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C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000176 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: HOW MERIDA FITS INTO THE EMERGING SECURITY 
CONSENSUS 
 
REF: A. A: PANAMA 00789/08 
     ¶B. B: PANAMA 00930/08 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara J. Stephenson for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
-------------------------- 
Merida, Before It's Too Late 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  The threat from home grown gangs and international 
criminal organizations in Panama is growing and worrisome. As 
Panamanians feel increasingly threatened in their homes and 
on their streets, some are arguing that Panama must choose 
between protecting itself and stopping the flow of drugs to 
the U.S. (see reftel b). While this dichotomy is false (very 
few Panamanian assets are used in drug interdiction), many in 
Panama, both inside and outside the government, believe that 
U.S. security assistance to Panama is only focused on 
protecting the Canal and intercepting drugs bound for the 
U.S. This misperception poses a long-term threat to our 
influence in Panama.  To preserve our deep and effective law 
enforcement cooperation with Panama the U.S. must avoid the 
optic that it is not concerned with the criminal threat to 
Panamanians, much of which is being fed by drug trafficking. 
At the same time, given Panama's strategic importance to the 
U.S., and the threat that criminal organizations might pose 
to the operation of the Canal if they are allowed to grow 
unchecked, the U.S. has a strong interest in helping Panama 
address the threat. 
 
¶2.  (C)  For these reasons, Merida funds are arriving at a 
perfect time for Post and for Panama, these new funds will 
allow Post to take advantage of the emerging support for a 
move to community policing and community organization to 
combat crime, and give Panama access to U.S. experience, 
organizational and planning capability it badly needs.  The 
threat in Panama is real, but is at a different stage than in 
Central America's northern countries. Panama still has time 
to gain control of its marginal areas before the gangs become 
a serious threat. It is hard to imagine what better protects 
our long-term interests in Panama than being widely perceived 
as the catalyst for improving security. 
 
------------------------------- 
Growing Violent Crime Fuels Fear 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Panama has a relatively low crime rate compared to 
other Central American countries, but has experienced a spike 
in violent crime over the last year. According to a recent 
newspaper report citing official statistics, 51 people were 
killed in drive-by shootings by gunmen on motorcycles or in 
cars in 2008, compared with 22 in 2007. In the first two 
months of this year, 11 have been killed in similar 
circumstances. Photographs of those executed overnight appear 
on the front cover of the papers almost everyday, creating a 
climate of fear and dread among the population, even though 
violent crime is mostly played out among Panamanian, 
Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers. At the same time, 
small homegrown street gangs are increasingly engaged in 
inter-gang warfare in the slums of Panama City and Colon. 
Recent public opinion polls have revealed that security is a 
major concern of Panamanians. One poll showed 44% declaring 
security as their number one concern in February, compared 
with 17% in May. Taken together, the situation has alarmed 
the population of Panama and had led to calls for "strong 
arm" police tactics. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Over the last six months, Post has seen a growing 
consensus from Panamanian government officials and opposition 
politicians on the need to adopt a mixture of "soft" crime 
prevention strategies while inculcating in the police a 
community policing doctrine. While there is significant 
evidence of this philosophical shift, the GOP has not 
produced detailed documents on how to achieve this 
transformation. The GOP has a singular lack of planning 
ability, and transformations tend to be based on the actions 
of a visionary leader, not on a detailed bureaucratic 
strategy. One of the most important contributions Merida 
Initiative funds can make in Panama is to give the USG a seat 
at the table of GOP security policy formulation process, 
allowing us to bring stakeholders together, deepen consensus 
and develop a realistic implementable strategy, while 
leveraging our experience and organizational abilities to 
help the GOP in carrying out an effective transformation of 
the police, and in designing and implementing an effective 
and coordinated crime prevention program. 
 
---------------------------- 
MOGJ Lays Out the Priorities 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Minister of Government and Justice Dilio Arcia told 
the Ambassador on December 18 2008 that the Ministry of 
Government and Justice (MOGJ - controls all of Panama's 
security forces) was focusing on controlling crime and gang 
activity in Panama's cities. He said the MOGJ planned to work 
with civil society on crime prevention programs, citing a 
pilot program had been successful in Veraguas. Under this 
program a committee had been formed in the city composed of 
representatives of the police, NGOs and the business 
community. Arcia noted that the police could not control the 
rising crime rate unless they formed a close partnership with 
the community.  Arcia also mentioned the Integral Security 
Program (PROSI), funded by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), that aims to prevent vulnerable youth from 
joining gangs and engaging in crime by building up sports 
infrastructure in marginal neighborhoods, along with youth 
centers and internet centers. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Arcia also highlighted the need to create an 
integrated approach to prevention by bringing together the 
various government ministries with a role to play, including 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social 
Development, so that children at risk of dropping out of 
school and joining gangs could be identified early on and 
steps taken to help them stay in school. Post strongly 
supports this kind of "whole of government" approach to 
Panama's security challenges. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Arcia stressed the need to focus on the retail sale 
of drugs to weaken the gangs. He said community policing was 
key to success on this front, as "everyone" in the community 
knew who was engaged in these activities, but most people 
were afraid to come forward to the police. He said he had 
tasked Panamanian National Police (PNP) Director Francisco 
Troya with developing a community policing model that would 
allow the police to develop the trust of the communities, and 
so gain improved access to information. Vice Minister of 
Government Severino Mejia noted the importance of the 
Neighborhood Watch (Vecinos Vigilantes) program. After years 
of decay, according to Mejia, the program was being revived 
in order to form partnerships between the police and 
neighborhood associations. This program was recently extended 
to security guards, who will now have a direct connection to 
the PNP, to report on any suspicious activities. There is 
also a Merchants Watch program. Arcia noted that the GOP was 
also toughening laws on gun possession in order to target 
gang members, allowing preventive detention to be used 
against them and giving prosecutors a chance to build up 
cases. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Reestablishing the Presence of the Police 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Troya told POLOFF February 19 that he was developing 
a plan to move the police into gang-infested neighborhoods 
building by building, floor by floor, and apartment by 
apartment. He said the idea was to establish the presence of 
the police throughout the neighborhoods (as opposed to 
respecting no-go areas), and developing information networks. 
Troy echoed Arcia's observation that the community residents 
"know" who the drug dealers and criminals are, but were 
afraid to speak out. Troya said he wanted to establish a data 
base of the neighborhoods so the police would know who lived 
where, where the gangs were, and where drugs were being sold. 
He said he also wanted to gather a data base of e-mail 
addresses, and to give residents an e-mail through which they 
could contact the police. This would allow information to 
flow between the community and the police in a confidential 
manner, and without putting people's lives in danger. Troya 
praised the NAS-funded Community Police training program, run 
in cooperation with the Miami-Dade Police Department, that is 
currently introducing the command ranks of the PNP to the 
community policing doctrine through a series of week long 
seminars. He said he wanted to se the program extended to 
entry level officers as well. Merida funds will become 
available to Post just in time to capitalize on the PNP's 
enthusiasm for community policing, an enthusiasm that this 
cable hopes to show is shared throughout the GOP. It will 
allow NAS to fund the expansion of the program down to the 
rank and file police officers, using part the $600,000 in 
INCLE Police Training funds. If Merida funding is continued 
for the full projected three years, Post will continue the 
program until the entire force has been trained. 
 
--------------------- 
Challenges to Success 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Danilo Toro, the MOGJ official in charge of the 
PROSI program, told POLOFF November 26, 2008 that the GOP was 
committed to introducing community policing, but that there 
were several important challenges. He noted that the lowest 
grade police officers were paid only $390 a month, and that 
this left them vulnerable to corruption, especially given 
recent high inflation that had eroded their buying power. 
This danger was part of the reason the PNP rotated senior 
police every six months: to break up corrupt links between 
the police and the community. Since community policing 
depended on strong police-community ties, Toro asserted, the 
PNP needed to extend the rotations of their senior officers 
so they could oversee the implementation of the community 
policing strategy. Toro noted that the police needed pay 
raises.  Balbina Herrera and Ricardo Martinelli, the two 
leading presidential candidates, have promised to raise 
police wages after the issue of low police salaries was 
highlighted by an independent think-tank study.  Toro noted, 
however, that successful community policing would also 
require other reforms to police administration, including 
force deployment, duty schedules, and internal control 
mechanisms. To achieve all of this, Toro said, the MOGJ would 
need to strike a grand bargain with the PNP, giving officers 
raises in return for concessions on work regulations that 
would make community policing a success. Additional Merida 
funding of the Community Police program would give the USG an 
equity in this process, and allow Post to play a role as the 
necessary administrative changes are brought about, including 
bringing international technical advisors in to assist. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Toro identified several other key challenges that 
would have to be overcome for the transformation to be 
successful. He said USG participation in all would be 
essential, especially in terms of training. He highlighted 
the following areas: 
 
A) Police supervision, self-control, and inspection. If 
community policing is to be successful, it will require a 
well disciplined and regulated force that can quickly 
identify and weed out problem officers. Toro said the US had 
the best experience in this field, and he would like the PNP 
to benefit from U.S. training; 
 
B)  Investigative police techniques. Panama will be 
transferring to an adversarial justice system over the next 
five years. Under the new system prosecutors will be held to 
a much higher evidentiary standard than the present 
administrative law system. The Directorate of Judicial 
Investigation (DIJ) works for Panama's prosecutors, but 
depends administratively on the PNP. Toro said the DIJ needed 
help creating an efficient investigative force, and asked for 
USG assistance in this field, especially from the FBI. He 
said the MOGJ would be willing to help fund such courses if 
we brought the experts; 
 
C)  Human Resources deployment. Toro said the human resources 
structure of the PNP was very poor, noting there was almost 
no training for sergeants, even though studies show that they 
are the officers most often in charge when the PNP reacts to 
criminal events. Many of the PNP's officers are poor, 
frustrated, and ill trained. While community policing can 
help solves these problems, the PNP also needs to learn to 
treat its officers well, give them the training and tools 
they need, and how to turn the police into a career of which 
its officers can be proud. With Merida funding, Post would be 
able to design training programs and provide technical 
advisors to strengthen the PNP in each of these critical 
fields. 
 
------------------------- 
To PROSI or NOT To PROSI? 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  At an earlier meeting on September 30 Toro outlined 
the PROSI program. He said PROSI was being funded by a $20 
million loan from the IDB. He said there were 35 projects 
underway, and 200 projects in the works ranging from 
technological improvement for the PNP, like video cameras to 
monitor street crime and a computer program to keep track of 
crime in real time, to youth and sports programs designed to 
keep kids out of trouble. He said one of the main tenants of 
the program was getting all the GOP agencies to work 
together, from local governments to the various ministries. 
However, IDB Country Rep Marcelo Anterini told POLOFF and 
USAID Country Director on October 8 2008 that the PROSI 
project was "not going well." He said a lot of the money was 
going on facilities, like a juvenile detention facility, and 
that he was not convinced the IDB or the MOGJ really had a 
strategy for how the money was going to improve security in 
Panama. Anterini said the loan was very large, but that the 
GOP was having trouble spending the money, noting that by 
2006 they had only managed to spend $1.4 million of the $22 
million loan. He said he would be very happy to work with the 
USG if we could provide MOGJ technical assistance that might 
be spent to help make the IDB loan more effective. This is an 
excellent example of what Merida money would allow Post to do 
in Panama. Without our own contribution, the USG cannot 
effect how Panama spends its own money, or the money it 
borrows from international lenders (which itself mostly comes 
from the USG as well). USAID's $150,000 in community policing 
support funds should give the USG a voice in how the IDB 
PROSI loan is used, allowing us to lend our organizational 
knowledge and experience to the GOP to take advantage of this 
opportunity to build an effective and coordinated 
gang-prevention program. While many have noted that Panama 
has resources of its own to address its problems, few have 
noted that its organizational and planning abilities are not 
at the same level as its funding capability. Given our 
strategic interest in Panama's success in its battle against 
international and gang violence, using Merida seed money as a 
way to get us influence over Panama's security planning and 
the ability to assist Panama's well intentioned but poorly 
coordinated efforts, is an excellent investment. 
 
-------------------------- 
Militarization Distraction 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The emergence of a GOP consensus in favor of 
prevention and community policing has been obscured for the 
last six months by the divisive "remilitarization" debate 
(see reftel a). Marcel Salamin, GOP National Security 
Advisor, told POLOFF January 20 that the security reforms 
were actually an attempt to complete the civilianization of 
the security forces, not their militarization. He explained 
that under Omar Torrijos, there was a large police force, 
with a small military force in reserve. Under Noriega the 
percentages were reversed, building a large military force to 
take over for the US after withdrawal. After Operation Just 
Cause in 1989, the U.S. military disbanded the Panamanian 
Defense Forces, but the personnel was not changed, and no new 
police doctrine was imposed. This allowed the 
military-trained Panamanian security services officers (PNP, 
Maritime Service and Air Service) to resist the idea that 
they were really police services, because their leadership 
had a military mentality. This led them to apply military 
tactics to a police mission, according to Salamin, such as 
keeping a large force in reserve, or staging large 
"operations" to sweep up criminals, neither of which makes 
sense in modern policing. Salamin said that at the beginning 
of the Torrijos Administration it was decided to change the 
security doctrine from National Security to one of Citizen 
Security. The idea was that Panama would concentrate on 
internal problems it could hope to handle, and the US and 
international community would worry about external threats to 
the Canal.  As part of this doctrinal shift,  Panama had to 
turn its security forces into real police forces, and target 
criminal and terrorist threats. The security reforms were 
designed to formalize this change. To that end, he said, the 
PNP needed to start patrolling the streets and building up 
community support and knowledge. He said he was aware of our 
community policing program, and strongly supported it. 
 
------------- 
And now what? 
------------- 

¶13.  (C)  Ebrahim Asvat, President of Panama's oldest daily 
La Estrella de Panama and a possible MOGJ Minister if 
Martinelli wins, told POLOFF November 25, 2008 that Panama 
needed to create a Ministry of Public Security to administer 
all the reforms that were required to build an effective 
police force. These included adopting a community policing 
strategy with public participation,  devising a national 
strategy against crime, gathering crime statistics, acquiring 
adequate equipment for the police and re-deploying forces in 
such a way as to prevent crime. Asvat had been a fierce 
critic of the Torrijo's government's security reforms. Yet 
his plans for police reform are largely interchangeable with 
those of Toro, Arcia, Troya or Salamin. Asvat specifically 
praised PROSI as a "great plan", though he noted 
implementation had not been satisfactory. Jaime Abad, a 
former Director of the extinct Judicial Technical Police 
(PTJ), another potential MOGJ Minister if Martinelli wins, 
also supports community policing and the NAS-funded program. 
STEPHENSON