VZCZCXRO5050
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0447 0901212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 311212Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3407
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000447 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID REPORTS 2008 DARFUR CASUALTY FIGURES, PROPOSES NEXT 
STEPS IN PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: A.) KHARTOUM 390 
B.) KHARTOUM 150 
 
¶1. (SBU) There were 1,540 total violence-related deaths in Darfur in 
2008, including those related to banditry, and 640 of these deaths 
were the result of Arab-Arab inter-tribal violence, according to 
UNAMID polchief Abdul Mohammed.  Mohammed told polchief on March 31 
that UNAMID will soon release a public report with these figures 
based on its own reporting and the reporting of NGOs.  These figures 
track with earlier reporting from Embassy Khartoum (also based on 
figures from UNAMID that Darfur expert Alex DeWaal posted on his 
blog) indicating that there were 528 total violence-related civilian 
deaths in Darfur in 2008 and that Darfur has, for now, reached a 
"miserable stasis" with periodic, small outbreaks of violence 
qualitatively different from the mass murder of 2003-2006 . 
Mohammed noted that this is a significant decline from 2007 and 
demonstrates a dramatic overall decline in civilian violent deaths 
over the last four years of the Darfur conflict. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Mohammed believes that the time may be right for additional 
progress in the Darfur peace process.  Following the GOS' reckless 
decision to expel 13 INGOs, the regime will be looking for ways to 
demonstrate positive progress in Darfur.  For example, the GOS might 
be willing to live up to its commitment to a ceasefire (announced by 
President Bashir at the Sudan People's Initiative in October 2008, 
but immediately qualified by a statement that it would depend on a 
"mechanism" to implement it.)  Mohammed said that UNAMID has now 
(finally) prepared a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, copied from 
some American ideas (Ref A), that it could quickly implement if the 
GOS agrees to unilateral security commitments, or if Chief Mediator 
Bassole is able to negotiate bilateral security agreements between 
the GOS and any of the rebel movements.  Mohammed noted that last 
year UNAMID's expenses totaled $1.2 billion, and this year the cost 
is projected at over $1.7 billion.  He acknowledged, with apparent 
frustration, that the oft-criticized mission must begin to 
demonstrate some actual progress in bringing peace to Darfur. 
Mohammed said that former South African President Mbeki (in his 
capacity as Chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur) would 
push for security commitments from the GOS during his visit to Sudan 
and Darfur this week. 
 
¶3. (SBU) There remains a serious problem in coordination between 
Chief Mediator Bassole and UNAMID, according to Mohammed.  He 
reported that since the Doha talks in early March (to which UNAMID 
was not invited despite a focus on security issues,) there has been 
no coordination between the JMST and UNAMID although there was a 
cable from DPKO instructing the JMST and UNAMID to coordinate. 
Mohammed suggested that donors and the UNSC members should also push 
the JMST and UNAMID to coordinate.  He suggested a division of labor 
between the JMST and UNAMID. JMST should have the lead on phase-one 
security negotiations (but with the participation of UNAMID,) and 
UNAMID should have the lead on phase-two civil society negotiations 
in Darfur to achieve greater buy-in from tribal leaders and IDPs 
(but with participation from the JMST.)  Phase-three "comprehensive 
peace talks" should be led by the Chief Mediator and whichever 
country hosts the talks, but also with participation from UNAMID. 
Mohammed complained that Bassole works in isolation and doesn't 
inform anyone of his activities nor seek input or participation from 
anyone else, despite the fact that UNAMID would need to implement 
whatever is ultimately negotiated. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Comment: Mohammed is just as territorial and ambitious as 
Bassole, but it is certainly ridiculous and shameful that the UN's 
own bureaucracy, ego, and turf wars appear to be additional 
obstacles to achieving peace in Darfur.  We should press both 
Bassole and UNAMID to coordinate better at every possible 
opportunity.  UNAMID's 2008 violence-related casualty figures for 
Darfur will no doubt be disputed by emotional activists in the 
advocacy community, and should be corroborated by additional 
organizations such as the ICRC and Human Rights Watch.  One must 
also recognized that all the state and other actors who caused the 
mass murders in the Darfur tragedy's first years are still very much 
in place and largely unrepentant. However, there is a demonstrable 
downward trend in violence-related deaths that indicates the 
changing nature of the conflict in Darfur.  As we have reported 
previously (Ref B), the intermittent Darfur conflict of 2008-2009 
reflects a gruesome low-grade fever of a stalemate that could be 
broken - with the opportunity for tangible improvements on the 
ground - if the U.S. and the rest of the international community are 
pragmatic about seeking security commitments from the GOS and the 
rebels.  A comprehensive political solution may be elusive for some 
time to come, but real improvements in security are within reach. 
 
FERNANDEZ