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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM446, UNMIS FEARS FOR THE STABILITY OF SOUTH SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM446 2009-03-31 12:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5048
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0446/01 0901210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 311210Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3405
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000446 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID EFIN SOCI ASEC KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNMIS FEARS FOR THE STABILITY OF SOUTH SUDAN 
 
REFS: A. KHARTOUM 375 
B. KHARTOUM 185 
C. KHARTOUM 330 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting on March 27 with ConGen Juba, Lise 
Grande, UNMIS Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 
expressed the view that the recent tribal fighting in Pibor County 
in Jonglei State and the "Wounded Soldiers" protests over back pay 
that shut down major trade corridors to Uganda and Kenya in March 
signal a disturbing trend.  Tracking with Embassy reporting over the 
past few months, she said this trend "could lead to dangerous and 
even catastrophic" levels of instability in Southern Sudan in the 
lead up to the 2011 referendum on independence.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) In a March 27 meeting with CG Juba, Grande expressed UN 
concerns over three issues that she thought could critically 
undermine the stability of Southern Sudan:  the budget crisis caused 
by the collapse in oil prices, civilian disarmament, and tensions 
within the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) that could create more 
Malakal-like conflicts across the South. 
 
3. (SBU) Of greatest concern to the UN, said Grande, is the recent 
fighting between the Murle and Nuer communities in Jonglei state 
(ref. A).  Traditional conflict between these tribes runs deep and 
is long-standing, although the cause of the latest flare up seems to 
have involved incidents of cattle rustling (the smaller Murle tribe 
supported Khartoum during the Sudanese Civil War while many Nuer 
were part of the SPLM and prior rebel movements).  The UN estimates 
that 450 people were killed, although there are reports the death 
toll exceeded 700.  Even at 450, this makes this conflict more 
deadly than the combined casualties resulting from SPLM-SAF fighting 
in Malakal in February, 2008 and in Abyei in May, 2008. 
 
4. (SBU) The GOSS understands that the best way to reduce the 
killing is through civilian disarmament, said Grande.  The problem, 
according to GOSS Interior Minister Paul Mayom's assessment that he 
shared with Grande, is that the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) 
is simply not up to the job.  There are not enough policemen, and 
they lack the training required to successfully carry out such a 
mission.  On the other hand, Grande said that SPLA Chief of Staff 
Oyay Deng Ajak told her the SPLA does not want to conduct the 
disarmament either.  The last time they tried to do so in this 
region the SPLA reportedly lost 200 soldiers killed.  The GOSS 
insisted that the level of force needed to effectively disrm the 
state would only alienate the local population to such a degree that 
the SPLA would come to be seen as an enemy, with serious 
consequences for the GOSS' ability to control the region. 
 
5. (SBU) Grande continued that the UN also is concerned that the 
GOSS still is not taking the looming financial crisis facing the 
South as seriously as it should.  The GOSS' almost complete 
dependence on oil revenues to fund its operations, combined with the 
recent plunge in oil prices, means that the GOSS budget will fall 
far short of what is needed in 2009 (refs. B and C).  Salva Kiir has 
for four years used oil revenues to secure a certain level of social 
peace and stability in South Sudan and that option is now ending. 
Salary arrears are building, which already has resulted in two very 
troubling protests by the "Wounded Heroes" elements in the SPLA. 
These protests completely closed two critically-important trade 
corridors, one to Uganda and the other to Kenya. 
 
6. (SBU) The first occurred near the Uganda border when the "Wounded 
Heroes" recently erected road blocks that halted all trade between 
South Sudan and Uganda.  The soldiers had not been paid since 
November, and the blockage created such a severe problem that GOSS 
President Salva Kiir himself went to the town of Yei to negotiate an 
end to the action.  In order to placate them, Kiir arranged for the 
protesters to receive two months of back pay, promising that the 
rest would be made up soon. 
 
7. (SBU) Observing the success of this action, a second group of 
"Wounded Heroes" held a similar protest in the town of Kapoeta, near 
the Kenyan border, once again shutting down a critical trade 
corridor into Southern Sudan and trapping a number of foreigners in 
the town.  This once again required a high-level delegation from the 
GOSS, including the Minister for SPLA Affairs, to travel to Kapoeta 
to negotiate with the protestors.  The Wounded Heroes this time 
refused the offer of two months pay as inadequate, and it took two 
days for the GOSS delegation to finally satisfy the demands of the 
protesters, keeping the SPLA Minister away from an important 
conference on implementing an SPLA strategy plan. 
 
8. (SBU) Finally, Grande stated her concern that the chronic and 
continuing political and economic problems will work to increase 
internal tensions in JIUs across the border areas and in the South. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000446  002 OF 002 
 
 
She said the UN believes the environment is ripe for a repeat in 
other places in the South of the recent SAF versus SPLM JIU clashes 
in Malakal, citing Torit as an especially troubling case where 
fighting could break out. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  We agree with Grande's assessment that the 
stability of the South is coming under increasing strain due to 
crippling budget shortfalls and the continuing deterioration of the 
security scene based on tribal and political dynamics. The cash that 
bought a certain level of social peace is almost gone. The protests 
in Yei and Kapoeta have taught a dangerous (for the GOSS) lesson to 
unpaid state workers:  create a big enough stink and the GOSS will 
act to somehow get you your money.  The GOSS has been fortunate that 
there have so far been no deaths or serious injuries in these 
actions, but such casualties are only a matter of time.  The bulk of 
the GOSS budget goes to salary payments (including to the 150,000 
man SPLA), which has helped to buy short-term social peace in an 
impoverished, war-ravaged, ethnically-divided, and heavily-armed 
region.  However, the GOSS' ability to distribute such largesse is 
drying up due to the drop in oil revenues.  Given the fiscal mess 
the GOSS finds itself in, coupled with continuing NCP machinations 
to promote discord in the South, the threat to South Sudan's 
continued stability is real and growing.  To avoid this, the GOSS 
must find a realistic way to meet its fiscal obligations and develop 
a strategic plan to disarm a dangerously well armed and increasingly 
unhappy civilian population. 
 
FERNANDEZ