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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANAGUA 000301 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC,INR/IAA 
DEPT ALSO FOR G/TIP, IO/RHS, DRL AND PRM 
DEPT FOR DS/CR/OCI 
DEPT ALSO FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT PASS TO USOAS AND USAID 
MONTREAL FOR USICAO 
PANAMA FOR REGIONAL ICE REP 
DOJ FOR CBP AND ICE 
TREASURY FOR SENICH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019 
TAGS: SMIG CVIS ASEC PGOV PREL NU
SUBJECT: VISIT NICARAGUA!  NO VISA NEEDED 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 260 
     ¶B. 2007 MANAGUA 2577 
     ¶C. 2007 MANAGUA 2551 
     ¶D. 2007 MANAGUA 2544 
     ¶E. 2007 MANAGUA 1902 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Richard M. Sanders, reasons 1.4 
(b & d) 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  On Friday, March 13, 2009, during a 
late-night event Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega signed a 
presidential decree relaxing visa requirements for foreigners 
seeking to visit Nicaragua.  Initial media reports that 
Nicaragua was removing visa requirements for all countries 
appear to be exaggerations.  Even so, more than 70 countries 
(mostly African, South Asian and the Eurasian Republics) may 
stand to benefit from the new changes.  In announcing the 
change, Ortega alluded to an expected and in our view 
improbable tourism boom.  The Minister of Tourism, who was at 
Ortega,s side throughout the event, was charged with 
developing and implementing the policy changes.  Nicaragua's 
Foreign Ministry and Immigration Office were nowhere visible 
nor mentioned at the event.  Public reaction was first 
alarmist, then dismissive.  Still, as with Ortega's 2007 
decision to grant Iran and Libya "visa-free" status, there 
has been almost no public discussion of several serious 
questions, including whether Ortega's decision is 
inconsistent with Nicaragua's obligations under the 2005 
Central America 4 (CA-4) Accord on Migration and whether 
Nicaragua has anticipated how it might handle a large influx 
of third-country migrants.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ortega Goes "Visa-Free" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (U)  On Friday, February 13, 2009, during one of his 
signature late-night public rallies, Nicaraguan President 
Daniel Ortega signed Presidential Decree 07-2009 to relax 
visa requirements to enter Nicaragua.  Initial media reports 
were that Ortega's decree had abolished all visa requirements 
to visit Nicaragua.  However, subsequent information 
indicated that only about 70 countries would be affected.  As 
of March 19, neither the Government of Nicaragua (GON) nor 
the President's Office had released either the official 
decree text or the text of Ortega's remarks. Our contacts at 
the Immigration Office and at the Foreign Ministry's Consular 
Division were unaware of the change as late as Monday, March 
¶16. 
 
Ortega's Populist Appeal, Can It Generate Tourists? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ortega's main (public) motivations appears to be increasing tourism to Nicaragua and burnishing his populist credentials as an opponent of border restrictions. An unofficial decree text in circulation notes the government's interest to "promote investment and attract capital," and the fact that "the tourism industry has improved and generated large revenues for the country." During the event, Ortega was flanked by Minister of Tourism Mario Salinas, who was assigned to develop and implement the Government's plan for the new policy. Salinas later said he expected an immediate up-tick in tourism as soon as the upcoming Holy Week holiday. Ortega stated that, "this measure is part of a series of actions to develop the country, because now tourists may visit our country without suffering the embarrassing (visa) process." Tourism industry representatives have long lobbied for lighter visa regulations, though no indications exist that Africans, Central Asians or Southeast Asians deferred tourism to Nicaragua due to visa requirements.
 
¶4.  (SBU) Some national figures have observed that Ortega 
perhaps believed he was sticking it to the "gringos."  His 
Friday speech repeatedly invoked Ortega's "champion of all 
the world's poor" image.  Well-aware that immigration and 
border security are "evergreen" issues for the USG, some 
critics here have sought to paint this as a brewing bilateral 
dispute over USG border security.  Vice Foreign Minister 
Manuel Coronel Kautz disparaged the "reduced security" 
arguments, noting instead that the "United States is full of 
traffickers, law-breakers and Mafia."  In subsequent comments 
on Monday and Tuesday Ortega lashed out at critics -- calling 
them "boot-lickers of the gringos" -- re-asserted his 
"populist equality" arguments.  He referred to the United 
States as "terrorists who throw bombs like the ones at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki." 
 
Nicaragua's Visa Classification System: A Primer 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU) Nicaragua's visa policy is nominally governed by the 2005 CA-4 Migration Accord (the Accord), which established common standards within the CA-4 area (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). Articles IV and VI of the Accord establish three different country categories governing visa issuance -- A, B, and C -- into which all countries and international organizations are divided. The "A-class" countries (originally numbering 79) effectively enjoy visa waiver status. For a nominal fee, foreign travelers may apply for a "tourist card" or entry stamp upon arrival at a Nicaraguan port of entry (POE). The United States, Canada and most European and Latin American nations fall into this group. It also includes Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar and Taiwan. The "B-class" countries number 72 and are predominately in Africa, Central and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. It also includes Bolivia, Peru, Belarus, Russia, Serbia, Egypt, the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. These visas could be issued by Nicaraguan embassies and consulates abroad, without consultation or personal appearance by the applicant. It is this "B-class" group (plus India) which appears to have been "upgraded" to "A-class" by Ortega. For the "C-class" countries (originally numbering 43) visa issuance required consulates to seek approval from Managua before issuing a visa. Iran and Libya had also been in this group until December 2007, when Ortega issued a similar decree "promoting" both countries to "A-class," as he appears to have now done with India (REF D). The current "C-class " group comprises 40 countries, including the Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, North Korea, Pakistan, the PRC, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Cuba appears on this list with a note that only El Salvador imposes the "prior approval" restriction. For the other three signatories, Cuba is an "A-class" nation.
 
Does This Violate The Migration Accord? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C) Two Nicaraguan legal experts we consulted, one a 
former Government official involved in negotiating the 
Accord, have told us that, in their view, Ortega's decree 
probably violates Nicaragua's obligations under the CA-4 
Migration Accord.  They pointed out that common visa 
categories are clearly established by the Accord (as noted 
above), and the Accord provides a remedy to modify the 
agreement under Article XII, paragraph 5.  The section 
requires that any changes be adopted by consensus and be 
subject to national ratification procedures.  Our contacts 
assert that Ortega's decree violates this provision.  They 
also note that Article IX expressly prohibits any signatory 
from entering into third-party agreements that simplify or 
eliminate the established visa categories, which Ortega's 
decree does.  However they also explained that Ortega could 
utilize several arguments in defense of his actions.  First, 
his decree is not a third-party bilateral agreement, but a 
unilateral administrative decision.  Second, he could invoke 
the sovereignty clause, taking an expansive view of Article X 
that "nothing in the Accord will be interpreted as a partial 
or total renunciation over national territory."  Third, he 
could be calculating that like the changes of December 2007 
for Iran and Libya, the other three signatories will not take 
issue with his actions.  Fourth, as the Director of 
Immigration has argued publicly, the GON has not abolished 
the visa requirement for Class B countries, but has 
simplified the process by allowing foreigners who qualify to 
be issued visas upon arrival at POEs. 
 
If So, So What? 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) If the other CA-4 signatories are bothered by 
Ortega's decree, our legal contacts identified three possible 
reactions that El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras could 
take.  One option would be to ignore Ortega, especially given 
the unlikelihood that hordes of Central Asian or Africa 
migrants would flood into Nicaragua -- at least in the 
immediate future.  A second option would be to make no public 
criticism, but adjust their own internal processes to give 
more scrutiny for in-bound travelers from Nicaragua.  A 
third, but unlikely option would be for them to take issue 
with Ortega, perhaps even in public, and invoke the 
provisions of the Accord regarding modifications.  Our 
contacts believe the second course is the most likely. 
 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶8.  (C) We find it difficult to believe that the new visa 
regime will generate significant new legitimate tourism for 
Nicaragua.  A more likely and long-term result would be a 
persistent and increasing flow of third- and fourth-world 
"tourists" whose true goal was northward migration.  In this 
regard, Ortega has probably correctly gauged the likely 
(non-)reaction of the other CA-4 nations, at least initially. 
 Only Honduras shares a land border and would be slow in 
reacting to new migrant flows.  There is no significant or 
regular commercial water-borne transit.  To the south, Costa 
Rica, already weary of illegal Nicaraguan migrants, is more 
likely to react first with increased border scrutiny. 
Furthermore, while most new "tourists" would depart Nicaragua 
quickly, becoming problems for the other CA-4 nations and 
perhaps Mexico and the United States; over time some would 
remain in Nicaragua, which is ill-equipped to handle the 
existing social burden of migrants. 
SANDERS