VZCZCXRO3952
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0390/01 0781426
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191426Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3311
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000390 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, IO, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIP TO EL FASHER MARCH 15-17 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 383 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The expulsion of 13 INGOs has led to a 
deterioration of services in IDP camps that local NGOs have neither 
the capacity nor inclination to fill, representatives of Al Salaam, 
Abu Shouk and Zam Zam (reftel) IDP Camps told CDA Fernandez on a 
March 15-17 trip to El Fasher. They also noted that any attempt by 
the government to dismantle the camps is misplaced, because 
insecurity prevents IDPs from returning home. Meanwhile, 
representatives of SLM/Minni Minnawi warned CDA about impending 
famine in far North Darfur, and accused the GOS of politicizing 
relief efforts to punish pro-rebel Zaghawa civilians. In meetings 
with UNAMID, the force's senior leadership told CDA they are 
exploring how they can provide temporary emergency relief in IDP 
camps to fill the gap left by the INGO expulsions, and also 
described a preliminary proposal for a 15-20 person Mobile 
Monitoring Team (MMT) to investigate armed attacks in the event of a 
negotiated cessation of hostilities. Finally, representatives of 
remaining INGOs told CDA they felt nervous and vulnerable following 
several acts of violence and heightened rhetoric, and it was unclear 
whether they would or could continue to operate in Darfur in this 
environment. End Summary. 
 
LOCAL NGOS ILL-EQUIIPED TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On March 15, CDA Fernandez and an Embassy team made up of 
POL, RSO, USAID, and JLE departed Khartoum despite feverish MFA 
efforts to block the trip. Despite written orders to prevent the 
journey, inobservant airport staff allowed emboffs to depart on 
commercial air to Darfur. In El Fasher, CDA first met with Abdalla 
Adam Bashar, former IRC Coordinator of Al Salaam Camp, and Adam Al 
Nur Abdallah, a Fur Dimlij (tribal leader). Bashar stated that 
expulsion of the 13 INGOs will have eventual "huge effects" on the 
ground, and is already being felt in very tangible ways. Patients in 
clinics operated by Action Contre la Faim (ACF) were sent home 
following the announcement of the expulsions, he said, but they 
continued to return to the clinic. Desperate for help, local 
authorities begged ACF national staff members to return, he said. 
"Officials in Khartoum thought they could just supply a few doctors 
and things would be fine," he observed. "But they are realizing it's 
not so easy. You need not only doctors but qualified staff for 
patient care." Bashar also cited water services as an area that 
would suffer greatly from the INGO expulsion, noting the technical 
and operational expertise brought by Oxfam in the operation of water 
systems could not easily be replicated by the government. "The 
government cannot even provide water or electricity for people who 
pay in El Fasher town," he said, noting that he himself had not 
received water shipments in over a month, despite paying local 
taxes. Bashar also lamented that services provided by some expelled 
INGOs--such as IRC--in rebel-held areas would not be replaced by the 
government at all. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Bashar continued to say that local NGOs have neither the 
capacity nor the neutrality to replace the expelled INGOs, noting 
that the only genuine local NGO was the Sudanese Red Crescent. "The 
rest are organs of the security apparatus, used to control and 
monitor the camps," he asserted, adding that these organizations 
would fulfill the government's desire to dismantle the camps by 
cajoling (or threatening) IDPs to return home. "If they refuse, they 
will force them out," he said. The Fur Dimlij Abdallah noted that 
IDPs cannot return due to insecurity and the fact that many of their 
houses have been newcomers. "They'd rather die here than there," he 
remarked. 
 
¶4. (SBU) CDA also met with Ahmed Abu Al Bashar (no relation) a 
community leader in Abu Shouk IDP camp, who asserted that there was 
a big gap in confidence between IDPs and local NGOs backed by the 
government. For example, he said, the government denies that rapes 
occur in Darfur, so how will its organs provide healthcare and 
services for rape victims? He also predicted humanitarian disaster 
will slowly proliferate under the watch of local NGOs, because "they 
will never acknowledge a need for help if something is beyond their 
capacity, for that is tantamount to admitting they failed." Since 
the expulsions, residents of Abu Shouk are suffering from a lack of 
medicine, food and water following the exodus of IRC, CHR and ACF, 
he said, and predicted that their departure would lead to a "slow 
death" for IDPs. 
 
SECURITY TRUMPS POLITICAL DEMANDS FOR IDPS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The government's hope that it can dismantle IDP camps by 
removing services is misplaced, according to Dr. Abduljabbar Abdalla 
Fadul, a prominent Darfuri academic. He noted that "no single IDP is 
 
KHARTOUM 00000390  002 OF 004 
 
 
interested in staying in the camps, but they are prevented from 
returning home due to insecurity," recalling the attempted return of 
a number of IDPs to their village of Hassan Jadia in East Jebel 
Marra. "They returned and started to harvest their crops, but soon 
after their harvest, most of their belongings were looted by GOS 
soldiers," he said. Consequently, they returned to the IDP camp, he 
said. Contributing to the insecurity are GOS forces, Janjaweed 
militia, and bandits, many of whom are former Zaghawa rebels, he 
said. "Minnawi's fighters have deserted him in droves because they 
have not been paid," he said, adding that most of the carjackings in 
Darfur are the work of SLM/Minnawi. 
 
PESSIMISM ON FUTURE DOHA TALKS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Professor Abduljabbar told CDA he was skeptical about the 
prospects for peace in Darfur given the current direction of the 
peace process. "The weakness of Doha is the same weakness of Abuja," 
he said, noting that Darfur's problems cannot be solved without the 
Fur. He characterized Paris-based SLM leader Abdul Wahid as "a 
hopeless guy" whose youth, immaturity and inexperience resulted in 
him having zero support from Fur elites or intellectuals. While he 
retains wide name recognition in IDP camps and support among camp 
sheiks because of his wild promises and intransigence, Abduljabbar 
asserted that IDPs' desire to return home is stronger than any 
political allegiance to Abdul Wahid or his political demands. "They 
are much less concerned with justice or compensation than they are 
with security for their return home," he said. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ahmed Adam Yousif, founder of the respected local NGO 
focusing on peace and reconciliation, was also pessimistic about the 
prospects for Doha. He noted that with the exception of JEM, all the 
rebel movements were weak militarily, and "weak movements do not 
meet our demands as Darfurians." A strong movement was needed to be 
a counterpart to the GOS, he said, because hardliners like Nafie Ali 
Nafie have no inclination to negotiate. He predicted that without 
Abdul Wahid, the Doha talks would fail, and lamented that Abdul 
Wahid was not replaceable because of entrenched support among IDPs. 
Fur elders in exile like Ahmed Diraije and Tijane Sese "have no 
standing among IDPs. They have no connection with them," he said. 
 
UNAMID PLANS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (SBU) On March 16, CDA met with an oblivious JSR Rodolphe Adada 
at UNAMID HQ in El Fasher. The flippant Adada, who seemed only 
vaguely aware of the situation around him, stated that UNAMID 
remained concerned about the humanitarian situation, and was 
examining how it could assist with the water crisis in Zam Zam and 
other camps on an emergency basis by delivering water bladders and 
interfacing with technical groups before humanitarians take over. 
Adada emphasized that UNAMID's role was one of temporary relief, and 
it did not plan to replace the expelled NGOs as a provider of 
humanitarian service. "We are like a neighbor who sees that the 
house next door is burning, so we bring over a bucket of water until 
the fire brigade arrives," he said. (Note: CDA cautioned Adada that 
if UNAMID is not careful, it might end up being stuck with this 
provision of services and risk the ire of IDPs, who n Lasge`part 
o|Q>G??Q__:Q;_?'~u/awQm/x 
o resume in earnest by April, 
and that he hoped for a 70% deployment rate by mid-summer. He 
monotonously affirmed that the GOS had been fully cooperative with 
UNAMID's demands and that the force had "nothing to complain about 
with the government right now." He stated that the next tripartite 
meeting was scheduled for March 31 in El Fasher, and although "there 
is nothing really important to discuss," it is important to continue 
these meetings. 
 
UNAMID'S PROPOSAL FOR A MOBILE MONITORING TEAM (MMT) 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following his meeting with JSR Adada, CDA met with UNAMID 
force Commander Martin Luther Agwai. Agwai stated that he remained 
hopeful for an eventual negotiation of a cessation of hostilities 
between two or more parties in future rounds of peace talks, and to 
that end UNAMID has created a proposal for a Mobile Monitoring Team, 
inspired by some State Department suggestions in late 2008, to 
investigate and report on armed attacks or acts of aggression to 
monitor a reduction in violence. Such a team would be small (15-20 
persons) and embedded into a Ceasefire Commission structure, and 
would ultimately report to him as Force Commander, he said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Agwai noted that there were two critical equipment 
requirements for such an arrangement, namely military transport 
 
KHARTOUM 00000390  003 OF 004 
 
 
helicopters (as UNAMID's current fleet of helicopters are limited in 
the scope of their usage due to contractual agreements); and 
surveillance helos. He added that UNAMID does not need fixed wing 
aircraft, because it has these already and can adopt them as 
necessary. Should a Cessation of Hostilities take shape, he said, 
UNAMID must also learn from past mistakes and be guarded in its 
provision of limited non-military assistance to the armed movements. 
He noted that he would advise against letting CFC members stay on 
the UNAMID compound or paying them a salary, noting how in the past, 
under AMIS, the latter only encouraged fragmentation of rebel 
factions to receive more money. Agwai said he would limit such 
provisions to food, water and per diem. 
 
¶11. (SBU) With regard to the situation on the ground, Agwai noted 
that the INGO expulsion has put pressure on UNAMID to provide 
humanitarian services, noting that IDPs may become increasingly 
frustrated with UNAMID if they don't see it meeting their needs. He 
emphasized that UNAMID is keen to use "soft power" to build and 
improve its relations with actors on the ground, most notably IDPs. 
"That is our main contingency plan: to continue to engage with local 
populations and IDPs, as well as with the government," he said. 
 
SLM/MINNAWI WARNS OF FAMINE IN DAR ZAGHAWA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) On March 16, CDA met with representatives of SLM/Minnawi, 
including Acting Wali and Minister of Social Affairs Dr. Ismail 
Hussein Hashim, Secretary General for SLA/MM in North Darfur Mohamed 
Yousif Adam, and North Darfur Legislative Council member Ahmed 
Hassan Bahar at TDRA Headquarters in El Fasher. Following his trip 
to Zam Zam with CDA earlier that day (reftel), a worried Dr. Hashim 
commented that he had traveled to the camp two weeks prior and "the 
situation has become much more grave." He noted he had not been to 
other Zaghawa encampments in Dar es Salaam and Shangil Tobay "but 
these are likely as bad as Zam Zam." He asserted that JEM was 
responsible for the current influx of displaced Zaghawa to the North 
due to its January 2009 aggression in Muhajeriya which triggered the 
regime's counterattack and the current IDP exodus. "SLM/Minnawi 
withdrew from the area to prevent further bloodshed, and people are 
fleeing because the government is targeting them for supporting 
SLM/Minnawi," he said. He also noted that the HAC was using food 
distribution as a political weapon, delivering shipments to areas in 
which Zaghawa have fled such as Wadaa while withholding them from 
Zamzam. 
 
¶13. (SBU) SLA/Minnawi's Humanitarian Coordinator told CDA that that 
he is expected a famine in the parched area of Dar Zaghawa (in the 
far north of North Darfur state) this year. SAF military operations 
in the area prevent local inhabitants from farming, he said, adding 
to the existing problem of desertification and limited rainfall in 
an area that includes some of Darfur's harshest terrain. 
Humanitarians have not been able to travel to areas in Dar Zaghawa 
such as Karnoi, Muzbat and Furawiya, he said, because they claim 
they need permits and clearances. However, "there is no problem of 
security on the ground," said Hashim, and urged CDA for USAID to 
come and make an assessment. (Note: In a meeting with OCHA on March 
17, OCHA representatives also noted a problem with the dam at Um 
Barro in Dar Zaghawa, which is in need of repair before the rainy 
season so that it may hold water. End Note.) SLM/Minnawi 
representatives also appealed to CDA to help resolve the problem of 
compensation for farmers upon whose land new arrivals at Zam Zam 
have settled, arguing that a "food for land" program involving US 
donated WFP food items, would likely be acceptable to the farmers. 
Without making any promises, CDA promised to look into the issue. 
 
NGOS "NERVOUS AND VULNERABLE" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) On March 17, CDA attended the OCHA inter-agency meeting 
for North Darfur, attended by representatives of several remaining 
NGOs including ICRC, IOM, Partner Aid, Goal, and Malteser 
International. In addition to discussing the urgent humanitarian 
needs of Zam Zam and other camps in North Darfur (reftel), the NGO 
representatives told CDA about the pervasive feelings of uneasiness 
following the kidnapping of three MSF workers in Saraf Omra and the 
surge in compound break-ins in North Darfur, including a fifth 
attempted on MSF properties this month. "We feel as if someone is 
trying to tell us something," said one, noting the MSF kidnapping, 
break-ins at compounds, intimidation and regime vilification 
campaign while another noted that "we need more than just verbal 
assurances for our protection and security. We saw on March 4 that 
HAC assurances meant nothing - that afternoon security officials 
were driving around in OXFAM vehicles." They also lamented that 
since the expulsions, there has been a change in perception of their 
operations amongst local populations. "We feel that they are buying 
 
KHARTOUM 00000390  004 OF 004 
 
 
into the government's rhetoric that Western NGOs are 'spies and 
thieves,'" they said. NGOs are being urged to hire local armed 
guards who could both protect or intimidate them. CDA assured the 
NGO representatives that the USG was pushing - when we can reach 
them - at every level for the GOS to act responsibly and change its 
tone towards humanitarians. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment: As noted in Reftel, it is important to maintain a 
practical focus on humanitarian needs and how best to address them 
through the UN and remaining NGOs as an uncertain and already 
difficult situation slowly deteriorates.  Post strongly recommends 
quiet but forceful engagement with both the GOS and the UN about how 
to ensure that IDPs are receiving water and food in the short term 
while the longer-term delivery options are negotiated. And given 
what little impact UNAMID is having on the security situation on the 
ground, any resources it can mobilize to assist with humanitarian 
relief ought to be utilized immediately. UNAMID's MMT proposal is 
actually a promising idea, but will likely take many months to 
implement (not that a cessation of hostilities is in any way 
imminent). Nonetheless if the MMT is put into practice first, it 
could facilitate a negotiation of a cessation of hostilities and 
even a ceasefire. UNAMID should be pushed strongly to implement this 
proposal. Upon the team's return to Darfur, CDA immediately applied 
for another permit to travel to Darfur and the Embassy was informed 
that this and other officers' requests were denied. Another CDA 
request for travel to Dongola (in Northern Sudan) was also denied 
"as payback for the Darfur trip," but at the end of the week, MFA 
officials signaled a possible change of heart and asked that the 
Embassy "return on Sunday (March 22) with your requests." 
 
 
FERNANDEZ