VZCZCXRO2279
OO RUEHGI
DE RUEHNJ #0111/01 0861351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271351Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6827
INFO RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI PRIORITY 1559
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0528

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000111 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SE GRATION, AF/FO, AF/C, AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM PTER MASS LY SU CT CD
SUBJECT: MAKING CHAD A PART OF THE SOLUTION IN DARFUR:  AN 
ACTION PLAN FOR POSITIVE OUTCOMES IN THE REGION 
 
REF: A. 1. NDJAMENA 103 
     ¶B. 2. NDJAMENA 102 
     ¶C. 3. NDJAMENA 100 
     ¶D. 4. NDJAMENA 98 
     ¶E. 5. NDJAMENA 97 
 
This message is Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for Internet 
dissemination. 
 
¶1.  This is an action message:  See para 5 and subsequent. 
 
---------------------------- 
CHAD MOST AFFECTED BY DARFUR 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Besides Sudan itself, Chad is the country most 
affected by the Darfur Crisis.  Virtually all Darfuri 
refugees are in Chad, which also hosts a vast humanitarian 
assistance effort and a UN PKO, MINURCAT.  Darfur-created 
tensions between Chad and Sudan have degenerated into a proxy 
war that has made Chad prey to Sudan-sponsored Chadian 
rebels.  These groups regularly attack, reaching Ndjamena 
twice in the past three years, nearly overturning the 
government, and causing havoc, taking innocent lives and 
destroying infrastructure across the country.  The GOC's 
security needs have led to high defense spending, reduced 
funding for social and economic development, and far less 
attention to elections and government reform than we would 
like. 
 
------------------------ 
GOC SEEKS USG ENGAGEMENT 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The Government of Chad is obsessed with the 
regional nature of the Darfur crisis and seeks to engage with 
the USG to resolve Darfur-created instability.  The GOC is 
eager to see the results of the USG's review of Sudan policy, 
and keen to work with us as we implement policies that 
address problems in Sudan as well as in Chad.  Chadian 
officials hope for U.S. support for, and more active 
involvement in, UN, AU and OIC efforts to manage the Darfur 
crisis and improve Chad-Sudan relations.  They would like 
existing Afro-Arab efforts to include initiatives not only to 
reconcile Sudanese rebels with the GoS but also to end 
Sudanese financial and material support to Chadian rebels. 
Domestically, the threat from Sudan discourages and 
undermines efforts by many, including the current Prime 
Minister, to toward better governance, democratic elections, 
and official transparency.  Chadian officials will need 
considerable encouragement and assistance to move toward 
elections on schedule, to take concrete steps to restore 
relations with IFIs, and to conduct institution-building and 
development of the public sector and economy.  MINURCAT's 
"civilian" mandate to promote human rights and spur judicial 
and penal reform now join robust EU and French efforts to 
promote better and more effective governance. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. INTERESTS 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The USG's humanitarian interests in Darfur are 
obvious.  Our interests in Chad derive from the nation's 
proximity to and implication in the Darfur situation.  The 
USG already invests heavily in Chad:  In 2009, we will spend 
approximately USD 125 million to assist refugees and IDPs, 
and upwards of USD 150 million on MINURCAT.  Chad thus 
already serves as a platform for carrying out our regional 
stabilization goals.  But the current platform is unstable 
and could tip in a negative direction if we do not shore it 
up.  We should keep in mind the extreme fragility of the 
Chadian state, one of the weakest in the world.  Preventing 
Chad from moving toward failing- or failed-state status is a 
legitimate aim of USG policy, and merits greater attention. 
We believe that we can use our presence here more effectively 
by undertaking some if not all of the additional steps 
outlined below. 
 
------------------------------------ 
AN ACTION PLAN FOR REGIONAL PROGRESS 
TOWARD A SOLUTION IN DARFUR 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  That the U.S. consider enhancing 
Darfur policy options by taking actions vis-a-vis Chad and 
the GOC, in the areas of Diplomacy, Democracy/Good 
Governance, Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Security 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  002 OF 003 
 
 
Assistance, and by reinforcing Embassy Ndjamena's ability to 
implement USG policy here, outlined in paras 6-10 below. 
 
--------- 
DIPLOMACY 
--------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The USG could: 
 
-- Re-Designate SE as "Special Envoy for Sudan and Eastern 
Chad" or "Special Envoy for Sudan, Eastern Chad, and 
Northeastern CAR"; 
 
-- Arrange an early visit to Chad by SE Gration; 
 
-- Arrange an early visit to Chad by an AF Bureau senior 
official; 
 
-- Provide an early invitation to a senior Chadian leader to 
visit Washington, with assurances of appropriately high-level 
meetings; 
 
-- Encourage the UK to establish its (planned) diplomatic 
presence here; 
 
-- Encourage Turkey to establish its (planned) diplomatic 
mission here ASAP; 
 
-- Encourage the Saudis to reopen their Embassy here; 
 
-- Consult more closely with the French and EU on Chad; 
 
-- Consult with the Libyans and the Qataris on their efforts 
toward Chad-Sudan reconciliation; 
 
-- Increase USG support to MINURCAT by:  Assigning more U.S. 
military advisers to MINURCAT; assigning U.S. police officers 
to UNPOL; and contributing to the Trust Fund for civil 
affairs projects. 
 
----------------------------- 
DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The USG could: 
 
-- Increase USG assistance to the 2010 election process; 
 
-- Review the USG approach to Chad's relations with the IFIs, 
with a view to encouraging each side to better meet the 
other's expectations; 
 
-- Facilitate meetings in Washington for the Chadian Finance 
Minister and senior officials from Treasury; 
 
-- Consider USG technical assistance to Chad in the area of 
public finance and resource management; 
 
-- Consider deploying a G/TIP TDY team to Chad to provide 
advice on resolving trafficking issues, with the aim of 
avoiding sanctions. 
 
---------------- 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
COOPERATION 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The USG could: 
 
-- Restart military-to-military CT cooperation under TSCTP, 
and reinforce that point with a visit by AFRICOM CG Ward. 
(Restarting TSCTP cooperation is already in train, but will 
be facilitated by resolving Leahy Vetting procedural issues.) 
 
-- Reinforce ongoing civilian CT cooperation, including by 
visits here by senior S/CT and/or ICITAP leaders.  (This also 
will be facilitated by resolution of Leahy Vetting procedural 
issues.) 
 
------------------- 
SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The USG could: 
 
-- Increase funding for IMET and FMS programs; 
 
-- Seek a U.S.-produced alternative to C-130Js for Chad. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
U.S. RESOURCES IN COUNTRY 
------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The USG could: 
 
-- Assign Long-term TDY Reporting Officer to Embassy Ndamena 
dedicated to the situation in Darfur and Eastern Chad. 
 
-- Deploy an S/CRS Team to Chad. 
 
-- Ensure increased USAID/OFDA TDY presence in country. 
 
-- Provide increased travel funding so Embassy Officers could 
make working visits to Khartoum, Tripoli, Paris and Brussels. 
NIGRO