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Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000748 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: CIUDAD JUAREZ AT A TIPPING POINT 
 
REF: CIUDAD JUAREZ 000022 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Charles V. Barclay. 
Reason: 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The federal government has dramatically 
expanded the size and scope of Joint Operation Chihuahua by 
ordering the deployment of an additional 5,000 troops and 
some 2,000 federal police officers to Ciudad Juarez in an 
attempt to combat high rates of violence in the area.  The 
chain of command and division of responsibilities remains 
unclear.  More clear is the dramatic -- if possibly temporary 
-- drop in violence since the arrival of the federal forces. 
No one seems to know for sure what is responsible for the 
diminution in violence, but Consulate officers do note a 
reduction in tension among the city,s residents.  There 
seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in identifying 
several key next steps necessary to achieving any lasting 
improvement in the city's security situation.  While local 
observers do not necessarily see Joint Operation Chihuahua as 
infinitely sustainable or desirable, the presence of federal 
forces bearing the burden of local law enforcement activities 
may provide a window of opportunity for reconstructing the 
city's ruinous municipal police, which is critical to a 
long-term, sustainable improvement in Ciudad Juarez's 
security environment.  The window is closing fast, however, 
as the local government moves forward with its efforts to 
create a 3,000-strong police force, with or without a clear 
strategy or endgame in mind. End Summary. 
 
Joint Operation Chihuahua: Mechanics... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In response to a then unprecedented spasm of violence 
in Ciudad Juarez and throughout the State of Chihuahua during 
the first three months of last year, the federal, state, and 
local governments announced in March 2008 the start of Joint 
Operation Chihuahua.  The centerpiece of the Operation was 
the deployment of some 2,000 military and 500 federal police 
forces who were reportedly instructed to work with their 
state and local law enforcement counterparts to combat the 
insecurity resulting from a bloody feud between the competing 
Juarez and Sinaloa cartels (ref a).  While Joint Operation 
Chihuahua succeeded to an extent in disrupting the cartels, 
narcotics trafficking networks, as a public security effort 
the Operation proved to be a significant failure. 
Recognizing this, on February 25, 2009, the National Security 
Council unveiled a new plan to dramatically increase the size 
and scope of the operation as bloodshed in Juarez continued 
to escalate in the first months of 2009.  Federal, state, and 
local leaders in Juarez, as well as state delegates from the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National 
Action (PAN), told Poloffs that the federal government's 
decision to expand Operation Chihuahua was a response to a 
direct petition by PRI Governor Jose Reyes Baeza for help in 
quelling the violence, although Operation spokesman Enrique 
Torres Valadez indicated that the federal government pressed 
the governor to accept additional aid.  The federal 
government has announced plans to deploy an additional 5000 
troops and 2000 federal police officers to the area to retake 
control of what was a quickly deteriorating situation.  So 
far, some 2000 of those additional soldiers and 500 
additional federal police have arrived on station and begun 
to take up policing duties in Ciudad Juarez. 
 
¶3. (C) Secretary of Public Security (SSP) Genaro Garcia Luna 
laid out for Embassy NAS Director on February 27 a six-point 
strategy for the Operation, which contacts in Juarez across 
the board indicated is being implemented.  The strategy 
includes: 1) retaking control of the streets; 2) closing down 
hubs for blackmarket activities; 3) seizing the city's two 
Centers of Communication, Command, and Control (C-4s), which 
serve as a sort of local security coordination center; 4) 
installing throughout the city a number of new surveillance 
cameras; 5) assuming customs responsibilities; and 6) taking 
control of the municipal police leadership, which has been 
absent since the second in command was assassinated on 
February 17, 2009 and the police chief resigned three days 
later.  According to contacts in local government and from 
the Operation, they have already done the first three items, 
will be taking control of customs this week, and are 
formalizing authority over municipal police responsibilities 
on March 13. 
 
¶4. (C) The chain of command and division of responsibilities 
in Joint Operation Chihuahua is unclear.  According to Torres 
Valadez and Consulate law enforcement officials, the military 
is the top Operation authority and General Felipe de Jesus 
Espitia, the Commander of Zone 5 who is based in Chihuahua 
City but frequently travels to Juarez, is primarily running 
the show.  The city is divided into six sections, with a 
colonel responsible for each one.  The military runs its own 
command center in Juarez, which is not an integrated 
facility, and contacts were vague on the role C-4 centers 
will play in the process.  There appears to be a great deal 
of suspicion among the various entities, the exception being 
a generally effective working relationship between the army 
command and the state attorney general,s office.  There is 
limited information sharing, although some contacts reported 
that -- with the exception of the Juarez municipal police, 
with which no other organization shares reporting -- this 
problem may be in the process of resolution.  The top 
military, federal, state, and local police officials, as well 
as the mayor and officials from the governor's office, meet 
on a weekly basis to coordinate activities. 
 
 
¶5. (C) It is similarly difficult to discern how the Joint 
Operation Chihuahua surge will play out on the ground and the 
role the municipal government will or will not play.  The 
military was scheduled to assume full control of municipal 
police leadership and responsibilities on March 13, and 
Consulate law enforcement officials and local contacts noted 
that municipal officers are technically supposed to ride 
along with soldiers to make arrests for non-federal offenses. 
 Poloffs did not see any such joint patrols or fixed posts 
and question whether the military, which has a distrust of 
the police at all levels, is so willing to deeply engage 
their civilian counterparts.  Operation Spokesman Torres 
Valdez vaguely said that "all forces" are supposed to arrive 
on the scene when arrests are made, but offered few details 
as to the mechanics or legality of such a convergence. 
Ciudad Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, who has for years resided in 
El Paso, supposedly has at least some authority over city 
security policy and rebuilding the municipal police force, 
but the military will also reportedly be involved in the 
efforts and the extent to which it consults with him is 
ambiguous. 
 
...Atmospherics... 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Consulate officers and contacts noted a sense of 
relief in the city's population following the new arrival of 
troops and federal police.  Local businesses, such as 
restaurants and other social establishments, appeared to be 
more frequented than in the past several months, and streets 
seemed overall busier.  Poloffs observed Ciudad Juarez 
residents walking in city parks and running alongside heavily 
trafficked roads.  Consulate officers suggested that Juarez 
residents tend to quickly take advantage of temporary 
improvements in the security situation, then return to their 
houses when conditions deteriorate. 
 
¶7. (C) Poloffs were struck by the high number of federal 
police officers patrolling the major streets and the 
relatively less frequent sightings of troops, except for in 
the border regions, other critical infrastructure points, and 
at checkpoints.  Torres Valadez explained the disparity as a 
result of the different deployment patterns of the different 
forces.  The military is reportedly focused on the areas of 
higher levels of crime and violence, which tend to be on the 
outskirts of the city.  Conversely, the federal police have 
been specially charged with securing the commercial 
districts, which are more often traveled by US officials. 
 
 
 
...Short-Term Impact. 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ciudad Juarez contacts ranging from political leaders, 
federal and state prosecutors, and officials from the mayor 
and governor's offices were cautiously positive when 
discussing the results thus far from the expanded Operation 
Chihuahua.  Murder rates have dramatically dropped since 
February 25, from about ten homicides a day to about 2-3 per 
day over the past week, and residents generally feel safer 
due to the troop presence.  Nevertheless, contacts were quick 
to point out that violence levels similarly dropped soon 
after the initial March 2008 deployment, only to hit even 
higher levels in May 2008, levels that were sustained until 
the most recent federal surge.  Local officials credit the 
operation with providing better intelligence into organized 
crime activities, which could lead to a greater number of 
arrests. 
 
¶9. (C) Theories vary on what is responsible for the 
diminution in violence.  The Juarez city government, perhaps 
optimistically, suggests the Operation is causing the 
"cockroach effect," forcing cartel operatives to scatter and 
relocate to other border states.  Mayor Reyes Ferriz says he 
expects the cartel wars to move to Sonora.  U.S. law 
enforcement officials hold a different view.  They indicated 
that organized crime elements are lying low to observe and 
collect intelligence on military and federal police 
activities so as to better avoid the patrols and determine 
their next steps in Juarez, as they did after the March 2008 
deployment, and that the cartels will renew the fight in the 
coming weeks.  The Mexican army generals in charge of the 
regional zone and the Juarez garrison agree with the U.S. LEA 
assessment, as does the Chihuahua state attorney general, 
although they suggest that monthly homicide figures going 
forward will be about half the 230 recorded in February 2009. 
 
¶10. (C) Not unexpectedly, opinions are mixed as to who stands 
to gain or lose the most politically from the results of the 
Operation.  PAN State legislators suggested that the federal 
government could benefit from a successful deployment, since 
President Calderon showed resolve and action in responding to 
a clearly overwhelmed PRI mayor and governor.  PAN deputy 
Hiram Apolo Conteras noted, however, that the party's 
opportunity to profit from any security improvements come 
election time may be limited by the state and local 
government's strong influence over the local media outlets. 
PRI state legislator Antonio Andreu noted that the party's 
prospects could be rocky for the July vote since he perceived 
the population to be blaming the regional leaders for 
security woes rather than the federal government.  The troop 
presence currently has wide public support -- Apolo Conteras 
reported up to a 90 percent approval rating for the military 
presence -- but some observers voiced their fear that 
organized crime elements will use false accusations of human 
rights abuses by military and police elements to erode public 
tolerance of the Operation.  (Note: Chihuahua Attorney 
General Patricia Gonzalez says that some of these reports of 
abuse, especially as carried out by the federal police, are 
true.  End note.)  Regardless, most politicians opined that 
at the end of the day, voters may privilege economic concerns 
-- particularly employment -- over security problems, 
suggesting that election results are far from certain. 
 
Looking Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶11. (C) There seems to be broad agreement in Ciudad Juarez in 
identifying several key next steps necessary to achieving any 
lasting improvement in the city's security situation.  All 
contacts recognized that a sustained military and federal 
presence, particularly at its current size, is not a 
sustainable solution, if for no other reason than the cost. 
Most of the 2000 newly arriving federal police officers will 
be housed in area hotels, which may be a boon to the local 
tourism industry, but a financial burden on the federal 
government. 
 
¶12. (C) First, contacts all said that the municipal police 
force must be rebuilt and reformed so as to provide the most 
basic policing services to the population.  Criminal elements 
in Juarez appear to be devolving into criminal gangs that are 
less organized, more erratic, very violent, and involved in a 
variety of criminal enterprises, making recapturing the 
streets even more complicated and making more necessary the 
development of a professional local patrol force.  Mayor 
Reyes Ferriz has informed Consulate officers that of the 
1,600 municipal preventive police officers who were on duty 
on January 1, 2008, 800 have been fired, quit to avoid 
completing a federal government background check, or been 
killed.  Their replacements are brand new.  The city 
government seems to have an idea as to how to go about 
purging the force of corrupt elements -- the mayor claimed in 
April 2008 that 99 percent has been corrupted by drug 
trafficking organizations -- and is continuing with the 
application of confidence control tests such as polygraphs, 
psychological exams, drug tests, and lifestyle surveys.  The 
new National Public Security System, created by legislation 
passed in the federal congress in December and mimicked by 
the Chihuahua state congress, provides a framework for such 
measures, but it seems to be coming together only piecemeal 
in Ciudad Juarez.  Still, the city government wants to build 
a force of 3,000 officers by the end of the year.  Local 
officials are optimistic that there will be few problems with 
recruitment as employment in the region has been hit hard by 
the economic crisis. 
 
¶13. (C) Beyond numbers, the municipal government indicated 
that the police need higher quality training, salary, and 
equipment, such as encrypted communication systems.  City 
Manager Guillermo Dowell was not able to elaborate for 
Poloffs a training strategy that will create a more 
professional police force and better inoculate them against 
infiltration by organized crime.  Moreover, municipal police 
lack any sort of investigQe capacity, and the city appears 
to either not understand or to be disinterested in taking on 
the investigative responsibilities that the state attorney 
general says were assigned to them in the 2008 federal 
reforms.  In practice, this keeps the city police from doing 
anything but the most rudimentary arrests and complicates 
their ability to complement the state's progressive judicial 
reform efforts.  Contacts also reported a need for higher 
police salaries and the development of a career service and 
benefits plan for officers.  Most officers currently make 600 
to 800 USD a month, which leaves them highly vulnerable to 
bribes from drug trafficking organizations.  The city 
government is uncertain about future federal funding levels. 
Last year Juarez reportedly received significant funds as 
part of the SUBSEMUN, a special federal subsidy for high 
crime areas, but city officials are afraid that the Operation 
Chihuahua expansion may cut into future funding. 
 
¶14. (C) Observers across the board -- from politicians to 
federal prosecutors -- highlighted the need to more involve 
civil society in combating the violence problem.  Ciudad 
Juarez is a city of passing or temporary residents, with many 
people arriving to try to make their way to the United States 
or to work in the maquilas.  Perhaps because of the transient 
nature of the population, little has evolved by way of civic 
identity or consciousness.  PRI deputy Andreu indicated that 
the state is working to replicate the creation of citizen 
security observatory councils to offer insight and input into 
security operations and solutions.  City Manager Dowell also 
highlighted efforts by the city government to encourage 
stronger values, sense of community, and an understanding for 
the value of civic participation at the community level, in 
part through a "Municipal Alliance for Order and Respect." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15. (C) Joint Operation Chihuahua at the very least has 
provided a momentary respite for residents suffering from 
months of escalating crime rates and blood violence.   It is 
unclear at this point how long the increase in the Joint 
Operation is sustainable or even desirable, but most 
observers recognize that the expanded deployment is not the 
final situation to security woes.  In the best case scenario, 
the presence of federal forces bearing the burden of local 
law enforcement activities may provide a window of 
opportunity for rebuilding the city's ruinous municipal 
police, which is critical to a long-term, sustainable 
improvement in Ciudad Juarez's security environment.  Ciudad 
Juarez security, municipal, state and federal officials all 
indicated they would welcome U.S. assistance, with the 
municipal government particularly interested in help from the 
United States in training its new police force.  The window 
is closing fast, however, as the local government will move 
forward with its efforts to create a 3,000-strong police 
force, with or without a clear strategy or endgame in mind. 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
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