VZCZCXRO5126
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0449/01 0901336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 311336Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3409
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000449 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID UPDATE, MARCH 31 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 425 
B) KHARTOUM 347 
C) KHARTOUM 310 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID is preparing for Nepalese contingent-owned 
equipment (COE) to arrive in Sudan.  The COE will get here before 
the contingent of Nepalese troops, which UNAMID is pushing to be on 
the ground by  July 2009.  In April and May, an Egyptian battalion 
will deploy to two camps in the contentious region southwest of 
Nyala in Sector South.  A financial dispute is hindering the arrival 
of the 2nd Ethiopian battalion, which intends to travel in April by 
road convoy from Addis Ababa to Sector South.  Construction will 
commence shortly on facilities in Nyala for the Ethiopian MI-24 
attack helicopters, but the GOS has not yet given final approval for 
their operation in Darfur.  However, this should be a procedural 
approval as the GOS has not previously objected to this aspect of 
UNAMID's deployment plan.  Finally, the backlog for receiving UNAMID 
visas continues to grow, as the GOS continues to delay visa issuance 
to important senior officers from European countries. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Under a somewhat unusual arrangement, Nepalese COE will be 
shipped directly to Port Sudan from the manufacturer due to 
political instability in Nepal, according to Col. Noddy Stafford, J5 
of UNAMID.  With the COE scheduled to arrive prior to the summer 
arrival of the Nepalese Force Reserve and Sector Reserve units, 
UNAMID intends to lump it in with shipments of other COE and UNAMID 
equipment from Port Sudan to Darfur. UNAMID does not expect this 
arrangement to complicate the arrival of what will amount to a 
significant portion of the total Nepalese COE.  Both Nepalese units 
had planned to arrive as late as September 2009, but with equipment 
on the ground as soon as May, UNAMID HQ intends to push for their 
early deployment in July of this year. 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID will proceed in April and May to deploy two Egyptian 
battalions in South Darfur, which should help UNAMID better respond 
to violence there (Ref A).  In mid-April, a convoy of Egyptian 
engineers and Nigerian infantry will proceed to Eid Al Fursan, 
approximately 100 kilometers west-southwest of Nyala, and will 
commence construction of a UNAMID team site there.  Within two 
months, the engineering company will move further south to do the 
same near Tulus, approximately 100 km south-southwest of Nyala, 
while 425 Egyptian peacekeepers will deploy to the new team site at 
Eid Al Fursan. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The second Ethiopian battalion has arranged to arrive in 
Darfur in April after traveling in a massive self-contained convoy 
by road from Addis Ababa, but disagreements at UNHQ over the amount 
of reimbursement may preclude the convoy from departing.   According 
to Stafford, a self-contained convoy from a neighboring African 
country would relieve UNAMID of the massive administrative headaches 
caused by bringing COE first to Darfur and then deploying it to the 
field.  The convoy would leave Addis Ababa to reach Nyala several 
days later, and the battalion would deploy immediately to turbulent 
Gereida (site of the largest IDP camp in Darfur) and a second camp 
in Sector South.  Such an operation would reap "huge benefits" in 
fulfilling UNAMID's mandate, and Stafford asked that international 
partners press UNHQ to resolve this matter as quickly as possible so 
the convoy can depart in April. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNAMID has succeeded in obtaining the necessary land and 
has pre-positioned Chinese engineers at the airstrip in Nyala in 
preparation for the construction of facilities to house the 
Ethiopian attack helicopters.  To house the Ethiopian attack 
helicopter pilots near the UN terminal in Nyala, construction of 
housing and associated machine shops should commence shortly. 
However, the Government of Sudan (GOS) has yet to issue formal 
permission for the arrival and operations of the helicopters in 
Sudan, an issue that Stafford expects will be taken up at the 
upcoming tripartite meetings in El Fasher.  (Note: The approval 
should be routine as the GOS has not previously objected to this 
aspect of UNAMID's deployment plan.  UN/USG Susanna Malcorra is 
currently in Sudan to participate in the El Fasher tripartite 
meetings. End note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) UNAMID is bracing for an internal administrative crisis as 
the GOS has ceased issuing visas to senior experienced Western 
military officers.  According to Stafford, 152 UNAMID visas are 
pending, while only 22 officers remain in UNAMID from Western 
countries including  the UK, France, Denmark, Australia and New 
Zealand.  French military authorities are now no longer sending 
officers to UNAMID due to the visa hold-up, and the UK is 
considering following France's lead.  Stafford predicted that the 
hybrid mission's effectiveness will decline quickly if officers with 
significant experience from developed countries are not permitted to 
serve in UNAMID. Regime officials have repeatedly made it quite 
 
KHARTOUM 00000449  002 OF 002 
 
 
clear to Emboffs that the regime will not approve such visas given 
the current political situation. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: Post requests that USUN consider pressing the 
issue of Ethiopian reimbursement at UNHQ to ensure that the convoy 
of the 2nd Ethipian Battalion can depart Addis this month and 
relieve pressure on UNAMID HQ in El Fasher.  While the UNAMID visa 
backlog once reportedly stood at 900 last year, even 152 outstanding 
visas is cause for concern at such a critical time.  With Sudanese 
authorities limiting the space for civil society and humanitarian 
operations in Darfur, foot-dragging on UNAMID visas for experienced 
officers will result in an even less effective peacekeeping mission, 
and a more unstable Darfur.  All the developments on deployments 
over the last year may be limited in effectiveness if the GOS limits 
UNAMID's military management to officers from third world countries 
the regime likes. 
 
FERNANDEZ