VZCZCXRO6721
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0190/01 0611317
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021317Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9253
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000190 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  BALANCE SHEET ON THE DRC-RWANDAN JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS 
IN NORTH KIVU 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Despite some significant risks and political 
fall-out, the joint FARDC-RDF operations were a success on the 
whole.  Most significantly, the operations have solidified the 
rapprochement between the GoR and GDRC, who were at the brink of war 
just three months ago.  The FDLR is in retreat, weakened, and 
without much of its traditional revenue sources around semi-urban 
areas, although this could change quickly.  The CNDP has been 
destroyed as a military or political threat to the GDRC.  However, 
the operations did not resolve all old problems, while creating some 
new ones for the GDRC: persistent criticism from politicians and the 
media; the FDLR's presence at many remote mines was not affected; 
and continued questions about FARDC capacity to go it alone against 
the FDLR, particularly in South Kivu.  There are also less clear, 
unresolved issues relating to the operations and DRC-Rwandan 
rapprochement:  how to handle the return of Congolese refugees and 
how the apparent shift towards a Rwandophone (Hutu and Tutsi) 
dominated North Kivu could alienate other ethnic groups, 
particularly the Nande.  End Summary. 
 
The achievements 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The number of FDLR killed or repatriated during Operation 
Umoja Wetu was modest, and the campaign fell far short of destroying 
the FDLR.  It did, however, achieve several notable objectives.  On 
the military front, FARDC Colonel Mamba, who was closely involved in 
the operations, noted that the joint operations were successful in 
destroying several FDLR headquarters, breaking the FDLR's hold over 
North Kivu mines, removing the CNDP as a threat to the DRC 
population and government, and pushing the FDLR further away from 
the Rwandan border and into more isolated territory, thus decreasing 
the rebel threat. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Umoja Wetu also allowed the GDRC to re-establish a 
government presence in much of the Petit Nord area of North Kivu, 
including restoring GDRC access to valuable sources of revenue, such 
as the Bunagana customs post.  The entire DRC-Rwandan border is more 
secure, allowing for better control of commercial and individual 
movements and reducing suspicions between neighbors.  On the 
diplomatic front, the joint operations allowed the GDRC to 
demonstrate its willingness to actively implement the Nairobi and 
Amani Agreements, even though actual FARDC support to the RDF was 
minimal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The biggest plus from the operations was a new spirit of 
cooperation between the GDRC and GoR.  As recently as 3-4 months ago 
the two countries appeared to be headed for war, with each 
government tacitly (or, sometimes, actively) supporting rebel groups 
to irritate its neighbor.  The Congolese and Rwandans worked out the 
rapprochement together, without any appreciable assistance from the 
international community.  There was undoubtedly a real desire in 
Kinshasa and Kigali to improve relations, opening the way for closer 
economic cooperation and growth in the region. 
 
Unresolved issues 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Many questions remain regarding the separate, but 
closely-linked issues of how to effect the return of Tutsi refugees 
to the DRC and how to facilitate the return home of IDP's (with the 
specter of increased FDLR reprisals).  The refugee issue was always 
a major point for the CNDP.  Where to resettle this community and 
how to do it without aggravating long-term land tenure controversies 
will be challenging, to say the least.  Moreover, according to 
Kinshasa-based MONUC sources, we have heard that many in the Tutsi 
refugee camps in Rwanda are unhappy with the GoR's decision to 
arrest Nkunda and possibly to extradite him.  How will the DRC deal 
with this influx of potential Nkunda supporters? 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Seen from Kinshasa, there seems to have been a tacit 
agreement between the GDRC and GoR to reestablish the earlier 
dominance (2000-2007) of Rwandophone (Hutu and Tutsi) Congolese 
within the provincial government of North Kivu, at the expense of 
other ethnic groups.  Former North Kivu Governor Eugene Serufuli 
appears to be Kinshasa's "point man" for this effort, but the CNDP's 
new leadership, with apparent backing from Kigali, seems equally in 
step.  The big losers are the Nandes (Note: Despite consistent 
support for Kabila, North Kivu Governor Julien Paluku, Nande, is 
rumored to be in trouble politically.  End note.)  How this ethnic 
re-alignment finally shakes out is uncertain at the moment. 
 
Liabilities for Kabila 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Many Congolese who remember previous Rwandan incursions 
 
KINSHASA 00000190  002 OF 002 
 
 
into the DRC were aghast when Kabila invited former enemies back. 
The invitation has caused some political damage to the Kabila camp, 
but his stock was already low in the East.  Moreover, the better 
than expected outcome (at least better what most DRC observers had 
believed) of the joint operations may help Kabila to weather any 
simmering criticism.  Pictures of departing Rwandan soldiers have 
helped to convince much of the populace that the incursion was 
worthwhile.  Residents of villages that the FDLR had occupied were 
glad to be rid of the Rwandan rebel group.  Some contacts even 
speculated that certain villages may request the Rwandans to return 
if the FDLR strikes back.  Despite these positive developments, the 
political benefits of the operation remain uncertain. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The FDLR controls most of the mines it had been operating 
before.  Many of them are in remote locations to the north and west 
of Walikale, where FARDC/RDF troops never reached.  The FDLR was 
pushed out of many semi-urban areas, but it lost only a fraction of 
its estimated 6,000 fighters.  It may be in disarray, but it has 
regrouped before and it is reportedly seeking out remote national 
parks to regroup in isolation. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Rwanda played a major role in splitting the CNDP, removing 
a persistent nuisance and political threat to the GDRC.  However, 
Nkunda still retains followers and Bosco Ntaganda's ICC indictment 
renders him unacceptable as a national military or political leader. 
 A large number of CNDP troops agreed to the accelerated 
integration, but most observers believe the integration was hasty 
and incomplete.  Disgruntled CNDP cadres could easily peel off and 
return to the bush, perhaps taking FARDC weapons or even soldiers 
with them. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The biggest potential liability for Rwanda in taking part 
in Umoja Wetu is its dramatic alliance with the FARDC.  Congolese 
troops have never displayed mettle, they have collaborated with the 
FDLR for years, and their pay and upkeep is always uncertain.  CNDP 
troops may add some backbone to forward elements, but the FDLR 
simply does not fear the FARDC as it fears the RDF.  In the days and 
weeks ahead, the FARDC could face real battles.  There are rumors 
that the RDF could re-enter the DRC, if the FDLR becomes too active. 
 Nevertheless, with its back against the wall, we suspect the FDLR 
will regain some of the ground it lost during the operations.  How 
the FARDC, with MONUC support, performs against the FDLR in South 
Kivu will be an important indicator of FARDC capacity and 
willingness to maintain the pressure. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment:  The status quo was not tenable and the joint 
operations deserved, and received, support from the international 
community.  While the FDLR had not caused major problems in the 
Kivus recently, its very presence made a mockery of the Nairobi 
Communique and the Amani Peace Process.  Cooperation and good 
relations between the GDRC and GoR remains the key to long-term 
stability in the region.  Kabila's decision to invite the RDF into 
North Kivu was courageous, made necessary through repeated military 
failures to deal with the CNDP.  Kabila, whose popularity in the 
region had plummeted, has bought some time, and, on the whole, the 
operation had more pluses than minuses.  The FDLR may recover, but 
the CNDP is unlikely to rise from the ashes.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK