VZCZCXRO0881
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0429/01 0851506
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261506Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3379
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000429 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION, AF/SPG, AF/E, IO, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL PREF KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SEARCHING FOR "TRACK THREE" ON DARFUR HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 421 
     B) KHARTOUM 409 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is an action message, please see para 7. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(DSRSG) for Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah Haq met with a core group 
of major donors on late on March 25 to inaugurate a weekly ad hoc 
coordination mechanism in Khartoum between Darfur humanitarian 
donors and the UN on what the new humanitarian infrastructure in 
Darfur should look like after the Khartoum regime's March 4 
expulsion of 13 major Western NGOs and suppression of 3 Sudanese 
NGOs. Haq began by apologizing that she didn't want to offend all 
the other donors but she wanted a process which could be low-key and 
manageable. Present for this initial meeting were COMs from EU, US, 
UK, Netherlands, and Norway plus both Sudan and New York-based OCHA 
representatives. She noted that this is also a discussion which 
needs to occur in New York with major stakeholders. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ameerah noted that the UN continues with tracks one and 
two of its three track approach: seeking a reversal of the 
expulsions and finding some sort of package of interim measures to 
prevent a total implosion of the humanitarian effort in Darfur. 
Track two is the just completed joint assessment (reftels). Track 
three is the discussion that needs to occur first with donors and 
then with the GOS on what could eventually replace the NGOs if the 
decision is never reversed. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) CDA Fernandez thanked Ameerah and noted that future ad hoc 
meetings should include specialized experts such as USAID 
colleagues. He noted that one problem with discussing track three so 
soon is track one: there was a working process in place that was 
mostly demolished by the Sudanese Government with the expulsion so 
whatever new dispensation is going to face the lack of trust created 
by the NCP's recent actions.  He suggested two points that need to 
be watched closely. The first is how any process is handled over 
time. The regime negotiated and initially paid lip service to a 
structure which included the Joint Humanitarian Access Communique of 
March 2007 and the Higher Level Committee to monitor the communiqu. 
Over time it slowly subverted the process. For example, a suggestion 
that NGOS needed to only "notify" the GOS on travel outside of 
Darfur's capitals became over time a "requirement for permission" to 
travel which eventually almost paralyzed INGO work in large parts of 
the region. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CDA also noted that unfortunately most countries had been 
very passive when they were on the HLC and had been deceived by HAC. 
NGOs were cowed by fear of HAC retaliation against them. The regime 
had sought to create an artificial division between the humanitarian 
and the political where NGOs had to suffer in silence and donors 
(except the US) could not complain. There needed to be a restoration 
of "donor primacy in the process." Donors were both funding the NGOs 
and the UN agencies.  Both Haq and others present generally agreed 
with that analysis. Ameerah noted that regime officials had removed 
impediments at the federal level while creating new ones at the 
state level. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The UN's Humanitarian Rep for Darfur, Toby Lanzer, noted 
that the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are so large that 
it is easy for the regime to play "divide and conquer," so there is 
a need for greater and constant coordination between the UN and 
donors to prevent this. He added that we should not forget that 
Sudan is a brutal police state and that "it backed down slightly on 
the NGO issue with the UN because it needed an agreement."  It will 
always act badly and that should come as no surprise to anyone. He 
suggested that the regime is unlikely to expel any more NGOs in the 
near future because of the firestorm of criticism it had ignited. 
Haq noted that "all we've done is avert a short term crisis over the 
next one to two months" and that there was a real danger that the 
current, temporary, ad hoc arrangement would become track three. 
OCHA suggested that involving real players, such as national 
security (NISS) rather than just the Humanitarian Affairs Ministry 
might also make sense since they were the ones calling the shots in 
this crisis. UK rep agreed, noting that NISS mostly controls 
Humanitarian Affairs anyway and it would remove the pretense that 
these are humanitarian rather than political decisions taken by the 
regime. 
 
¶7. (SBU) After the meeting, Ameerah Haq approached CDA Fernandez and 
said that she was sending Lanzer to Paris next week to try to get 
SLM rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur to allow his partisans among the 
leaders in the teeming Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur to accept 
urgently help from the UN and other INGOS (replacing the ones 
 
KHARTOUM 00000429  002 OF 002 
 
 
expelled) in the form of food and meningitis vaccinations. Haq asked 
for American help in encouraging the stubborn Abdul Wahid to be 
reasonable. CDA noted that the US does not have any special 
influence over Abdul Wahid but he would certainly pass the message 
to Washington to coordinate with the French. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The meeting was a very humble beginning to the 
next great task facing donors and the UN in Sudan: what replaces the 
almost dysfunctional and rickety humanitarian structure which was 
precipitously demolished by the NCP on March 4? Getting an answer 
will indeed require greater coordination by donors in Sudan and in 
New York and a consistent message and principled stand by the UN. It 
also needs consistent pressure and eventual incentives for the 
regime by the international community. Otherwise, a patient and 
duplicitous NCP will merely wait until a changing cast of characters 
here and elsewhere allows them to subvert whatever structures and 
processes are put in place. End comment. 
FERNANDEZ