VZCZCXRO6896
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0571/01 0820925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230925Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8906
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6434
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3142
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3006
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4583
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000571 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR PRM.AFR, PRM/MCE, AF/E, GENEVA FOR RMA, 
BRUSSELS FOR POL/PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV EAID PHUM KE ET SO
SUBJECT: KENYA: GOK THOUGHTS ON DADAAB REFUGEES AND FOURTH 
CAMP 
 
¶1. Summary: Government of Kenya (GOK) officials underscored 
the need for a "special solution for a special problem" 
during a recent discussion about Somali refugees in Kenya 
with representatives of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, 
and Migration (PRM). They highlighted Kenya's waning patience 
with hosting refugees due to the deleterious effects of 
refugees on the fragile environment and water resources, as 
well as the proliferation of human and drug trafficking and 
small weapons smuggling. The GOK remains skeptical of UNHCR's 
willingness to respond to their concerns and insists that any 
new camp for refugees should automatically include conditions 
for host community development. They also cited the need for 
more humanitarian activities within Somalia to keep Somalis 
from fleeing their country. Some progress has occurred in 
regards to the allocation of additional land in Dadaab, but 
the GOK officials insist that UNHCR demonstrate "honest 
goodwill" by initiating the transfer of some refugees to 
Kakuma (at UNHCR expense) and developing and allocating funds 
for local development projects before a final decision can be 
made. End summary. 
 
¶2. Visiting US Mission Geneva Refugee and Migration Counselor 
Peter Mulrean hosted a March 12 dinner for key government of 
Kenya (GOK) representatives to hear Kenyan concerns and 
solutions for mitigating the growing disquiet over Dadaab 
refugee issues. GOK representatives included Member of 
Parliament (MP) for Lagadera constituency and Deputy Speaker 
of Parliament Farah Maalim; MP for Fafi constituency and 
Assistant Minister for Public Service Aden Sugow; Permanent 
Secretary (PS) in the Ministry of States for Internal 
Security and Provincial Administration Francis Kimemia; and 
PS in the Ministry of Immigration and Registration of Persons 
Emmanuel Kisombe. Canadian Political Counselor Richard 
LeBars; Nairobi Political Counselor Mitch Benedict; Nairobi 
Political Specialist Michael Kamau, along with the Regional 
Refugee Coordinators from Embassies Addis and Nairobi rounded 
out the discussion participants. 
 
------------------------------- 
"Not Business as Usual Anymore" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. GOK representatives were unanimous in their feeling that, 
having hosted Somali refugees for the past 18 years in a very 
fragile environment, Kenyan patience was waning. Citing a 
host of deleterious effects caused by refugees in Dadaab, 
including environmental degradation and further depletion of 
very limited water resources, loss of livelihoods, increased 
insecurity, and proliferation of human and small arms 
trafficking, the Kenyan representatives said automatic 
agreement to UNHCR requests was no longer possible. They 
added that future GOK agreements would include 
"conditionalities" ensuring that the long-term effects on 
local communities of hosting large numbers of refugees would 
be addressed. Skepticism that UNHCR would be voluntarily 
responsive to the needs of local communities was underscored 
by MP Maalim who said UNHCR acted like "an occupying force" 
and did not listen to local communities. GOK representatives 
said they needed to get the UN beyond talking only of "camp, 
camp, camp" and to address the refugee problem in more 
comprehensive, holistic terms. 
 
------------------------- 
"Keep Somalis in Somalia" 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. GOK solutions to addressing Somali refugee issues in Kenya 
were linked to addressing humanitarian needs inside Somalia. 
Citing the daily departure of 10-15 minibuses from Dadaab to 
Mogadishu, one MP wondered why it was not possible to promote 
refugee returns to southern Somalia or why the international 
community did not initiate programs inside Somalia to "keep 
Somalis in Somalia." The MP said food aid could be delivered 
to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia via 
Kenya limiting the need for Somalis to seek refuge in Kenya 
to obtain food. He also argued that Kenyan NGOs were willing 
and able to implement cross-border and development projects 
inside Somalia if international agencies were unable to do 
 
NAIROBI 00000571  002 OF 003 
 
 
so. MP Maalim asserted that if UNHCR anchored Somalis in 
Somalia in the same manner it anchored Sudanese in southern 
Sudan, Somalis would begin repatriating. PS Kisombe concurred 
that a comprehensive plan needed to be developed that 
included increased border control and security vetting of 
refugees. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Security Concerns Linked to Refugees 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. Security concerns were also linked to the growing presence 
of Somali refugees in Kenya. PS Kimemia said keeping refugees 
in the Dadaab area has become a national security threat, 
referring to the growing influence refugees have on local 
communities by the Somali refugees bringing their "outside 
conflicts and dynamics" to Kenya while young Kenyan-Somali 
men leave Kenya for militia training inside Somalia. 
Referring to refugee camps as "small kingdoms", Kimemia said 
camps were outside GOK control and that prosecuting refugees 
for crimes committed in and around the camps was very 
difficult under Kenyan law. In particular, Kimemia expressed 
concern about the increase in drug trafficking through Dadaab 
(with drugs taken off ships by pirates) and the training of 
suicide bombers either in the camps or in Somalia. Proposing 
both the transfer of refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma and the 
erection of fences around existing camps to control refugee 
movements as methods to increase security, Kimemia said UNHCR 
is resisting both options as too expensive. 
 
¶6. When asked if the re-opening of the Liboi transit center 
(located very close to the Kenya-Somalia border) to conduct 
security and health screening of incoming refugees would 
increase the Kenyan sense of security, GOK representatives 
agreed that more vetting of refugees was needed, but 
intimated they preferred to retain the "closed" border policy 
instituted in January 2007. They preferred to concentrate 
efforts on enhancing the capacity of Kenyan officials to 
police the Kenya/Somalia border through training, provision 
of resources such as vehicles and fuel to patrol the border, 
and receiving funds to deploy at least one police division 
(and possibly, counter-terrorism troops) along the border. 
Kimemia also said that the GOK would support the idea of 
increasing the number of police to cover the Dadaab area, but 
did not have the funding to maintain them there. He also felt 
police there should be trained in handling refugees, as well 
as some with counter-terrorism training to monitor activities 
in and around the camps. 
 
-------------------- 
Progress on the Land 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. MP Sugow clarified that the Garissa Council approved land 
for an additional camp of 2,000 hectares on the understanding 
that 30,000 refugees from the existing camp in Hagadera (and 
not new arrivals) would be relocated there. This would reduce 
the health, environmental, and security threats posed by the 
severely overcrowded Hagadera camp. (Comment: UNHCR is 
planning for the new camp on the basis that 2,000 hectares 
can accommodate up to 120,000 refugees. GOK Refugee 
Commissioner Peter Kusimba referred to the new camp holding 
up to 100,000 in a recent meeting. End comment.) MP Sugow 
also said UNHCR would first have to build the camp's 
infrastructure before refugees could be transferred to 
minimize UNHCR's inclination to encamp refugees on the site 
prior to its being sufficiently ready to accommodate refugees. 
 
¶8. MP Maalim foreshadowed a delay in awarding land to UNHCR 
by indicating that the Kenyan Land Trust required a 14-day 
period for public comment or objection to the allocation of 
public land, and that he was sure there would be objections 
to the Garissa Council's decision. The officials were in 
agreement that while the local community could allocate the 
land, the final decision on the issue was the domain of the 
central government. Some of the conditionalities raised by 
GOK representatives included fencing in of all refugee camps 
to control the movement of refugees, elimination of all 
 
NAIROBI 00000571  003 OF 003 
 
 
refugee livestock herds, and the transfer of 30,000 refugees 
to Kakuma. MP Sugow also strongly advocated that refugees 
should no longer be allowed to collect firewood; instead, a 
community-based organization could be established to collect 
firewood and then sell it to UNHCR or the refugees as a way 
to both protect the environment and promote local development. 
 
------------------------------------- 
"Let's See UNHCR Make the First Move" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. GOK representatives agreed that the burden was on UNHCR to 
demonstrate "honest goodwill" by initiating the transfer of 
refugees from Dadaab to Kakuma, a UNHCR commitment that 
evoked skepticism among the GOK participants. All GOK 
representatives agreed that developing a plan and allocating 
funding to address community needs was another priority 
action step UNHCR had to initiate (particularly plans to 
address environmental degradation) before a final decision on 
a fourth camp could be made. GOK representatives said if 
UNHCR began movement on these issues, they would work on 
getting formal allocation of land for a fourth camp. GOK 
representatives also wanted the UN to develop a coordinated 
plan to reduce the Somali refugee burden in Kenya that 
included funding for a Kenyan national security plan and 
cross-border operations that would facilitate the 
repatriation of Somalis back to Somalia. Of note, the GOK 
representatives presented different figures for the number of 
refugees to be transferred to Kakuma, originally stating 
30,000 but then changing the number to 50,000. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. The frank dinner conversation underscored the 
frustrations of GOK officials not only with the burden of 
hosting Somali refugees but also with UNHCR and the 
international community, which they see as only asking more 
of Kenya without addressing Kenya's needs. The process of how 
exactly to acquire additional land seems to be kept 
deliberately vague to allow these officials or others in the 
GOK to block approval of the land unless their conditions 
(which have not yet been officially submitted to UNHCR) are 
met. Addressing the security concerns is also critical in 
"unlocking" the allocation of land, but whether UNHCR and/or 
the UN Country Team can meet these conditionalities remains 
to be seen. In order to get agreement for a fourth camp, 
UNHCR has to build confidence within the GOK that it is not 
only concerned about refugees, but their impact as well. 
Developing a long-term environmental rehabilitation plan with 
committed funding would be one example of a measure to build 
that confidence. Addressing security concerns about the 
cross-border movement of Somalis would be another. These are 
areas that go well beyond UNHCR's mandate, however. The 
international community may need to prepare for more than a 
"symbolic" transfer of refugees to Kakuma and to continue 
pushing the UN to develop a more comprehensive plan to 
minimize the refugee burden on Kenya. 
RANNEBERGER