VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0533/01 0631502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD39B0DB MSI4525-695)
P 041502Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2231
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000533 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR 
AFGHANISTAN COOPERATION 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  In a February 11 roundtable with 
visiting SCA DAS Patrick Moon, Russian experts on Afghanistan 
and Central Asia observed that Russia needed the U.S. to 
succeed in Afghanistan as it lacked the psychological 
 
capacity and the financial and military resources to get 
directly involved in the country again.  They argued 
cooperation on Afghanistan should serve the strategic goal of 
improving U.S.-Russian relations; conversely resolving some 
of the more prickly issues such as missile defense and NATO 
enlargement could help improve Russian willingness to 
cooperate on Afghanistan.  The analysts worried that some 
degree of competition and zero-sum game between the U.S. and 
Russia was inevitable given the energy, resource, and 
strategic implications of the South and Central Asian region, 
and discussed GOR claims that there was no link between 
Russian assistance and Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas 
air base.  Nevertheless, they believed that Russia had 
genuine concerns about the worsening situation in Afghanistan 
and shared mutual interests with the U.S. in countering the 
Taliban and ensuring stability.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  During his February 9-11 visit to Moscow for 
Afghanistan consultations with the GOR (septel), Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 
Patrick Moon held a roundtable discussion with Russian 
experts.  The attendees included Yevgeniy Volk of the 
Heritage Foundation, Aleksandr Lukin of the Center for East 
Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at the 
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), 
Gennadiy Chufrin of the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO), Aleksandr Golts of the 
online publication The Daily Journal, and Sergey Kortunov of 
the World Politics Department of the Higher School of 
Economics. 
 
Mutual Interests in Afghanistan 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The experts unanimously agreed that the U.S. and 
Russia shared mutual interests in Afghanistan and that 
cooperation was essential.  Russia needed the U.S. to succeed 
in Afghanistan, as the GOR lacked the financial and military 
resources to play a leading role in countering the myriad of 
challenges that could have destabilizing effects on the 
region.  Sergey Kortunov was particularly blunt in stating 
that as Russia was psychologically incapable of getting 
militarily involved in Afghanistan again, U.S. troops were 
doing the job for Russia.  The experts welcomed the recent 
positive statements by the U.S. and the GOR on the need to 
cooperate on Afghanistan and saw the February 10-11 
consultations, the first face-to-face formal dialogue between 
our two governments since President Obama's inauguration, as 
a positive step in "resetting" the bilateral relationship. 
 
Cooperation Should Serve the Great Bilateral Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The analysts stated that cooperation on 
Afghanistan should serve the larger strategic goal of a 
better U.S.-Russian relationship, one characterized by 
respect and mutual cooperation.  They all dismissed GOR 
claims that there was no link between Russian assistance to 
Kyrgyzstan and Bakiyev's decision to close Manas air base. 
Respect and the wish to be taken seriously as the country 
with a historical dominance and special interests in Central 
Asia were behind these machinations, they contended.  They 
suggested that Russia believed it had not been treated as an 
equal by the U.S., and now that Russia had recovered from its 
weakened state of the 1990s, the GOR was sending reminders 
that Moscow was at the center when it came to security issues 
in the region.  Thus, while the GOR seemed to be giving mixed 
signals, offering transit rights to the U.S. and NATO on the 
one hand but allegedly engineering behind-the-scenes the 
closure of Manas on the other, in reality, it had a clear 
strategy to induce the U.S. away from individual Central 
Asian governments toward dealing with Russia.  They argued 
that Manas was a minor and transitory issue that could be 
resolved relatively quickly through negotiations with Moscow. 
 The way it was resolved, however, should contribute to the 
overall understanding between Washington and Moscow on the 
direction of the bilateral relationship. 
 
And Vice Versa 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  At the same time, the overall direction of the 
bilateral relationship and the resolution of important 
strategic issues could help determine the degree to which the 
U.S. and Russia cooperated on Afghanistan.  Aleksandr Golts 
observed that Moscow took a global view of its relations with 
 
the U.S. and had often been frustrated by Washington's 
cherry-picking approach, seeking cooperation on some issues, 
disagreeing on a few issues of importance to Russia, and 
simply ignoring Russian views on others.  Noting that the GOR 
tended not to compartmentalize in such a manner, the experts 
suggested that Moscow, in its wish to emphasize that 
cooperation was a two-way street, wanted the U.S. to 
compromise on issues such as missile defense and NATO 
enlargement in exchange for meaningful collaboration on 
Afghanistan.  IMEMO's Gennadiy Chufrin observed that how the 
U.S. set the tone for the bilateral relationship, whether one 
of cooperation or competition, could determine the range of 
possible joint activities between our two countries and the 
degree to which Russia would be willing to be helpful on 
Afghanistan.  If the U.S. chose cooperation--with the implied 
compromises on the more strategic issues of NATO, missile 
defense, and START--the transit of military equipment through 
Russia was a possibility in addition to the current agreement 
on the transit of non-lethal supplies to ISAF.  What both 
governments must avoid, Chufrin stressed, was the temptation 
to start a modern version of the Great Game, which was not in 
the real interests of either country. 
 
Is Zero-Sum Unavoidable? 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Yet parts of the Russian government may indeed 
have the Great Game or a zero-sum game in mind, some of the 
experts suggested.  According to Sergey Kortunov, if the GOR 
was behind the Kyrgyz announcement on Manas, it meant that 
there were influential voices in the Russian security forces 
who held zero-sum views and that they had succeeded in 
pushing a bad policy onto the Russian decision-makers. 
Others agreed that the GOR might be more interested in using 
Afghanistan as a card in a bigger global game, even though 
Russia had genuine concerns about the potential spill-over 
effects of instability in Afghanistan.  Yevgeniy Volk argued 
that Washington should be realistic about the scope of 
U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, as a certain degree 
of competition was inevitable because of the enormous energy, 
natural resources, and strategic implications of the South 
and Central Asian region.  In some cases, competition might 
overshadow the inclination to cooperate. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  In response to DAS Moon's question on whether 
competition or zero-sum was truly inevitable, Golts answered 
that as long as mutual deterrence remained the foundation of 
our bilateral relationship, the two countries would 
inevitably turn to competition whenever problems arose, no 
matter how much talk of cooperation existed.  In this regard, 
the U.S. should remedy the Bush Administration's mistake of 
steadily ignoring disarmament, and resolve the outstanding 
START issue as soon as possible.  Otherwise, the basic 
foundation of the relationship would always be fundamentally 
zero-sum. 
 
Genuine Concerns about Afghanistan 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Despite their views on Russia's inclination to 
view Afghanistan through the prism of strategic interests 
vis-a-vis the U.S., the experts were unequivocal that Russia, 
as well as the Central Asian countries, had genuine concerns 
about the situation in Afghanistan.  According to them, the 
pervasive view in Russia and Central Asia was that the 
security situation was worsening and drug trafficking in the 
region was increasing.  For countries such as Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in particular, the narcotics 
problem was growing, fueled by both internal factors as well 
as the supply from Afghanistan.  Lukin argued that 
Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas was not just about money 
and pressure from Moscow; it also reflected Bishkek's 
dissatisfaction with a perceived U.S. inability to stabilize 
Afghanistan and ensure security in Central Asia.  The Central 
Asian countries were questioning whether the U.S. could 
guarantee their security as well as Russia could.  The Manas 
announcement was thus Bishkek's way of signaling that it was 
seeking alternative security guarantees from the region, 
including Russia, the SCO, and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The experts were skeptical of recent poll results 
from groups such as the Asia Foundation that suggested only 
15 percent of the Afghan population supported the Taliban, 
noting that they had seen other data indicating that the 
Taliban's support base was growing, possibly as high as 30 
percent.  Even assuming the 15 percent figure to be accurate, 
this still indicated an enormous capacity for sustained 
guerrilla warfare, they noted.  Golts warned the U.S. not to 
repeat the Soviet mistake of putting undue focus on civil 
 
reconstruction projects as a way to demonstrate an improved 
situation in the country, as they came at the expense of 
addressing the more urgent security challenges.  Lukin agreed 
that getting control of the security situation was the top 
priority, and in this connection questioned the wisdom of 
focusing too much attention on the democratization process 
and the voter registration efforts for the upcoming 
presidential elections.  In his view, introducing too much 
democracy at this stage was dangerous, as Afghanistan needed 
first and foremost a leader who could have effective control 
of the country, rather than a leader who could get the most 
votes. 
BEYRLE