VZCZCXRO8132
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0100/01 0830939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240939Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6805
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0197
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0568
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE IMMEDIATE 0025

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
LONDON FOR POL -- PLORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- GD'ELIA AND RKANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU CD
SUBJECT: USG SHOULD PUSH BRITISH TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC 
PRESENCE IN CHAD, AS THEY SAY THEY INTEND TO DO. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000100  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
This message is Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for Internet 
dissemination. 
 
¶1. (U)  This is an action message:  See para 11 below. 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The British are considering establishing a small 
diplomatic presence in Chad, but Canada is planning no 
mission in the near term, according to visiting British and 
Canadian diplomats here last week.  The British say they 
wanted direct, on-the-ground information-gathering 
capabilities, particularly on the Deby regime and any 
alternatives to it that might emerge.  The Canadians say that 
their unwillingness to consider opening a mission at the 
present time is based on Chad's failure to make the sort of 
progress toward democratization and development that would 
render it "deserving" of even a small upgrade in diplomatic 
relations.  We encouraged both the British and the Canadians 
to take greater interest in Chad and told the British that we 
looked forward to cooperating closely with any UK diplomat 
posted here.  A British presence would mean that all of the 
UNSC Perm-5 would be resident in Chad, especially important 
now that MINURCAT is reinforced and as long as the 
humanitarian effort in the East and South continues.  We also 
offered to consult on security with UK and Canadian diplomats 
resident or visiting. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) It is unfortunate that the Canadians do not intend 
to upgrade their relations with Chad.  The British have been 
talking about posting a diplomat here for years, but have yet 
to move.  It is in the U.S. interest for more international 
attention to be focused on Chad, especially in light of the 
standup of MINURCAT and prospects for greater humanitarian 
assistance in eastern and southern Chad, depending on 
developments in Darfur and CAR.  The diplomatic presence in 
Ndjamena of additional like-minded countries works to that 
end.  At a minimum, the USG should approach HMG to encourage 
the British to figure out logistics of a UK diplomatic 
presence and implement their stated intention of deploying 
here.   END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Brits Serious about Locating Here 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) On March 17, DCM, DATT and poloff met with UK Second 
Secretary Giles Montangnon of the High Commission in Yaounde. 
 Montagnon said that HMG "had more or less decided" to post 
an officer to Chad, in part because the UK felt that its 
proxy arrangement with France -- whereby London makes itself 
available to cover French equities in former British colonies 
and Paris does the same for London in former French colonies 
-- was not yielding  completely satisfactory results from the 
British point of view.  According to Montagnon, HMG felt that 
the French were too willing to conclude that the Deby regime 
deserved full support as the only conceivable governing 
entity in Chad. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Montagnon made clear that HMG had initially hoped to 
post an officer at the U.S. mission, as it had had this 
arrangement in some other African locations with great 
success.  It was aware that we did not have room, and so was 
exploring other options.  Britain very much wanted to have 
first-hand knowledge of events in Chad, said Montagnon, and 
to be less reliant on French perceptions. Montagnon asked 
whether U.S. felt isolated in Chad, "surrounded by 
Francophones." 
 
¶6. (SBU) We made clear that we had an excellent relationship 
with the French, but added that the USG would welcome even a 
small and/or temporary UK diplomatic presence in Chad, and 
that we looked forward to cooperating closely with any UK 
diplomat posted here.  We noted that a UK presence would mean 
that all of the UNSC Perm-5 would be resident in Chad, 
especially important now that MINURCAT was reinforced and as 
long as the humanitarian effort in the East and South 
continued. We repeated a long-standing offer to consult on 
security with UK officials, including with respect to 
emergency action planning.  We reviewed the reasons that we 
 
NDJAMENA 00000100  002.4 OF 002 
 
 
were not in a position to provide work space in our 
facilities, repeating what we had told visiting UK diplomats 
in 2008.  We told Montagnon that we enjoyed excellent working 
relationships not only with the French, but also with the 
Germans, EU, Russians, Chinese and small Africans nations 
that maintained a presence here, as well as with the UN. 
 
----------------------------- 
Canadians are Negative on GOC 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) On March 16, DCM and poloff meet with Canada's Lan 
Hoang, political officer at the High Commission in Yaounde, 
and Kirk Duguid, desk officer for Chad at the Canadian MFA. 
Duguid made clear that Ottawa was not for the time being 
contemplating either opening a mission locally or posting a 
single diplomat here, as the British were now considering. 
The Canadians said that Chad had not made the sort of 
progress toward democratization or development that would 
render it deserving of such a step on Canada's part.  Duguid 
recalled that although the GOC had a year ago approached the 
Canadian government about opening a Chadian mission in Ottawa 
-- and the Canadians had assented -- there had been no 
further action from the Chadian side.  He noted that Canada 
also was quite frustrated with Chadian "nonchalance" about 
Ottawa's demining support -- areas that had been demined with 
Canadian assistance were remined again immediately afterward. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Duguid also noted that Canada had found the Chadian 
response to the hostage-taking of the two Canadian diplomats 
in Mali inadequate, particularly in that one of them, Louis 
Guay, was accredited to Chad.  Neither Duguid nor Hoang could 
offer information on the current status of the hostages or of 
Canadian efforts to free them. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) After expressing our extreme concern and sympathy 
for our Canadian colleagues detained in Niger, we encouraged 
greater interest by Canada in Chad, citing MINURCAT, the 
humanitarian effort in the East and South, the prospects of 
elections here, perhaps early next year, and development 
needs.  We said that the USG would welcome more Canadian 
attention to Chad and that we would naturally continue to 
cooperate closely with any Canadian  diplomats visiting here, 
as we had with Louis Guay. We told the Canadians as we had 
the British that we enjoyed excellent working relationships 
with our French, German, EU, Russian, Chinese and UN 
colleagues, as well as with those from African states with 
missions here. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶10.  It is unfortunate that the Canadians do not intend to 
upgrade their relations with Chad.  The British have been 
talking about posting a diplomat here for years, but have yet 
to move.  The French have told us that they would welcome a 
UK mission as a way to supply London with accurate 
information on developments in Chad.  It is in the U.S. 
interest for more international attention to be focused on 
Chad, especially in light of the standup of MINURCAT and 
likelihood of greater humanitarian need in eastern and 
southern Chad, depending on developments in Darfur and CAR. 
The diplomatic presence here of like-minded countries would 
work to that end.  At a minimum, the USG should approach HMG 
to encourage the British to figure out the logistics of a UK 
diplomatic presence and implement their stated intention to 
deploy. 
 
----------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Request for Action:  That the USG formally 
approach HMG to encourage the British to implement their 
stated intention to establish a diplomatic presence in Chad. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli Minimize considered. 
NIGRO