VZCZCXRO2947
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0383/01 0771533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181533Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3300
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000383 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: TWIN CRISES IN DARFUR'S ZAM ZAM IDP CAMP 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 318 
B) KHARTOUM 313 
C) KHARTOUM 311 
D) KHARTOUM 306 
E) KHARTOUM 299 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Over 36,000 new arrivals in Zam Zam IDP camp are 
living in extremely precarious conditions, with little or no access 
to water, food, health care, shelter, or education, according to 
what IDPs told CDA Fernandez and Embassy staff on a March 16 visit 
to Zam Zam. Several persons who arrived in the camp that morning 
said they were forced by Janjaweed militia out of their villages in 
South Darfur because of their Zaghawa tribal affiliation. 
Meanwhile, long-time residents of Zam Zam described the serious 
deterioration in services following the expulsion of several INGOs 
active in the camp, and highlighted the growing shortage of water. 
This dire humanitarian situation has been further exacerbated by the 
continuing influx of new arrivals, they said. All of the IDPs 
appealed to the USG to find a quick solution to alleviate 
humanitarian suffering in Zam Zam. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  On the morning of March 16, CDA Fernandez and Embassy 
staff set out along the dusty road to the now 90,000+ person Zam Zam 
IDP camp, located 17 kilometers southwest of El Fasher. Traveling in 
the company of the acting Wali of North Darfur, Dr. Ismail Hussein 
Hashim (from SLM/MM), the group was escorted by several "technicals" 
belonging to SLM/Minni Minnawi, whose forces control the 
predominantly Zaghawa camp. Following a slight delay, the convoy was 
waived through the NISS security checkpoint and proceeded past a GOS 
police camp and into Zam Zam. (Note: Coincidentally, a joint UN-HAC 
Joint Assessment Team was entering the camp at the same time as the 
CDA. End Note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Upon arrival at Zam Zam, the CDA and USAID staff drove 
through established areas of the camp, past familiar thatched huts, 
a butcher shop, and local brick- and charcoal-making operations. 
They proceeded directly towards the "new" Zam Zam, hosting 
recently-displaced, primarily- Zaghawa IDPs from South Darfur. 
(Note: according to the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Zam Zam has had 36,833 new arrivals 
during the last six to eight weeks.  The IDPS come primarily from 
the towns of Muhajeriya, Sharia, Labado and surrounding villages in 
South Darfur. They fled to the camp following the seizure of the 
area by the GOS, in the wake of a JEM offensive and SAF bombing in 
January. These areas had been relatively stable under the rule of 
Minnawi before his forces were pushed out by JEM which was then 
pushed out by the Sudanese Armed Forces. The "old" section of the 
camp, set up in 2003 at the beginning of the mass murder in Darfur 
holds approximately 55,000 IDPs, increasing the population of Zam 
Zam to over 90,000, more than three times its intended capacity. End 
Note.) 
 
NEW ARRIVALS AREA IN DIRE STRAITS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The "new" section of Zam Zam camp is a sprawling, desolate 
area interspersed with feeble makeshift dwellings, but has little 
else in terms of infrastructure. A group of desperate women and 
children who arrived ten days prior told the CDA  there was no water 
in the new arrivals' area.  The complained "we are thirsty" and 
begged for plastic sheeting for shelter and blankets to protect them 
from the bitter desert cold at night. They stated that not all the 
new arrivals had access to food distribution, noting that "some 
managed to get food, but others did not" (WFP later confirmed that 
the last food distribution in Zamzam had occurred on February 28, 
since then thousands have streamed into the camp). They also 
lamented there were no health clinics in the new area, noting that 
the clinic in the "old" camp was quite far away. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The CDA then proceeded to a gathering of several hundred 
IDP representatives, from both the new and old areas of the camp, 
which had assembled to address him. Representatives of the new camp 
went first, saying that there was a lack of services in their area. 
They noted there were no clinics or hospitals in the new camp, and 
asserted that there had been a number of deaths of children over the 
past several days due to diarrhea-related illnesses. They stated 
that many of the newcomers who arrived in the past several days had 
yet to receive food rations, and that the water situation was 
becoming increasingly precarious.  They added that it took 2-3 hours 
to fill a jerry-can with water from the one of the few hand-pumps 
there. They also stated that there was a dire need for plastic 
sheeting for shelter, and said there where no schools in the new 
camp for children. Finally, they noted that the security situation 
in the new camp was unstable, and begged for increased protection. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000383  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The CDA then spoke with representatives from the old camp, 
including many who have been residents of Zam Zam for over five 
years. They noted that services in their area have deteriorated 
rapidly since the expulsion of the thirteen INGOs, with IRC and CHF 
having had the most tangible presence in Zam Zam. Hundreds of camp 
dwellers had lost their jobs with these NGOs and scarce 
opportunities for female literacy, nutrition, and skills for youth 
had been lost. They showed the forlorn, padlocked former CHF and IRC 
premises and expressed skepticism and distrust of local NGOs' 
ability to fill the gap left by the INGOS' expulsions.  Long time 
camp residents stated that the influx of new arrivals from South 
Darfur had further exacerbated the shortage of services, and also 
drew attention to another problem involving the disputed land on 
which the new arrivals have settled. The land, they said, does not 
belong to the government, but rather to local farmers who are 
demanding compensation for its loss. They urged that officials 
immediately address the issue of compensation. SLM officials were 
trying to find a way to solve the problem but had no resources to do 
so. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The continuous influx of new arrivals into Zam Zam was 
evident with the arrival earlier that morning from South Darfur of 
IDPS in a dual-axle lorry, overloaded with shelter materials, 
bedding, tables, plastic chairs and fuel drums  The CDA spoke with 
an agitated man who had come with the truck, who described how he 
and 25 families were "burned out" of his village by Janjaweed 
militia due to their Zaghawa ethnicity. He then lifted up his 
jalabia to reveal scars and bruises he had received the day before 
from Janjaweed beatings. Others with him noted that the journey 
itself had been perilous, with other trucks attacked and overturned, 
and belongings looted. A women's representative said that women 
making the journey were subjected to rape and harassment by the 
Janjaweed. The IDPs attempt to travel by night and hide during the 
day. 
 
NEW LAND NEEDED FOR NEW ARRIVALS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UN has asked repeatedly for the GOS to consider opening 
additional IDP sites in El Fasher in order to accommodate the 
60,000+ overflow of IDPs in Zam Zam but the GOS is resisting any new 
IDP camps being established anywhere in Darfur. Prior to the latest 
waves of new arrivals, humanitarian staff noted acute concerns that 
the camp's precarious water supply could only support 10,000 new 
residents in addition to the 55,000 "old" residents.  According to 
the Zam Zam task force members, unless the Wali of North Darfur 
makes a new site available, even "old" Zam Zam residents will 
experience a dramatic water shortage in the near future.  Although 
the GOS officials agree that the camp is beyond capacity, they have 
made no move to restrict new arrivals into the camp or to provide an 
alternative site for the displaced.  "Getting a new site is the 
priority," according to Alex Gregory, the OCHA Representative in 
North Darfur.  He noted that IDPs are now starting to arrive in Zam 
Zam with animals, putting an additional strain on the already 
tenuous water situation.  "It's just a matter of time before the 
wells run dry," he said. 
 
ONGOING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN ZAM ZAM 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Humanitarian agencies continue to work to expand the camp's 
inadequate supplies. On February 12, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
commenced drilling previously planned boreholes in the newly 
authorized portion of the camp.  In total, UNICEF plans to drill a 
total of 20 new boreholes in Zam Zam, but to date has been able to 
drill only 10.  The GOS Office of Water and Environmental Sanitation 
(WES) and UNICEF continue to dig new latrines and provide hygiene 
information to camp residents.  The newly-arrived IDPs have settled 
near a pre-existing borehole in a new part of the camp, authorized 
for use in October 2008.  According to the UN, water and sanitation 
conditions in the newest part of the camp were very poor during the 
month of February, with 25 temporary latrines available for more 
than 3,000 people (one latrine for every 122 people.)  Although 
UNICEF and partners continue to provide additional resources, the 
camp's population grows faster than partners can provide adequate 
resources.  "We are currently reacting and not in a position to 
prevent [further inflows] until we can find a place for people to 
stay," said OCHA's Gregory. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Another essential need in Zam Zam camp is adequate shelter 
and non-food item (NFI) supplies. The GOS' March 4 and 5 expulsions 
included Zam Zam camp's main shelter partner, CHF International. 
According to OCHA, CHF International had shelter kits available in 
El Fasher and plastic sheeting stored at the UN Joint Logistics 
 
KHARTOUM 00000383  003 OF 004 
 
 
Center (UNJLC) warehouse.  As of March 15, GOS security officials 
had refused to unlock the UNJLC warehouse or provide unrestricted 
access to UNJLC staff.  UNJLC is currently negotiating with the 
government for unrestricted access to the warehouses in order to 
conduct an inventory and then provide appropriate distributions. 
(Note: Per reftels, as of March 8, the GOS had promised to 
relinquish control of any UN or UN-NGO managed assets seized since 
early March.  According to OCHA, the GOS promise has not been 
realized on the ground in North Darfur. End Note.) Another 
consequence of the expulsion of CHF is the loss by IDPs of 
livelihood activities and the opportunity to make an income, 
according to those in the camp.  "CHF programs helped increase our 
income, and now we have nothing" one IDP told CDA. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Before its expulsion, CHF built four large "rekuba" 
structures for Zam Zam IDPs to provide shelter from the sun. 
According to OCHA staff, the rekubas can hold between 100 and 120 
persons. In addition, humanitarian staff noted that most IDPs 
arrived with their meager personal possessions, and aid staff have 
already conducted three non food item distributions.  Therefore, 
although some people are in need of NFIs, a widespread distribution 
is not a current priority.  In addition, acting camp coordinator 
OCHA currently discourages a shelter kit distribution, because it 
would encourage newly-arrived IDPs to stay at the site and lead to a 
further depletion of the camp's stressed underground water 
resources, instead of moving to another site where they can be 
adequately assisted. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Prior to March 4, Zam Zam camp had three health clinics 
operated respectively by Relief International (RI), the Sudan Social 
Development Organization (SUDO), and a national NGO HAD.  Before its 
March 4 dissolution by the regime, local NGO SUDO was the sole 
provider of emergency health care in Zam Zam camp.  With SUDO no 
longer operating, both RI and HAD primary health care clinics have 
experienced increased numbers of outpatient cases.  According to 
OCHA, the Sudanese Ministry of Health has provided staff to assist 
in the camp for the next 90 days.  In addition, UNICEF is 
constructing a health clinic in the camp's new arrivals area and has 
completed a measles vaccination campaign.  UNICEF, the UN World 
Health Organization (WHO) and UN Population Fund (UNFPA) have 
donated health kits and emergency delivery kits. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Humanitarian partners continue to monitor the camp 
residents' access to adequate food and nutrition services. 
According to the UN World Food Program (WFP), the regular caseload 
(residents in the "old" section of the camp) is in the process of 
receiving their one month ration.  WFP also provided an emergency, 
one-month ration to 15,000 individuals in the camp's "new" section 
on February 25 and 28. In addition, RI and UNICEF continue to screen 
new arrivals for malnutrition, and RI provides therapeutic and 
supplementary feeding programs and services to Zam Zam camp 
residents.  According to OCHA, WFP plans to conduct an additional 
distribution in the camp, but for now those who have received 
distributions are sharing what little they have with those that have 
not.  IOM is conducting the registration for the new IDPs. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Comment: The sheer number of residents at Zam Zam and the 
arrival of 36,000 additional IDPs are cause for immediate concern. 
The deterioration of essential services following the INGO expulsion 
elevates such concern to unprecedented levels. This is the first 
Darfur IDP crisis since the March 4 mass NGO expulsions (although 
the IDPs began moving in February) and humanitarian agencies are 
barely coping.  The influx of new arrivals in Zam Zam camp was 
caused directly by the Sudanese government's callous and 
irresponsible actions: first its response to JEM's January 2009 
invasion of South Darfur (when SAF moved to take over all formerly 
SLM/MM locations in South Darfur and began pushing out the IDP 
Zaghawa populations while championing other African tribes like the 
Birged and Mima); second its expulsion of INGOs; third its targeting 
of Zaghawa populations in areas not only in South Darfur but also in 
Wadaa (North Darfur). At a time when competent and locally-trusted 
INGOs are desperately needed in areas like Zam Zam, the government's 
continued rhetoric has many of INGOS, which have not been expelled, 
questioning whether the humanitarian imperative is enough to keep 
them in Darfur.  What we see now in Darfur is a crisis in slow 
motion.  We are already seeing its impact most dramatically in Zam 
Zam camp.  In the coming weeks the humanitarian situation there and 
elsewhere could become increasingly more urgent. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment Cont.: In seeking solutions to the impending 
crisis, it is important to maintain a practical focus on 
humanitarian needs and how best to address them through the UN and 
remaining NGOs - and even the GOS (using SLM officials who are 
deeply concerned about their fellow Zaghawa in Zam Zam camp could be 
an option).  Discussing these matters with the regime may be 
 
KHARTOUM 00000383  004 OF 004 
 
 
facilitated by the increasingly serious impact of INGO expulsions on 
the humanitarian situations in both Darfur and the Three Areas.  The 
regime is now slightly "cooling down" its anti-U.S. and anti-Western 
rhetoric following the ICC indictment.  As we have reported, the 
regime does not want to "commit suicide" over the ICC issue, and we 
expect that in the coming weeks NCP officials could be more willing 
to engage with us.  Embassy Khartoum recommends an immediate 
statement about the situation in Zam Zam and other camps (text 
provided to AF/SPG).  We also suggest quiet but forceful demarches 
to the Sudanese government and the UN about how to ensure that IDPs 
are receiving water and food in the short term, and to warn the 
regime about the targeting of Zaghawa, while the longer-term 
delivery options are negotiated (both the GOS and many other tribes 
in Darfur - both African and Arab - fear the aggressive Zaghawa, who 
make up the backbone of most rebel movements in Darfur).  We 
strongly recommend additional pressure be applied on the UN to act 
now, before it is too late, to ensure that urgent IDP needs are 
addressed and that Zam Zam's worrying situation is addressed before 
a crisis becomes a catastrophe.  Many UN agencies are doing heroic 
work in Darfur (and even in Zam Zam) although UNAMID generally 
remains passive.  But the ultimate responsibility is the regime's - 
should the situation there deteriorate further, it will be because 
Khartoum allowed it. As long as the regime continues to issue the 
CDA and Mission officers travel permits, we will make visits to IDP 
camps in Darfur as often as possible to closely monitor the 
situation there. 
 
FERNANDEZ