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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM439, ABYEI ADMINISTRATOR TRAVELS TO KHARTOUM TO RESOLVE FUNDING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM439 2009-03-30 14:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3970
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0439/01 0891422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301422Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3395
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000439 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID SOCI ASEC KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI ADMINISTRATOR TRAVELS TO KHARTOUM TO RESOLVE FUNDING 
PROBLEM 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 217 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Abyei Administrator Arop Mayok is in Khartoum to 
try to secure the release of GNU revenues for his Administration. 
The annual Misseriya cattle migration has gone fairly smoothly, but 
both the Dinka and Misseriya continue to be worried about security 
as they remain respectively south and north of Abyei town.  Flooding 
and a food shortage in Twich County are causing an influx of 
additional IDPs into Agok, complicating humanitarian operations 
there. Mayok also expressed concern about the NCP pushing Misseriya 
settlers into the northern part of the interim borders of the 
region.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Progress on AIA Financing? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU) On March 28, Abyei Administrator Arop Mayok met with 
Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC) Chairman Derek Plumbly and 
CDA Fernandez.  Mayok was in Khartoum to try to resolve the standoff 
over the release of funds promised in the June 8, 2008 Abyei Roadmap 
Agreement to his Abyei interim Administration (AIA) (reftel). 
According to Mayok, there some snail-like progress as the Presidency 
now has instructed the Government of National Unity Finance Ministry 
to release revenues for the AIA budget.  In the coming days, Mayok 
will meet with MOF officials to determine the mechanics of the funds 
transfer which should allow him to pay salaries and hire more staff 
for the first time. 
 
3.  (SBU) Chairman Plumbly said that he understood from MOF State 
Minister of Finance Lual Deng (SPLM) that the MOF has prepared a 
budget for the AIA of 50 million Sudanese Pounds (Note: US$1:2.25 
SDG.  End note.)  SDG 26.6 million of that will be for "staff" and 
SDG six million will be for "salaries."  (Note:  It is not clear how 
the staff and salaries categories relate to each other.  End note.) 
 
 
4.  (SBU) Regarding the two percent of oil revenues that are to be 
used to benefit the Ngok Dinka, Mayok said that the nine Ngok Dinka 
chiefs have to meet and to agree to sign a letter, giving him a 
mandate to establish an account into which the funds can be 
deposited and authorizing him to supervise how the money is used. 
These monies are for the Ngok Dinka specifically, and will be 
separate from the AIA operating budget.  Mayok now is seeking 
clarity on what further is required from the Dinka chiefs on how 
they want the money spent. 
 
Seasonal Migration Update 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU) Chairman Plumbly noted that during his recent visit to the 
Abyei region, both the Dinka and the Misseriya told him that their 
primary concern is security.  While the Dinka IDPs around Agok fear 
to return to their homes in Abyei, the Misseriya have been afraid to 
move south of the river Kiir this year on their annual migration. 
Instead many have camped around Gulih, north of Abyei town.  Mayok 
confirmed that there is a Misseriya concentration at Gulih, armed 
with weapons that include heavy 12.7 mm PKM machine guns. 
Currently, water and grass around Abyei is just sufficient to 
sustain the Misseriya cattle.  He said that it seems that the NCP 
had encouraged the Misseriya to settle in Gulih and about a dozen 
other sites near the oil fields of Difra but the Misseriya had only 
constructed very flimsy structures and were not particularly about 
staying there. When the rainy season starts in two months, the 
Misseriya plan to return North. 
 
6.  (SBU) Plumbly agreed that the Misseriya he spoke to have no 
desire to remain in the area, but rather seek guarantees that they 
will be able to maintain their traditional way of life by migrating 
with their cattle southward annually through Abyei into Bahr 
al-Ghazal.  CDA Fernandez noted that there are two reasons for the 
Misseriya encampments north of Abyei.  First, they are being pressed 
out of their own traditional homeland by a combination of 
environmental pressures including  desertification and the migration 
due to similar pressures of the Reizegat tribe from Darfur into 
Misseriya lands.  Second, the National Congress Party (NCP) is 
seeking to manipulate the situation to its own advantage by 
encouraging the Misseriya to settle permanently in the Abyei region 
in order to create facts on the ground they can use later.  But even 
though the Misseriya are subject to manipulation, they have their 
own agenda separate from the NCP. 
 
7.  (SBU) Mayok said he still hopes to organize a Dinka-Misseriya 
reconciliation conference that would set the ground rules for the 
cattle migration through Abyei, possibly in the remainder of the 
current migration season, but likely at the beginning of the next 
season.  Chairman Plumbly remarked that other Misseriya have 
 
KHARTOUM 00000439  002 OF 002 
 
 
migrated south along the route to the west and east of Abyei, 
following an ad hoc conference with local leaders.  The CDA 
commented that the CPA recognizes the Misseriya's right to migrate 
south with their cattle, but is unclear about their right to carry 
weapons.  Mayok noted that the local population in Bahr al-Ghazal 
has been disarmed, therefore the migrating Misseriya also should be 
unarmed because "there always problems with their migration when 
they are the only ones armed".  The CDA agreed, but remarked that 
policies are not consistent across the entire border.  For example, 
Misseriya herdsmen are permitted to bring light weapons into parts 
of Bahr al Ghazal.  As Chairman Plumbly noted, migration along the 
eastern corridor this year was worked out in an ad hoc fashion.  A 
consistent arrangement needs to be reached for the entire border. 
Mayok noted that it will be the responsibility of the SPLA to make 
sure that the Misseriya do not misbehave. 
 
Looming Food Problem in Agok 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8.  (SBU) Administrator Mayok reported that the IDP population 
around Agok is growing with the influx of new arrivals from 
neighboring Twich County to the south.  The original IDP population 
in Agok comprised residents of Abyei who fled the fighting last May 
and who continue to fear to return.  The newer arrivals are 
attracted by the humanitarian food distribution for the IDPs in 
Agok.  Twich is plagued by flooding and a resulting food shortage. 
The influx of non-Abyei IDPs is complicating planning for the 
support of the IDP population there, he said.  This situation can 
only worsen as the rainy season begins. "I have briefed the UN 
agencies here in Khartoum that we could have a famine," remarked 
Mayok, because of the poor harvest in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal. 
 
9. (SBU) Mayok expressed frustration on the change of command of the 
Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) in Abyei. The NCP sought to make the 
current SAF deputy, LTC Ali, into the next commander (leadership 
should rotate between SAF and SPLA). LTC Ali does not have a good 
reputation and was on the ground when the JIU collapsed in May 2008 
amidst ethnic fighting.  Mayok believes that either both top 
officials should be changed or both kept as is with SPLA Colonel 
Valentino remaining in charge. He expected that such an outcome will 
probably prevail in the short run. He once again underscored the 
need for greater support for the local police or JIPU, which have 
almost no transportation to police a large and wild area. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
10.  (SBU) Mayok's long-awaited travel to Khartoum to resolve the 
spending issue is a step in the right direction, but does not equal 
success. Even to get him here to engage the Ministry of Finance took 
great pressure from the AEC and the US Embassy and CG Juba.  As we 
have seen in other situations, the NCP may simply find new excuses 
not to release funds to the AIA, once it complies with the current 
requirements, but Mayok should not give them the easy excuse of his 
absence.  (This is exactly what the SPLM anticipates.)  Still, by 
engaging in Khartoum, Mayok at least has finally put the ball back 
in the NCP's court and removed its latest justification for not 
complying with the terms of the June 2008 Abyei Roadmap agreement. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ