand in hand with other DOD funded programs 
to improve SENAFRONT's logistical capabilities so it could 
cut the drug, weapons and supply trafficking routes in the 
Darien. 
STEPHENSON