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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000276 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S OTHER SANDINISTAS: THE MRS' POSITION 
AFTER THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
 
REF: A. 08 MANAGUA 1261 
     ¶B. 08 MANAGUA 761 
 
Classified By: CDA Richard Sanders, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: In hindsight after the November 2008 
municipal elections, Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
President Enrique Saenz believes his party made the correct 
choice in supporting candidates opposed to the Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN).  MRS participation in the 
elections as a "coalition" partner allowed the party to 
remain a relevant political actor, and increased its 
favorable rating among the Nicaraguan electorate.  From now 
until the 2011 national elections, Saenz stated that his 
party would focus on consolidating its political base in the 
urban centers along Nicaragua's Pacific coast, and try to 
capitalize on newly identified demographic groups of rural 
and young voters.  The MRS will continue to pursue legal 
means to regain its party registration, Saenz stated, and 
that with or without registration, the MRS would almost 
certainly participate in the 2011 national elections in a 
coalition with other opposition parties.  End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Lessons Learned 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a March 9 meeting, MRS President Enrique Saenz 
described to PolOff the party's decision to support the 
November 2008 municipal election candidates who opposed the 
FSLN candidates (ref A).  The decision was contentious and 
not all members of the national committee agreed, but at the 
end the party followed the decision in unison.  The exception 
to this was National Assembly Deputy Monica Baltodano, whom 
Saenz described as an outsider within the party.  Saenz 
explained that MRS national figures' participation in the 
opposition's campaign allowed the MRS to remain a relevant 
political actor rather than fall into the FSLN's trap of 
becoming a spectator of the nation's politics.  The decision, 
he added, gave the MRS a vehicle through which to continue to 
promote itself with the electorate.  Saenz admitted that 
working with the Liberal opposition in the campaign allowed 
his party to overcome some biases it had against the Liberals 
and similarly allowed the Liberals to overcome some of biases 
against the MRS.  Finally, the MRS' participation in the 
elections allowed for the continuing erosion of the FSLN's 
support base. 
 
¶3.  (C) Following the elections, the MRS contracted a polling 
group to conduct surveys and focus groups to gain a better 
understanding of the party's national standing.  The results 
confirmed what the party previously knew - i.e., its 
strongest base was in urban centers along Nicaragua's Pacific 
coast.  However, the surveys and focus groups also presented 
new data to the party.  First, MRS popularity in the rural 
areas was increasing.  Second, the MRS rated higher than any 
other opposition party among Nicaragua's youth.  With this 
information, Saenz stated that his party would work to 
consolidate its bases in urban centers, but also work to 
capitalize on these two newly identified demographic groups - 
rural and youth voters.  In its efforts to strengthen its 
organization and support base, Saenz noted the party had one 
obstacle it needed to overcome.  Saenz admitted that while 
Nicaraguans generally viewed the MRS favorably, there was 
still an unknown factor that inhibited voters from formally 
joining the party. 
 
--------------- 
Looking to 2011 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In June 2008 the government stripped the MRS of its 
legal registration, barring the party from participating in 
Nicaraguan elections for four years (ref B).  Since that time 
the party has attempted to regain its legal registration 
through legal recourses, both in Nicaragua and through the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  However, Saenz 
recognized that only a political decision by Ortega's 
government based on one of two reasons would lead to the 
party regaining its legal registration.  One reason would be 
if Ortega needed to portray an image of openness and 
commitment to democracy to the international community in 
 
MANAGUA 00000276  002 OF 002 
 
 
order that foreign assistance resume to Nicaragua.  The other 
reason would be Ortega's desire to divide the opposition 
during elections to strengthen the FSLN's ability to win at 
the polls. 
 
¶5.  (C) Saenz was uncertain if the government would return to 
the MRS its legal registration, but this was not of utmost 
importance to him.  The legal registration, he said, was only 
needed during elections, which are still two years away.  At 
this moment the MRS would concentrate on capitalizing on the 
political relevance of the party by strengthening its bases 
regardless of the legal structure.  Ultimately, Saenz 
believed that the MRS would almost certainly participate in 
the 2011 national elections in a coalition against the ruling 
FSLN, rather than go it alone at the polls. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Accounting for approximately 10% of the nationwide 
electorate, the MRS remains a minority party in Nicaraguan 
politics.  However, its participation as a coalition partner 
in the November 2008 municipal elections was seen as a key 
factor that led to the opposition's wins in big cities such 
as Managua and Leon, although the government ultimately stole 
these elections through fraud.  While the MRS decided late in 
the electoral calendar to support Liberal opposition 
candidates, the party made the right decision and, more 
importantly, its leaders recognize that they made the right 
decision.  Their collaboration in the November elections with 
the Liberal opposition and the Conservative Party 
demonstrated to all the ability of the MRS to work together 
toward a common goal and the necessity of maintaining unity 
against the ruling FSLN.  Prior to the 2011 national 
elections, the MRS, as well as other opposition parties, will 
work to strengthen its support base.  The MRS has correctly 
concluded that Nicaragua's current political environment will 
force all opposition parties to work together to defeat 
Ortega and the FSLN in 2011.  While the national elections 
are still two years away, at least the MRS and other 
opposition parties appear to be heading in the right 
direction. 
SANDERS