VZCZCXRO9583
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0070/01 0631702
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041702Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6760
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0545

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000070 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR POL: LORD 
PARIS FOR POL: D'ELIA AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF EU FR AU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD ELECTIONS UNLIKELY BEFORE 2010 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
======= 
SUMMARY 
======= 
 
¶1. (SBU) Parliamentary and local elections in Chad are 
unlikely to be held until the first half of 2010, but the 
Chadian parties to the electoral reform process and Chad's 
key international partners remain committed to working 
towards credible elections as agreed in the 2007 August 13 
Accord.  Although not specifically mandated by the August 13 
Accord between the Government, the pro-government majority 
party coalition, and the opposition minority party coalition, 
the goal was for credible elections for parliament and local 
government this year.  Many factors have slowed progress 
toward the 2009 goal, including the rebel attacks of February 
and June 2008, the glacial process of working through complex 
issues according to the canons of Chadian political culture, 
and maneuvering for political advantage among the three sides 
and for personal interest within the three parties. 
 
¶2. (SBU) But the Chadian parties to the Accord, as well as 
its international sponsors and supporters -- the European 
Union, France, Germany, the UN, the Francophonie, and the 
African Union -- are still committed to the continued 
implementation of the electoral reform process in the hope 
that the pace of progress will increase and permit 
legislative and communal polling no later than mid-2010.  The 
August 13 Accord, though flawed and subject to delay both 
from objective factors and from foot-dragging, is still the 
best vehicle available for advancing a democratic agenda in 
Chad.  The USG should stay solidly in step with our partners, 
both Chadian and international, to support the electoral 
reform process and ensure the first round of elections in 
early 2010.  We believe that continued USG financial 
assistance to the general census, and also, if possible, to 
the electoral census, will be the most convincing 
demonstration of our commitment to accompany Chad along the 
(dusty, pot-holed, and largely unpaved) road toward better 
governance and democratic political practice.  END SUMMARY. 
 
================================ 
BACKGROUND: THE AUGUST 13 ACCORD 
================================ 
¶3. (U) In 2004, despite expectations that he was prepared to 
step down, Chadian President Idriss Deby used his majority 
support in Parliament to pass a law to amend the constitution 
to eliminate presidential term limits.  In 2005, a referendum 
approved the amendment and Deby ran successfully for his 
third five-year tem.  Most of the the political opposition 
parties responded by boycotting the May 2006 presidential 
polls, thereby calling into question the election,s 
credibility.  At about the same time, key members of Deby's 
inner circle and fellow members of his Zaghawa ethnic group 
deserted him to join  the ranks of armed Chadian rebel groups 
based in - and supported by ) Sudan, bent on his violent 
overthrow.  Beset by internal political unrest and active 
armed rebel groups based in Sudan, President Deby agreed to 
negotiate with the political opposition and his own majority 
party coalition in talks brokered by the European Union. 
Months of negotiations, funded and facilitated by the EU, 
French, and Germans, led to the signing of the August 13 
Accord in Ndjamena in 2007. 
 
¶4. (U) The August 13 Accord laid out a roadmap toward the 
goal of credible communal and legislative elections in 2009 
and equally credible presidential elections in 2011.  The 
Accord called for a new electoral code, an independent 
electoral commission, two national censuses, one 
"demographic" and the another "electoral," as well as a 
series of political and administrative reforms to increase 
democratic space and foster a political climate conducive to 
credible election outcomes.  In order to implement the 
Accord, an electoral reform committee (Comite de Suivi et 
d'Appui) was established, composed of equal numbers of voting 
members from the MPS majority and the CPDC opposition party 
coalitions, and non-voting government representatives in an 
advisory capacity. 
 
===================== 
WAR DISRUPTS PROGRESS 
===================== 
¶5. (U) From August 2007 until February 2008, implementation 
of the Accord was painfully slow.  The Committee was formed 
and adopted  a set of working procedures.  Discussions began 
on all of the various issues to be addressed.  But progress 
stopped dead in late February 2008, when rebels attacked 
N,Djamena and battled Deby's troops in the streets.  This 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
attack and its aftermath disrupted political and 
administrative operations, and the government was not fully 
functional for weeks, as retreating rebels and local looters 
vandalized government buildings, private businesses, and 
homes alike, destroying infrastructure, archives and records. 
 What is more, the opposition CPDC suspended its 
participation in the Committee,s work, in protest over 
heavy-handed GOC repression in the wake of the attack.  Among 
other actions, the government arrested and detained 
opposition leaders, including Lol Mahamat Choa, the 
Committee,s head.  The CPDC returned to the Committee in 
May, after an independent Commission of Inquiry investigated 
the February events and issued a report detailing the abuses 
committed by GOC security forces. 
 
==================================== 
VESTED INTERESTS AND LACK OF URGENCY 
==================================== 
 
¶6. (SBU) When the Committee resumed its work in May, progress 
on implementation of the Accord was slow and difficult, due 
to maneuvering for political and personal advantage by the 
three sides.  For example, upon receiving draft laws to 
establish the electoral commission and the electoral code 
from the Committee, the National Assembly changed the text 
before approving the laws - even though half the voting 
members of the Committee are majority party members who could 
have incorporated the majority's wishes into the original 
text.  These changes prompted objections by the opposition 
members of the Committee, further delaying implementation of 
the laws. 
 
================================ 
LAWS NOT THE ONLY STICKING POINT 
================================ 
 
¶7. (U)  In addition to finalizing the legal framework for the 
elections and establishing an electoral commission, other key 
pre-election tasks remain incomplete.  The August 13 Accord 
require both a general census and an electoral census 
conducted with biometric measures to deter fraud.  Both 
censuses are behind schedule due to delays in acquiring 
equipment and reduced efficiency during the rainy season, the 
head of the Census Bureau told the press last week, and could 
not be completed to set the stage for elections before 2010. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Committee itself moved slowly in response to the 
opposition's latest objections.  When the opposition members 
on the Committee complained in mid-January 2009, the session 
was suspended - and did not resume for five weeks.  When the 
Committee finally reconvened in late February, it decided to 
form a panel to examine the issue and report back to the full 
Committee, despite the urging of observers, including the 
European Union, the Africa Union, France, and Germany, to act 
more quickly.  The Committee,s leisurely operational pace 
reflected as always the canons of Chad,s political culture. 
A week later, the panel reported to the full Committee that 
it was deadlocked.  Attempts by the French, German, and EU 
diplomatic observers to resolve the stalemate were not 
immediately successful. 
 
================ 
WHAT'S THE RUSH? 
================ 
 
¶9. (SBU) All three parties to the Accord have found reasons 
to drag their feet in this process.  The GOC and President 
Deby are in no hurry for the planned elections and have not 
pushed the electoral reform process forcefully because he is 
in the Palace and his party controls Parliament.  Also, he 
can justify his action ) or lack of it ) to the need for 
the Executive to concentrate on defense of the country 
against clear and present threats from Sudan-based nd 
Khartoum-supported Chad rebels.  The rebel grups, in fact, 
did obligingly attack again in fore in June 2008, but were 
contained by the Chadian army and defeated in eastern Chad, 
whence they retreated into Sudan.  Despite the signature of a 
bilateral Peace Accord in Dakar in March 2008, Chad-Sudan 
relations remained tense, and worsened when Chad-based 
Sudanese rebels attacked Khartoum in May.  The MPS majority 
party coalition likewise is in no hurry to go to elections. 
It already controls Parliament and makes the laws.  Its 
Parliamentary deputies enjoy all the perquisites of power, 
including their handsome salaries and benefits.  It is 
confident of winning the planned elections, but is agnostic 
on the actual date of those elections.  Finally, the CPDC 
minority coalition also does not always feel the urgency of 
 
NDJAMENA 00000070  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
progress toward elections that it believes it will lose in 
any case.  Meanwhile its deputies receive their salaries and 
benefits until that election takes place.  It should be noted 
that all members of the Committee itself receive an 
additional emolument, which they will lose when elections 
happen, an additional motive for restraint on their part. 
 
==================================== 
EU, FRENCH STILL SUPPORT THE PROCESS 
==================================== 
 
¶10. (SBU) Given the state of affairs and based on prior 
experience with the Chadian parties, the European Union and 
the French, who have been the most active and concrete 
supporters of the process, recently have started to admit 
privately that Chad will not hold elections in 2009.  But 
they are unwilling to give up on the August 13 Accord process 
itself and will continue to work with and support the Chadian 
parties on the road to communal and legislative elections in 
the first half of 2010. Other international supporters of the 
process ) Germany, the UN, the AU, the Francophonie, all 
agree with the EU and French on this. 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
¶11. (SBU) It is unfortunate that communal and legislative 
elections look to be delayed until 2010.  But it is good that 
progress toward them continues, though more slowly than we 
would like.  The August 13 Accord is still the best vehicle 
available for advancing a democratic agenda in Chad.  The USG 
should stay solidly in step with our partners, both Chadian 
and international, to support and encourage the electoral 
reform process and to ensure the first round of elections in 
early 2010.  We believe that continued USG financial 
assistance to the general census, and also, if possible, to 
the electoral census, will be the most convincing 
demonstration of our commitment to accompany Chad along the 
(dusty, pot-holed, and largely unpaved) road toward better 
governance and democratic political practice.  As we wait for 
the Committee to hear from its panel, we will remain in 
contact with other observers to consider a coordinated 
response when and if the Government of Chad announces 
elections will not take place this year.   END COMMENT. 
NIGRO