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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW504, UNITED RUSSIA WINS BIG DESPITE LETHARGIC TURNOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW504 2009-03-02 15:14 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO6912
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0504/01 0611514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021514Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2190
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000504 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM RS
SUBJECT: UNITED RUSSIA WINS BIG DESPITE LETHARGIC TURNOUT 
 
REF: MOSCOW 489 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Despite decreased voter turnout, United 
Russia unsurprisingly won all nine regional elections held 
March 1.  Although framed by the Communists as a referendum 
on the regime's anti-crisis measures, KPRF made only modest 
gains in key regions where it had hoped to break United 
Russia's hold on power.  Decreased turnout indicated less a 
protest against United Russia and its leaders than a 
deepening belief among Russians that they cannot influence 
the political process.  United Russia won a majority 
everywhere except in Volgograd and Nenets Autonomous Region 
and, as in past elections, it performed best in regions with 
strong central governments (Tatarstan, 
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria).  The 
Communists won seats in all regions but did not receive more 
than 28 percent (in Vladimir) in any one election; the 
ultra-nationalist LDPR and Just Russia passed the 7-percent 
threshold in seven regions; Patriots of Russia met the 
threshold in two regions.  Allegations of electoral or 
campaign fraud have emerged particularly in Tatarstan.  End 
Summary. 
 
United Russia Wins Big, As Expected 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On March 1, regional parliamentary elections were 
held in Tatarstan, Volgograd, Kabardino-Balkaria, 
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Khakassia, Arkhangelsk, Bryansk, 
Vladimir, and Nenets Autonomous Region (reftel).  United 
Russia unsurprisingly won in all nine regions, although 
preliminary reports indicated the party did not receive a 
majority in Vladimir or Nenets Autonomous Region.  As it did 
in October 2008 regional elections, United Russia performed 
best in regions with strong central governments (Tatarstan, 
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria) where 
get-out-the-vote efforts and local media restrictions more 
effectively hampered opposition efforts.  United Russia also 
campaigned vigorously until the last possible moment, with 
Premier Putin publicly calling February 27 (at the legal 
cutoff for campaigning) for continued support of the 
government and its programs despite the economic situation. 
 
3. (SBU) All four State Duma parties were on the ballots in 
all nine regions, but only United Russia and the Communists 
met the 7-percent threshold in all nine.  Despite hopes by 
party leaders to best United Russia in Bryansk or Vladimir, 
the Communists took only 23 percent and 28 percent in those 
regions, respectively.  Just Russia and LDPR reached the 
threshold in seven regions each.  Patriots of Russia, which 
was on three regional ballots, met the threshold in 
Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Khakassia. 
 
Communists and LDPR Allege Fraud 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Communists and the ultra-nationalist LDPR have 
alleged electoral or campaign fraud in several regions, most 
notably in Tatarstan where LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy 
demanded the resignation of the region's president and 
electoral commission.  The Communists conducted "parallel 
counts" on March 1, which matched official results in some 
regions (such as Volgograd) but varied widely in others (such 
as Bryansk).  The Communists have threatened to protest 
vigorously any electoral fraud, but Central Electoral 
Commission chair Vladimir Churov said March 1 that there were 
only 23 reports of irregularities.  Electoral rights NGO 
Golos reported March 2 that it received a large number of 
reports of fraud in Tatarstan. 
 
Lower Turnout Shows Economic Crisis Not Yet Political 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5. (SBU) Dmitriy Oreshkin, president of the Mercator Group, 
postulated to us March 2 that voter turnout was lower than 
previous regional elections because voters did not yet 
consider the economic crisis to be a political crisis. 
Election results were predictable, Oreshkin added, because 
elections are "no longer an instrument of cooperation between 
society and elites."  Society knows that too, he noted, which 
led to a lower turnout on election day.  A December 2008 
Levada Center poll confirmed this hypothesis, as it revealed 
that only 8 percent of Russians agreed that they could 
influence the political process.  Golos' Aleksandr Kynev 
speculated March 2 that turnout also was lower because, due 
to the economic crisis, the government was unable to 
adequately fund efforts to drum up the vote.  Voters 
therefore were neither internally nor externally motivated to 
go to the polls.  Without confidence that elections affect 
politics or that the economic crisis could be corrected 
through political change, the lower turnout was as 
 
MOSCOW 00000504  002 OF 002 
 
 
unsurprising as United Russia's margin of victory. 
 
Preliminary Results 
------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Regional electoral commissions reported the 
following results on March 2: 
 
-- Tatarstan (79 percent turnout, down slightly from 83 
percent in 2004 elections): United Russia took an 
overwhelming 79 percent of the vote, up from 69 percent in 
2004.  The Communists took 11 percent (up from 6 percent in 
the last regional election), while Just Russia (5 percent) 
and LDPR (3 percent) failed to meet the threshold.  LDPR and 
the Communists both have alleged repeated campaign fraud 
against the Tatarstan electoral commission. 
 
-- Volgograd (42 percent turnout): United Russia fell just 
short of a majority with 49 percent of the vote.  The 
Communists took 24 percent (down 2 percent from the last 
regional election), Just Russia received 13 percent, and LDPR 
won 10 percent.  Patriots of Russia garnered just 1 percent. 
The Communists reported that their "parallel count" closely 
matched official results. 
 
-- Karachayevo-Cherkessia (77 percent turnout): United Russia 
received 70 percent; the Communists 10 percent; and Patriots 
of Russia 11 percent. LDPR (3 percent) and Just Russia (5 
percent) missed the threshold. 
 
-- Kabardino-Balkaria (82 percent turnout): United Russia 
reportedly won an overwhelming majority with 72 percent; Just 
Russia received 12 percent; and the Communists (8 percent) 
and LDPR (7 percent) also cleared the threshold. 
 
-- Khakassia (50 percent turnout): United Russia received 57 
percent; the Communists 15 percent (up from 7 percent in the 
last regional election); LDPR 10 percent; Just Russia 7 
percent; and Patriots of Russia 7 percent. 
 
-- Bryansk (48 percent turnout, reportedly down from previous 
elections): United Russia won 54 percent, the Communists 24 
percent (up 5 percent from the last regional election), LDPR 
10 percent, and Just Russia 9 percent.  The Communists 
reported that their "parallel count" varied widely from the 
official count, with United Russia taking 35 percent, KPRF 34 
percent, LDPR 17 percent, and Just Russia 10 percent in their 
own tally.  KPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov had said repeatedly 
that he believed the Communists would beat United Russia in 
the region. 
 
-- Vladimir (34 percent turnout, below the expected 45 
percent): United Russia reportedly won 51 percent of the 
vote, with the Communists receiving their best result of the 
day with 28 percent (up from 20 percent in the last regional 
election).  Just Russia and LDPR each took 9 percent. 
 
-- Nenets Autonomous Region (49 percent, which Kommersant 
reported was less than the last election): United Russia had 
its worst showing of the day with just 42 percent of the 
vote. The Communists took 21 percent; LDPR had its best 
result of the day with 20 percent, and Just Russia won 13 
percent.  The recent firing of the region's governor and 
other United Russia infighting had been expected to depress 
the party's turnout. 
 
-- Arkhangelsk (38 percent turnout): United Russia won 52 
percent of the vote.  Just Russia picked up 18 percent, the 
Communists took 17 percent (up from 9 percent in the last 
election), and LDPR garnered 10 percent. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) Hamstrung by media access restrictions and an 
unmotivated electorate, the opposition proved unable to turn 
these regional elections into the anti-crisis referendum it 
had hoped for.  So long as Russians overwhelmingly believe 
that they cannot influence the political process (according 
to the Levada poll), institutional inertia will thwart 
efforts to cast the economic crisis as a political problem 
whose course can be changed.  As a result, with March 1 
results evidence that economic despair does not lead directly 
to electoral comeuppance, the ruling regime will remain safe 
as the "legitimately elected" government for the foreseeable 
future. 
BEYRLE