VZCZCXRO7127
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0414/01 0821307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231307Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3344
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000414 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, SE GRATION, AF/SPG, AF/E, DRL 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN DUCKS TOUGH QUESTIONS ON SUDANESE ELECTIONS 
 
REFS: A. Khartoum 393 
       ¶B. Khartoum 382 
       ¶C. Khartoum 240 
       ¶D. Khartoum 234 
       ¶E. Khartoum 137 
       ¶F. 08 Khartoum 1685 
 
¶1. Summary:  During the first Electoral Assistance Group (EAG) 
meeting after the ICC's March 4 arrest warrant for Government of 
National Unity (GNU) President Al-Bashir, the UN spoke at length 
about meager and unimpressive electoral preparations made by the 
National Electoral Commission (NEC), but mentioned only briefly the 
effect the ICC warrant and the INGO expulsions might have on 
elections in Sudan.  USG officials asked whether the UN has 
developed red lines for providing electoral assistance to the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) and Government of South Sudan 
(GoSS) in the event of a "snap" election.  According to UNMIS Chief 
Electoral Affairs Officer Ray Kennedy, policy decisions on UN 
support will be made by the UN Security Council and he was reluctant 
to discuss the potential effects of the post-ICC environment, 
including the INGO expulsions, on donor electoral support.  End 
Summary. 
 
UNMIS UPDATE OF NEC PROGRESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  UNMIS Chief Electoral Affairs Officer Ray Kennedy told electoral 
donors on 19 March that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) is 
still "struggling to reach operational capacity." (ref F)  The 
Commission has not yet set up the 25 state-level and Southern Sudan 
high electoral commissions -- one of its highest priorities when it 
was first established.  Kennedy said that the committees might be 
named by the end of March.  Kennedy noted that the NEC is scheduled 
to move to its new office location soon, and the move, which puts 
the NEC much closer to the UNMIS compound, should make UN-NEC 
coordination easier.  He also said that the NEC has announced and 
designated Department heads who will preside over various electoral 
functions (ref A). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) According to Kennedy, the NEC appears not to be taking any 
policy decisions yet.  He flagged the determination of the scope of 
power of the Southern Sudan High Electoral Committee as a potential 
North/South flashpoint that might hold up elections if the NEC and 
the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) cannot agree.  Kennedy 
informed donors that the UN "has not yet heard" from the NEC on a 
specific timeline for elections, but said that the NEC wants to hold 
elections in 2009, a general timeframe that the UN is "taking 
seriously." (refs D and E)  The UNMIS Elections Chief stated that 
the NEC has discussed conducting voter registration in May/June or 
July/August.  According to Kennedy, UNMIS deems May/June as 
unfeasible due to the amount of time it will take to procure voter 
registration materials, but said there is "some reasonable 
possibility" that voter registration could occur in July/August; 
particularly if the NEC could procure materials faster than the UN. 
Were registration conducted in July/August, the voter list could be 
posted in early September, finalized in late September and elections 
could occur by the end of 2009. (Note: The electoral law requires 
that voter registration be completed three months before elections 
occur.  End Note.) 
 
CRITICAL ISSUES TO TRACK 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4. (SBU) According to Kennedy, there are a number of "critical 
issues" regarding elections to track, such as the roll-out of census 
results, the ratification of reformed legislation on press/media and 
national security, and the sentiment about election participation in 
Darfur.  Kennedy announced that at the next census technical working 
group (TWG) scheduled for 26 March, UNFPA expects the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) and the Southern Sudan Census Commission 
(SSCCSE) to agree to send the final census figures to the Population 
Census Council (PCC) for endorsement.  [Note:  USG officials 
understand from SSCCSE contacts that the CBS has refused to 
participate in a jointly-developed census results verification 
process.  The SSCCSE is documenting its concerns with the census 
results and the CBS's verification process.  Results of the Census 
TWG will be reported septel.  End Note.] 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UNMIS Electoral Chief said that the UN is concerned 
that large areas of turbulent Southern Kordofan were uncounted due 
to an SPLM boycott in that state during census enumeration.  Kennedy 
said that UNMIS Civil Affairs and UNFPA were jointly working the 
issue to see how the undercount could be resolved.  He said that the 
undercount could result in Southern Kordofan's loss of three 
geographical constituency seats.  Kennedy did not mention an obvious 
undercount in Darfur.  According to Kennedy, the NEC expects to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000414  002 OF 003 
 
 
receive census results in early April. [Note:  this is assuming the 
CBS and SSCCSE agree on the census priority results.  End note.] 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kennedy reported that there has been "intensive discussion" 
between the NCP and the SPLM on pending legislation on media/press 
and national security (ref C).  He said there has been "some 
progress" on the press/media law, but that there continue to be big 
sticking points between the two partners on a reformed national 
security law. Kennedy added that during his recent trip to El 
Fasher, North Darfur, UNAMID officials were pessimistic about IDPs 
(who are over 2 million people in Darfur, not all of voting age) and 
rebel movements participating in upcoming elections.  Kennedy 
announced rather unconvincingly to donors that "this could change in 
very short order, because of the way things happen here."  He stated 
that UNMIS Electoral Affairs now has an electoral advisor based in 
El Fasher. 
 
UPDATE ON UN ELECTIONS PROGRESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7. (SBU) Kennedy said that UNHQ NY is reluctant, for security 
reasons, to send a team to Sudan to conduct an electoral needs 
assessment.  They have asked Kennedy to conduct the assessment and 
report back to UNHQ "over email" with the results.  The UNMIS 
Electoral Chief said he is pushing back on this issue and still is 
requesting a team from NY to visit Sudan in mid-April. 
 
¶8. (SBU) UNDP officials asked donors to pledge more money to its 
recently-amended Elections Project Implementation Plan (PIP), which 
will require USD 26 million in funding.  So far, donor countries 
have pledged USD 13 million to PIP activities, but UNDP only has USD 
4.5 million of this funding in hand.  UNDP officials said that the 
NEC has not yet signed the PIP (i.e. - authorized UNDP's electoral 
programs), but they expected it would do so the week of March 22. 
[Note:  The UNDP's amended PIP has four assistance areas:  providing 
support to the NEC, civic and voter education, media training and 
monitoring, and domestic observation.  End note.]  Kennedy 
explicitly asked whether there were any donors willing to commit to 
provide additional funds; the Germans and Dutch indicated some 
willingness without specifics, while the UK stated that the PIP must 
be signed before they will commit more funds.  UNDP noted that some 
activities can move forward with funds currently in hand, but 'big 
ticket' items such as equipment and Requests for Proposals cannot 
move without more funding commitments. 
 
A CALL TO FOCUS ON REFERENDUM PREPARATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶9. (SBU) Kennedy told donors that preparations for the 2011 
referendum on southern Sudan self-determination "should be a high 
priority for all of us now."  He explained that the southern Sudan 
referendum law will be two years late come July 2009 (ref C).  The 
CPA calls for referendum registration to be completed three months 
before the referendum vote (January 2011), which would put the 
registration squarely in the rainy season.  Realistically, said 
Kennedy, referendum registration needs to happen in the first 
quarter of 2010.  Passing a referendum law and establishing a 
referendum commission are "more than urgent," he said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Kennedy explained that the NCP and SPLM already disagree 
over a number of issues related to the southern Sudan referendum: 
(a) whether there should be separate laws for the southern Sudan and 
Abyei referenda or just one - NCP wants one law, the SPLM wants to 
see two separate laws; (b) composition of the Referendum Commission 
- NCP wants a North/South balance, SPLM wants the Commission to be 
composed of a majority of Southerners; (c) Referendum Commission 
Headquarters - NCP would like to see it in Khartoum, SPLM would like 
for it to be in Juba, and (d) southern Sudan voter eligibility 
requirement - the NCP would like the requirement to be more broad 
than what the SPLM is proposing.  UNMIS has asked the MFA for a 
written request from the GNU for UN assistance on the referendum as 
soon as possible. 
 
AND WHAT ABOUT THE POST-ICC ENVIRONMENT? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11. (SBU) In his election update (a regular part of every EAG), 
Kennedy did not once mention the potential effects of the post-ICC 
environment on elections (ref B).  UNDP only glossed over the issue 
(38 minutes into the joint UNMIS-UNDP briefing) by stating that its 
request for proposals for an elections media implementing partner 
was on hold due to the uncertainty over whether an awardee would be 
able to register in northern Sudan as a result of the NCP's March 4 
expulsion of 13 INGOs.  During the question and answer session, 
poloff questioned Kennedy on whether the UN was concerned about a 
potential snap election (particularly for the GNU Presidency), how 
the UN would respond in such an event, and whether the UN had 
 
KHARTOUM 00000414  003 OF 003 
 
 
developed "red lines" for moving forward with its electoral 
assistance.  Kennedy was dismissive of the question and stated that 
UNMIS will move forward with assistance until the UNSC tells it not 
to. [Note: UNMIS has a UNSC mandate to provide technical assistance 
to the GNU and GoSS to carry out nation-wide elections.  End note.] 
He did not comment on the possibility of a snap presidential 
election.  He did affirm that per the electoral law, if there is a 
sole candidate for the GNU Presidency, he/she would be proclaimed 
President without a vote. A UNDP official responded that in the 
event of a snap election (i.e. - before the end of July), "we would 
try our best to see what we can deliver."  USAIDoff expressed the 
USG's concern about the March 4 INGO expulsions and what a post-ICC 
environment may mean for USG elections programming in the north. 
Neither UNMIS nor UNDP responded to the concern.  Other donors also 
were silent, leading Kennedy to say, "it is unusually quiet in here 
for such a big group today."  After the meeting, UK officials 
approached Emboffs to register their own concern about potential 
snap elections, the INGO expulsions, and what all of it means for 
donor electoral assistance.  They agreed to call an electoral donor 
group meeting (more intimate than the EAG) to discuss these very 
issues. [Note:  Outcomes of the March 24 meeting to be reported 
septel.  End note.] 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶12. (SBU) This month's donor electoral meeting can only be described 
as surreal given that there was no substantial mention by the UN of 
the ICC arrest warrant, the INGO expulsions, or the possibility of a 
snap election until USG officials directly raised them.  Kennedy 
made it quite clear that the UNSC would call the shots on the fate 
of UN electoral assistance, and reiterated more than once that until 
UNMIS is told otherwise, it will continue to support the electoral 
process in Sudan.  Other donors (excluding the UK) seem perplexed, 
yet much less concerned, by what the post-ICC environment might mean 
for elections and donor electoral assistance in Sudan.  This is 
partly because they do not have nearly as much at stake in the way 
of electoral assistance, nor have many of them felt the direct 
effect of partner expulsions.  With the current toxic environment 
for aid and development work in northern Sudan, the USG will have to 
make some tough decisions on what it means for upcoming USG 
electoral assistance in the North.  Implementing partners that are 
brought in to support the electoral process in Sudan will almost 
certainly face unbearable scrutiny and limitations by the NCP and 
the state's security apparatus.  End Comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ