VZCZCXRO8114
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0101/01 0831148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241148Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6807
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1555
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0027
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0199
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0570
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000101 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR GAVIN AND HUDSON, PRM FOR MCKELVEY AND PARKER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF UN CD SU LY
SUBJECT: HUMANITARIAN CONTINGENCY PLANS IN CHAD: LEGAL, 
LOGISTIC, AND HUMAN RESOURCE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 97 
 
NDJAMENA 00000101  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) The recent expulsion of 13 key NGOs implementing 
humanitarian assistance programs in Darfur has sparked 
concern that affected IDPs may consider moving across the 
border into eastern Chad in order to access established 
assistance programs targeting the existing population of 
approximately 250,000 Sudanese refugees hosted in 12 camps 
along the border.  The humanitarian community in Chad is 
generally skeptical that Darfuri IDPs will decide to move 
across the border in large numbers in the short term given 
potential insecurity on the journey and ethnic group 
composition in the refugee camps in Chad.  Nevertheless, UN 
and NGO actors in Chad have begun preparing for possible 
emergency scenarios by convening an interagency contingency 
planning group in Abeche (the humanitarian base of operations 
in eastern Chad) and building a database of individual 
organizations' capacities to respond to a sudden influx of 
refugees.  As the lead agency in charge of this exercise, 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) has 
brought in a Geneva-based planning consultant to get the 
process started. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a series of meetings with Ndjamena-based PRM 
Refugee Coordinator (RefCoord) several UN and NGO partners 
made clear that the humanitarian community would be able to 
provide quick, basic assistance to an inflow of up to 50,000 
refugees for one to two months using current food stocks and 
with existing staff resources.  However, a significantly 
greater number of refugees arriving simultaneously would pose 
problems for organizations in the region without staff 
increases and injections of additional money and supplies 
from donors.  One of the most significant constraints on 
assistance to a possible influx is the reluctance of the GoC 
to allocate land for new camp sites or to allow expansion of 
existing camps.  UNHCR Chad Country Representative Serge Male 
told RefCoord that he had no reason to believe the GoC would 
not honor its commitment to newly arrived refugees under the 
international agreements it has signed.  However, he said the 
GoC clearly is not enthusiastic about the possibility of 
welcoming more Sudanese refugees. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Although UNHCR and organizations like ICRC and IRC 
have the capacity and flexibility to assist with a refugee 
influx in the short term, assistance to a large inflow would 
be impossible to maintain over the medium to long term within 
the current scope of the humanitarian operation in eastern 
Chad.  Even short term assistance would mean short rations 
and decreasing assistance to the existing population of 
Sudanese refugees and Chadian IDPs in the coming year unless 
stocks were immediately replenished through a significant 
injection of goods and money by donors like the USG.  Given 
the harsh and logistically difficult environment in eastern 
Chad, and the reluctance of the GoC to allocate further sites 
for camps, augmenting the scope of the humanitarian operation 
in this fashion would certainly be extremely challenging for 
humanitarians and ultimately very expensive for the 
international community.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
MOST HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES SKEPTICAL OF LARGE-SCALE 
MOVEMENT IN THE NEAR TERM 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ndjamena-based Regional Refugee Coordinator held a 
series of meetings with UN and NGO partners working in 
eastern Chad to determine the status of contingency planning 
for a possible inflow of Sudanese refugees.  The recent 
expulsion of 13 key NGOs implementing humanitarian assistance 
programs in Darfur has sparked concern that affected IDPs 
would be motivated to cross the border into Chad in order to 
access assistance programs already targeting the population 
of approximately 250,000 Sudanese refugees hosted in 12 camps 
along the border.  RefCoord met with ICRC Head of Delegation 
Catherine Deman March 19; she told RefCoord that based on 
analysis from ICRC Sudan staff, she considered it unlikely 
that IDPs in Darfur would cross the border in the near term. 
In a separate conversation March 17, UNHCR Abeche-based 
 
NDJAMENA 00000101  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Deputy Representative Emmanuel Gignac told RefCoord that 
UNHCR colleagues in Darfur had seen no sign of IDP 
preparations to move toward the border.  Gignac said he 
considered major movements unlikely in the next few weeks. 
In a March 23 meeting with RefCoord, OCHA (UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) Country Representative 
Eliane Duthoit said she thought refugees would trickle into 
Chad slowly in small numbers over the next month, but based 
on OCHA's analysis she did not anticipate a large and sudden 
influx from Darfur. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According ICRC's analysis of the situation, IDPs are 
unlikely to be motivated to become refugees in Chad solely on 
the basis of decreasing assistance in Darfur.  IDPs reported 
to ICRC that they were motivated to stay in place because the 
ethnic composition of refugee camps in Chad closest to 
affected IDP camps on the Darfur side was not viewed as 
suitable.  Deman noted that the presence of Sudanese armed 
forces or JEM in the areas surrounding the various IDP camps 
might also act as a deterrent.  ICRC judged that the GoS was 
not, at this point, willing to export the issue of displaced 
Darfuris to Chad, but would prefer to maintain this 
population within its own borders and so retain a significant 
amount of leverage over the international community.  Deman 
said the humanitarian community in Chad was moving cautiously 
in its contingency planning and was unwilling to be too hasty 
in publicizing its capacity to assist further Darfuri 
refugees.  She reported that many organizations felt that 
advertising their capacity to provide services which were 
currently decreasing in Darfur might actually influence IDP 
decisions to move across the border and act as a pull factor. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Differing slightly from other agency assessments, 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) Country Representative 
Philippe Adapoe reported to RefCoord March 20 that refugees 
in Oure Cassoni camp had told IRC staff that they expected 
more refugees to cross the border toward the camp in the 
coming weeks.  Oure Cassoni is the northernmost camp and 
located only a few kilometers from the JEM stronghold in 
Chad.  As noted by Adapoe, movement across the border by IDPs 
in the Zaghawa dominated camps of North Darfur is more likely 
to be politically motivated and directed by the JEM than 
influenced by the decrease in assistance in Darfur. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE UN AND NGOS IN EASTERN CHAD 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) As the UN Agency mandated to assist refugees, UNHCR 
has taken the lead in coordinating interagency contingency 
planning in Chad including sending a Geneva-based consultant 
to Abeche to get the process started.  UNHCR has outlined its 
capacity within the framework of two different scenarios.  In 
the first scenario, the agency could handle an increase in 
the refugee population of approximately 20% or up to 50,000 
refugees if they arrived at several different camps spread 
out along the border.  In fact, a 10-20% increase in 
population per camp would be the most manageable scenario. 
In the second scenario, in which up to 50,000 refugees 
crossed the border at one location, UNHCR would require 
logistic and financial support from outside its Chad 
operation.  Also within this scenario, if there were an 
influx of more than 50,000 refugees whether dispersed or 
concentrated, UNHCR would need to seek additional funding and 
logistic support from headquarters and ultimately from 
donors.  UNHCR has indicated that it would first seek 
increased funding using internal UN mechanisms such as the 
CERF and would make an emergency appeal to donors as a last 
resort. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Nairobi-based Food For Peace Field Officer (FFP) Dan 
Suther reports from meetings with World Food Program (WFP) 
staff that WFP is currently prepositioning quantities of food 
stocks in eastern Chad in preparation for the rainy season, 
which begins in May/June.  These stocks are intended to 
support the existing population of Sudanese refugees and 
Chadian IDPs in the region for the duration of the rainy 
season when many areas are inaccessible to WFP convoys. 
However, drawing down the stocks to support new refugees 
would result in a shortfall in rations unless stocks were 
immediately replenished.  WFP estimates it would need an 
 
NDJAMENA 00000101  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
additional 9,000 metric tons of food in order to support a 
population of 40,000 new refugees for a period of nine 
months.  This would require WFP to take extraordinary 
measures since the organization would not be able to 
transport this amount of food through its normal pipeline as 
quickly as necessary in the event of a new refugee crisis. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) ICRC's Deman said her organization would be able to 
move quickly in coordination with UNHCR to assist new 
refugees with food rations for a population of up to 30,000 
for a period of two months from its own stocks based in 
Abeche and Goz Beida. Some of this stock is in place and the 
rest is on its way to Chad from operations in neighboring 
countries.  ICRC has non-food item (NFI) stocks in place for 
a population of 10,000 and has the capacity to provide water 
in the short term for 10,000 people.  In addition, ICRC has a 
mobile surgical team based in the Abeche hospital consisting 
of one surgeon, one anesthetist, one surgery nurse, and a 
post-operative nurse. 
 
¶10. (SBU) IRC Country Representative Philippe Adapoe and 
visiting IRC Vice President for International Programs Sue 
Dwyer told RefCoord that like most organizations in the East, 
IRC was already operating at full capacity and any refugee 
influx above 10,000 would require an injection of staff and 
resources from other operations.  In the event of a new 
refugee crisis, IRC is considering moving some former Darfur 
team members who were evacuated in the wake of the 
organization's expulsion to Chad, CAR, and South Sudan 
operations to assist overburdened staff in those locations. 
IRC may also place some team members in neighboring 
operations in advance of a possible crisis to help with 
contingency planning. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
KEY CONSTRAINTS ON HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE CAPACITY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11. (SBU) UNHCR Chad Country Representative Serge Male told 
RefCoord March 20 that one of the most important constraint 
affecting assistance to any new Sudanese refugees in Chad 
would be the reluctance of the GoC to accept them or allocate 
land for the settlement of new camps or extension of existing 
camps.  The GoC has consistently refused to consider creating 
any new camps or expanding the current camps.  Approximately 
10,000 Sudanese refugees crossing the border near Birak in 
February 2008 was forced to wait at the border for several 
weeks until UNHCR was able to negotiate GoC acceptance to 
placing them in existing camps.  The majority of the camps in 
Chad are currently at capacity and would not be able to host 
a large number of new arrivals without expanding their 
physical borders or becoming significantly overcrowded. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Based on his meeting with the Minister of the 
Interior the week of March 17, Male said he had no reason to 
believe the GoC would not honor its commitment to newly 
arrived refugees under the international agreements it has 
signed.  However, he said the GoC clearly is not enthusiastic 
about the possibility of welcoming more Sudanese refugees. 
Male said that for the time being, UNHCR planned to proceed 
cautiously in urging the GoC to acknowledge and get ready for 
a potential refugee inflow.  UNHCR is hesitant to press the 
government to discuss specific topics like possible locations 
for new camps until there is more evidence of movement from 
Darfuri IDPs.  Male noted that UNHCR would approach the Prime 
Minister directly on the issue of new camp sites in the event 
of a large-scale movement into Chad.  Other constraints on UN 
and NGO capacity to respond to a new refugee crisis include a 
slight depletion of NFIs and shelter supplies used to respond 
to the arrival of 7,000-8,000 Central African refugees in 
southern Chad.  In addition, the logistic difficulty of 
providing water in the northernmost camps like Oure Cassoni 
and Am Nabak would be multiplied with the arrival of many 
more refugees.  Lack of water in eastern Chad is another key 
constraint on organizations' ability to provide increased 
assistance quickly. 
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COMMENT 
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¶13. (SBU) Although UNHCR and partners like ICRC and IRC do 
 
NDJAMENA 00000101  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
have the capacity and flexibility to assist with a refugee 
influx in the short term, assistance to a large inflow would 
be impossible to maintain over the medium to long term within 
the current scope of the humanitarian operation in eastern 
Chad.  Even short-term assistance would mean short rations 
and decreasing assistance to the existing population of 
Sudanese refugees and Chadian IDPs along the border in the 
coming year unless stocks were immediately replenished 
through a significant injection of goods and money by donors 
like the USG.  Given the harsh and logistically difficult 
environment in eastern Chad, and the reluctance of the GoC to 
allocate further sites for camps, augmenting the scope of the 
humanitarian operation in this fashion would certainly be 
extremely challenging for humanitarian actors and ultimately 
very expensive for the international community. 
 
¶14. Minimize Considered 
 
NIGRO