VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMV #0227/01 0891609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD49CF61 MSI2864-695)
R 301609Z MAR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0905
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0289
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1164
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MONROVIA 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (RENUMBERED PARAGRAPHS) 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP FOR MELISSA A LEDESMA-LEESE 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP PLEASE PASS TO DHS 
DEPT FOR AF/W FOR NOLE GAREY 
DEPT FOR CA/VO/KCC 
ECOWAS POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO RONALD S PACKOWITZ 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LI
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - LIBERIA, SEPTEMBER - FEBRUARY 2009 
 
REF: 08 STATE 074840 
REF: 08 MONROVIA 346 
REF: 08 MONROVIA 762 
 
(U) Post's fraud summary fQ September - February 2009 follows 
according to REFTEL: 
 
¶1. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS: 
 
Liberia continues its gradual recovery from fourteen years of civil 
war.  Limited parts of the capital city, Monrovia, have electricity 
and the city still lacks a functioning water/sewer system and 
telephone network; health care is substandard.  Government 
institutions are in need of capacity building - corruption and 
document fraud are rampant.  The literacy rate is less than 20%. 
 
It is, therefore, not surprising visa fraud is an everyday 
occurrence at Embassy Monrovia.  Immigration from Liberia to the 
United States remains the desire of many Liberians given our unique 
relationship and shared history.  There are an estimated 500,000 
Liberians who have settled in the U.S.  The drive to join those 
family members makes visa adjudication a high stakes game. 
 
¶2. (SBU) NIV FRAUD: 
 
NIV fraud continues: most applicants are standard unqualified 
travelers refused 214(b); however four applicants were refused 
212(a)(6)(c) from September to February, including two G4 visa 
applicants. 
 
Applicants continue to submit all manner of fraudulent letters of 
invitation, bank statements, and employment documentation.  The 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ADIS (Arrival and Departure 
Information System) tool has been indispensable in investigating 
overstays and SEVIS violations.  In one case this reporting period, 
a previous J1 visa recipient, whose alleged wife and child 
accompanied him as J2 and J3s in July 2008, applied in early 
February for a B1/B2 visa.  At the time of his B1/B2 application, a 
search of ADIS showed that the applicant's wife and child had not 
yet departed the United States.  When questioned about this, the 
applicant averred his wife and child had returned to Liberia.  The 
application was suspended 221(g) pending additional evidence of 
their return - an appearance at the consular section was suggested. 
As of late March, the applicant has not returned, suggesting, as 
ADIS indicated, this alleged wife and child remain in the United 
States in overstay or some other, potentially illegal, status. 
 
The facial recognition and IDENT tools continue to enable officers 
to identify applicants applying with different names, nationalities, 
and dates of birth from the time/s of their last application/s. 
Inconsistent spellings and rendering of birth dates on official 
Liberian documents is widespread and troubling.  Even among GOL 
applicants, officials have applied for visas using different dates 
of birth, and in some cases, different names.  These applications do 
not always appear in the standard NIV application name check, so 
officers frequently utilize the "CA Applicant Lookup" tool in the 
Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) to get a thorough picture of an 
individual's application history. 
 
¶3. (U) IV FRAUD: 
 
During this reporting period, 71 family based petitions were 
returned to the National Visa Center with a recommendation for 
revocation - of these petitions, 21 were based on DNA test results. 
 
DNA testing has been especially effective in combating fraud in IR2 
cases.  For example, this reporting period in cases when American 
citizen (or LPR) parents have petitioned for multiple children, at 
least one of the alleged children (in a group of two to five cross 
referenced cases) has not/not been a biological relative of the 
petitioner.  In cases where the petitioner is the father of the IR2, 
there is decent chance the petitioner legitimately did not know 
before DNA testing whether or not the child was his biologically. 
However, there have been several cases where petitioner mothers have 
tried to "slip through" extra children as beneficiaries.  It is 
highly unlikely that the birth mother of a child would not know if a 
child was hers biologically.  Yet, DNA results excluded many 
"biological mothers" as the blood relatives of beneficiaries during 
the reporting period, indicating these petitioners were attempting 
alien or relative smuggling. 
 
Another interesting trend of note is, again, in groups of cross 
referenced beneficiaries of American citizen or LPR fathers, when 
DNA testing has been conducted between the petitioner and multiple 
beneficiaries, the child in the group whose DNA results do not 
confirm the alleged relationship usually bears the 
father/petitioner's name with the designation of junior (Jr.).  In 
at least three cases this reporting period, the petitioner's 
"junior" child (again, the child with the same name as the 
petitioner father) was the only child amongst a group of 
beneficiaries who did not have a biological relationship with the 
petitioner.  This indicates, like fraud with biological mother 
petitioners, there are consistent attempts by petitioners to smuggle 
non-biological children through the immigrant visa system by any 
means necessary. 
 
A dearth of secondary evidence continues to make adjudication of 
marriage and fianc(e) cases difficult.  Conveniently, proof of bona 
fida relationships is "missing" due to the "war," a "fire," or a 
"robber."  While this is likely the situation in some cases, it is 
certainly not true across the board, as applicants would have 
officers believe.  Accurint, the Consular Consolidated Database 
(CCD), DNA testing, and neighborhood investigations are relied upon 
heavily in order to authenticate claimed relationships. 
 
¶4. (U) DV FRAUD: 
 
Between IV and DV (Diversity Visa) from September to February, 54 
cases were refused 212(a)(6)(c)(1), 8 cases were refused 
212(a)(6)(c)(2), and 2 cases were refused 212(a)(6)(e).  The bulk of 
6(c) refusals were DV cases in September 2008, the closing month of 
the DV program for 2008.  In fact, in September alone, 37 DV 
applicants were refused 6(c)(1), one was refused 6(c)(2), and two 
were refused 6(e).  Predictably, in the last month of DV, applicants 
made last ditch efforts to meet the educational qualifications of 
the program by submitting fraudulent documents.  The number of DV 
imposters also increased during the last month of the program. 
 
Since September, one DV applicant who could not read or write openly 
admitted to having obtained a fraudulent diploma and West African 
Examination Council (WAEC) certificate from Assemblies of God High 
School through her uncle.  Another set of WAEC results from this 
high school was also recently confirmed by the WAEC office as 
fraudulent.  Said high school has replaced Muslim Congress High 
School (see REFTEL) as the school of choice from which to receive 
fraudulent documents specifically for DV.  Undoubtedly, when 
applicants receive word Post is savvy to Assemblies of God High 
School malfeasance, this fraud pattern will replicate itself with 
another secondary institution.  Diplomas from the Monrovia 
Consolidated School System also appear to have been given to 
applicants who have not completed high school.  In one case, the 
applicant crumpled her diploma to give the appearance it was old - 
issued in the 1990s - even though it otherwise appeared new.  In 
fact, the computer technology used to create this diploma would not 
have been available in the middle of the civil war when it was 
alleged to have been rendered. 
 
Post continues to see pop-up and clip-on spouses and children, the 
most insidious of which have been refused for alien smuggling.  The 
consular investigator, through neighborhood investigations, has also 
discovered and increasing number of "single" applicants (applicants 
who have entered the DV lottery alone) living with wives and 
children, grounds for a 5(A) refusals. 
 
Another recent trend is for applicants to submit recent name change 
documents in order for their educational documents, which are in a 
different name, to look like theirs.  What seems to be happening is: 
applicants are purchasing a set of legitimate documents in one name, 
and then getting paperwork to indicate they have changed their name 
from that name to the name with which they entered the DV lottery. 
However, many of these names bear no correspondence to one another - 
there have been cases where applicants have supposedly changed their 
first, middle, and last names in the time between completing high 
school and entering the DV lottery.  A text search in CCD of one 
applicant's alleged name during high school, which was different 
than his current "changed" name, showed that the applicant was 
actually attempting to submit his brother's high school documents as 
his own.  While documents might be confirmed as genuine by the 
authorities, the DV applicants with the alleged name changes are not 
the documents' true owners. 
 
¶5. (U) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: 
 
There is no doubt thousands of Liberians in the United States 
wrestle with very complicated immigration issues and statuses.  As 
the diaspora returns home, these issues emerge both on the visa line 
and at the ACS window.  Officers have recently discovered during the 
course of visa interviews that Liberians previously residing in the 
United States were able to work by falsely claiming to be United 
States citizens.  One immigrant visa applicant swore an oath on his 
I-9 that he was an American citizen in order to work for the state 
of New Jersey.  Another applied for a NIV after alleging during 
American citizen hours that he was alternately a citizen and an LPR. 
 If Delayed Enforced Departure (DED) eventually comes to a close for 
Liberians, findings of false claims to U.S. citizenship will rise in 
the adjudication of passport and visa applications. 
 
During this period, two teenagers claiming to be American citizens 
without any documentation of their citizenship were interviewed. 
The teenagers went so far as to state American high school and 
supposed relatives' names in the United States.  However, PIERS, 
Accurint, and other searches produced no results; neither are 
American citizens.  When one was asked to provide additional proof 
of his status in the United States, he never returned.  This 
individual also stated that he "heard there was a form you could 
fill out to get a plane ticket back to the United States."  Officers 
hear this widespread myth about repatriation loans frequently.  The 
bar for receiving a repatriation loan is high, however, and to date 
Post does not believe the system is being abused. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ADOPTION FRAUD: 
 
Post was informed on January 14, 2008, that the GOL suspended 
adoption processing by the adoption service providers (ASPs) Acres 
of Hope (AOH) and the West African Children Support Network (WACSN) 
following allegations of sexual assault and failure to adhere to 
exit procedures.  Subsequently, the President of Liberia announced 
on January 26 that processing of all/all inter-country adoptions was 
suspended.  The President announced the suspension will last until 
the GOL ratifies the new Child Protection Act, which calls for the 
institution of new adoption regulations.  The GOL has not given a 
timeframe for lifting the suspension, but on March 25, Post heard 
the new Child Protection Act, which contains provisions for 
adoption, is on the President's desk. 
 
Meanwhile, adoption disruptions continue in the United States by 
parents who have adopted Liberian children.  Some of these 
disruptions have at their root fraud committed by ASPs.  In one 
disruption, which resulted in a child's abandonment then 
repatriation to child protective services in the United States, AOH, 
the ASP who had the child adopted, alleged a child was 10 years old 
and had documents (birth certificates, adoption decrees, passports) 
created that stated the same.  In reality, according to the adopting 
family, the child is probably at least 12 or 13 years old.  The 
adopting family was not expecting to adopt a preteen and thus, 
experienced several incidents with the child, which eventually 
resulted in his abandonment back in Liberia.  In another case, which 
also resulted in the repatriation of a previously adopted Liberian 
child (also through AOH), the ASP purported the age of a child to be 
11, when in reality she is probably 16 or 17.  These disruptions are 
indicative of a larger trend of age fraud by ASPs and have led to a 
more thorough examination by interviewing consular officers, as well 
as by Post's panel physician, of adopted children's purported versus 
actual ages.  In several cases before the adoption suspension, the 
consular chief warned adopting parents that their adoptive children 
were probably well above the ages purported on their documents.  In 
one case, the ASP was asked to change a child's breeder documents to 
more accurately reflect the child's true age - the ASP refused. 
 
Additionally, before adoptions were suspended, Post continued to see 
cases where DNA testing excluded the relinquishing parent as the 
biological parent of the child as well as several cases where there 
were neither death certificates nor records for allegedly deceased 
parents. 
 
¶7. (U) USE OF DNA TESTING: 
 
DNA testing continues to be used in all categories of IV and some 
CRBA adjudication.  All testing is performed by a panel physician 
and monitored by Post's EFM consular associate.  A considerable 
number of cases eventually go to TERM 1 after DNA testing is 
suggested, indicating petitioners have filed a petition on behalf of 
a parent or child who is not their biological relative.  While post 
receives a number of DNA results where the petitioner is excluded 
(see IV Fraud), many do not bother to go through the expensive, and 
sometimes time consuming, process since they already know the likely 
outcome. 
 
¶8. (U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: 
 
Lost and stolen green cards remain an area of particular concern. 
During the reporting period, Post developed a good working 
 
relationship with the risk management advisor (RMA) hired by 
Liberia's Robertsfield International Airport (RIA) whose role it is 
restrict mala fide travel from Liberia.  The RMA reported several 
airport turnarounds for passengers bound to the United States 
including: an individual with an expired travel permission stamp in 
her passport, an individual who claimed to have left her green card 
in the United States, an individual with a fake green card, and 
three imposters, individuals holding green cards that clearly did 
not belong to them.  Interestingly, the woman who claimed to have 
left her green card in the U.S. did not come to the Embassy to 
receive a travel letter though she was referred to Post by the RMA, 
suggesting she is not, in fact, an LPR.  In another case, a visa 
recipient was denied boarding because her birthday was inconsistent 
between her visa and passport.  Instead of returning to the Embassy 
to have the visa reissued, she altered the birthday in her passport 
herself.  She was denied boarding a second time and asked to have 
her passport official endorsed with the correct birthday by the 
Liberian passport agency.  This also highlights the vulnerability of 
Liberian passports (for more about host country documents, see 
section 11). 
¶9. (SBU) ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND 
TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
 
Post has nothing to report on organized crime and terrorist travel 
for the reporting period. 
 
¶10. (SBU) DHS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: 
 
There are no pending DHS criminal fraud investigations at this 
time. 
 
¶11. (SBU) HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY: 
 
As outlined in Post's last semi-annual summary, Liberian passports, 
birth and marriage certificates, and divorce and adoption decrees 
are easily obtainable and can be completed with any information 
requested.  These generally low-quality and universally insecure 
genuine documents remain problematic in visa adjudication.  It has 
become apparent a number of forged documents are being created in 
the United States:  the access to technology in the U.S. makes it 
even easier to produce fraudulent documents than in Liberia, where 
access to technology remains very limited.  Moreover, it has become 
increasingly clear that individuals with access to genuine 
letterhead, official seals, and government computers have been 
complicit in backdating, altering, or creating documents outside of 
their official duties for financial and personal gain. 
 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) is responsible for issuing 
traditional marriage certificates and traditional divorce decrees. 
Traditional marriages are typically performed outside the court or 
church and are usually executed by both parties' families with a 
dowry, or bride price, paid to the bride's family.  Traditional 
certificates and decrees have no/no security features (letterhead, 
revenue stamps, and content are inconsistent even between legitimate 
certificates) and thus are, by far, the most vulnerable of all 
Liberian documents to fraud. 
 
The MIA has not issued any new traditional marriage decrees since 
October 2008, when Clarke S. Kaifa, the Superintendent for Native 
and Tribal Affairs in the MIA (and signatory on all certificates and 
decrees), was dismissed for corruption.  Given the Superintendent's 
malfeasance, the MIA has been charged with the task of making 
traditional certificates less vulnerable to fraud.  The MIA has no 
timeline for the introduction of new, security-enhanced certificates 
and decrees, but, once created, has agreed to provide the Embassy 
with the template.  According to Gloria Doe in the Native and Tribal 
Affairs department, former Superintendent Kaifa was signing 
backdated traditional marriage certificates as well as new 
certificates without secondary evidence of relationship. 
Superintendent Kaifa's tenure at MIA was 2002 to 2009, rendering all 
documents issued during this timeframe suspect.  Additionally, 
Gloria Doe affirmed the MIA knows of several fraudulent certificates 
allegedly signed by former Superintendent Willie Williamson 
posthumously.  Superintendent Williamson served at the MIA prior to 
Superintendent Kaifa; he died in 2000.  Gloria Doe also explained 
many of the certificates Kaifa signed were not entered into the 
Ministry's ledgers, so there is no official record of these records. 
 The records the MIA does have of traditional marriages, she 
admitted, are not arranged by date.  In fact, she stated, there is 
no system for entering traditional marriages into the ledgers; the 
ledgers are done by hand in composition notebooks.  The MIA does not 
own any computers, therefore there are no computerized records at 
the MIA:  the certificates are created with one antiquated 
 
typewriter present in the Native and Tribal affairs department. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT: 
 
Cooperation with the GOL remains good.  However, as before, while 
GOL officials are friendly and welcoming during site visits, post's 
consular investigator and officers have been generally unable to 
view official records in conjunction with fraud investigations. 
 
¶13. (U) STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
 
One of post's consular assistants is planning to attend ACS training 
at FSI in April.  In December, Post's lead LES received Special 
Immigrant Visa status for her 17 years of service to the United 
States government.  While she has not yet applied for her immigrant 
visa, she is tentatively planning to depart this summer. 
 
Also, during the summer transfer season, one vice consul and the 
consular chief will depart - their replacements will arrive in June 
and August respectively. 
 
THOMAS-GREENFIELD