VZCZCXRO2351
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0377/01 0770633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180633Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3288
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000377 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, PRM 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, DCHA/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN, DONORS, NGOS SCRAMBLE TO KEEP UP WITH SLOWLY 
DETERIORATING SITUATION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 365 
B) KHARTOUM 339 
C) KHARTOUM 334 
D) KHARTOUM 362 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: United Nations Deputy Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (D/SRSG) Ameerah Haq and members of the INGO 
Steering Committee (INGO-SC) briefed donors over the past two days 
on the status of INGO expulsions and efforts to address the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This was occurring even as the 
Government of Sudan was taking its rhetoric one step further and 
calling  for all international relief efforts in Sudan to cease 
within a year (Ref A).  Regardless of whether the announcement by 
the regime is rhetoric or reality, it forces the international 
community to take a hard look at what assistance may be possible in 
the current context.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) At a briefing for donors on March 15, the INGO-SC outlined 
four scenarios for those INGOs that continue to operate in Sudan: 1) 
further expulsions; 2) INGOs leave voluntarily; 3) INGOs continue 
with life-saving activities and scale up emergency response; 4) 
INGOs expand programs to fill the gap created by departure of 
expelled INGOs, which would include non-life-saving activities.  The 
INGOs feel that they are somewhere between scenarios 2 and 4, and 
where they end up will depend both on GoS provision of 
confidence-building measures as well as donor indications of future 
parameters for funding.  After the INGO representatives left the 
meeting, all of the major donors confirmed a wait-and-see approach, 
pending the results of the joint UN-GoS assessment in Darfur that 
will conclude later this week.  They also expressed an unwillingness 
to request and/or program new funds as well as skepticism regarding 
the capacity and humanitarian commitment of national NGOs put 
forward by the GoS as gap-fillers. 
 
¶3. (SBU) At a briefing on March 16, D/SRSG Haq told donors that 
while the UN has been pursuing a three-track approach (Ref C), the 
GoS' intransigence on reversing the NGO expulsions and its 
escalating rhetoric are forcing the UN to abandon track 1 (reversing 
expulsions) sooner than anticipated and postpone track 3 (shaping 
the assistance environment in future) to focus on track 2 
(identifying immediate humanitarian needs in Darfur and elsewhere.) 
Donors reiterated to D/SRSG that any decisions made by the GoS and 
UN on track 2 options will ultimately have to meet with donor 
consent if their funds are to be used to fill gaps. 
 
¶4. (SBU) While awaiting the results of the UN-GoS joint assessments, 
UN agency heads told donors that, thus far, no crises have emerged 
in food and water provision for IDPs in Darfur.  WFP reported that 
shortages will start to emerge in the next two months once the 
emergency two-month food ration is used up, if the distribution 
network is not restored.  UNICEF stated that immediate water needs 
are being met, albeit through hand pumps rather than motorized 
pumps, but a delayed impact will be seen in sanitation and hygiene 
promotion.  [Note: In CDA Fernandez's meeting with desperate, newly 
arrived IDPs in Zam Zam camp on March 16, the IDPs consistently 
complained about the lack of water, saying they were thirsty.  In a 
meeting with Embassy/USAID, UN-AU Joint Special Representative 
Rodolphe Adada mentioned that UNAMID was asked by the government to 
assist with providing water for the newly-arrived IDPS in Zam Zam. 
UNAMID provided water for the new IDPs by water bladder but 
evidently not enough.  End Note.]  WHO reported that remaining 
medical stocks in clinics serving IDPs will likely last 2-3 weeks, 
and supply shortages will develop soon thereafter (IDPs complained 
that shortages already exist).  UNJLC said that the immediate needs 
for non-food items of newly-displaced people in Zam Zam camp (North 
Darfur) are being met, and they have not received reports of any 
other new displacements - NGOs in El Fasher spoke of recent 
displacements into Shangil Tobaya and Dar es Salaam.  [Note: During 
a visit to Zam Zam on the 16th of March, Embassy witnessed 25 
families just arriving at Zam Zam with all their personal belongings 
in tow.  The IDPs said they were coming from Muhajariya where they 
were forced off their land by the janjaweed.  End Note.]  UNJLC has 
suffered a 50% loss in transportation and distribution capacity for 
NFIs with the INGO expulsions.  All UN agencies emphasized that the 
true impact will be felt in 6-8 weeks, and expressed concern about 
being able to meet the needs in areas where only certain INGOs (that 
have now been expelled) had acceptance from the populations and 
could therefore gain access. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The INGO-SC provided an update to donors on closeout 
procedures for expelled INGOs, stating that the GoS Humanitarian 
Affairs Commission (HAC) staff continue to demonstrate more 
restraint than in days past (Ref B).  Nonetheless, 21 passports of 
expatriate staff are still being held by the GoS, questions of 
 
KHARTOUM 00000377  002 OF 002 
 
 
accountability and liability for seized assets remain unresolved, 
and HAC has not yet provided clear, consistent guidance on the issue 
of severance payments for local staff.  Additionally, the INGO-SC 
described two reported incidents in which government agents or 
governmental NGO staff attempted to access IDP camps using INGO 
vehicles and t-shirts.  OCHA Deputy Head of Office Antoine Gerard 
informed donors on March 16 that OCHA has provided lists of expelled 
INGOs' license plate numbers and agency logos to UNDSS, UNMIS and 
UNAMID and asked them report any mis-use of assets.  Return of 
stolen assets or restitution for them, which is a key issue of 
concern for INGOs and donors, does not seem to be a priority issue 
for the UN. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The unresolved issue of severance payments for INGO local 
staff continues to concern Post, as the GoS may use it as an excuse 
to further detain expat INGO staff seeking to depart Sudan (Ref B). 
The INGO-SC briefed donors on March 15 that HAC assured them that 
the Sudanese Labor Office would provide consistent guidance to all 
NGOs on the severance pay issue.  OCHA Deputy Gerard briefed donors 
on March 16 that HAC Commissioner Hassabo informed him that HAC 
considers the Labor Law to be determining, and OCHA's interpretation 
of the Labor Law is that a six-month payment is not required.  USAID 
subsequently learned from expelled NGOs that the guidance they had 
received that day in a meeting with the Labor Office was not 
conclusive. They are considering preparing a common position to 
provide to HAC and the Labor Office with a March 31 deadline for 
decision.  To date, no INGOs have made any severance payments 
pending a determination on the legality of the extraordinary 
payments demanded by HAC. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The remaining INGOs feel that the threat of expulsion is 
still active, and already limited trust in their GoS interlocutors 
has been deeply shaken.  They even question whether HAC should 
continue to be their primary interlocutor or whether they should be 
dealing with National Security or the Office of the Presidency, who 
are actually calling the shots.  The INGO-SC told donors that INGOs 
are looking for confidence-building measures from the GoS that would 
assure them they are still wanted in Sudan, and if so, which INGOs 
are welcome.  Confidence-building measures cited by the INGO-SC 
range from the extremely simple to the highly unlikely.  In the 
former category a meeting with Hassabo and all remaining INGOs has 
been requested by the Steering Committee and by OCHA, to which 
Hassabo has not responded, as has been the growing trend in his 
behavior in dealing with both donors and INGOs.  In the latter 
category, the INGO-SC has requested the lifting of the requirement 
to sign technical agreements before visas, work permits and travel 
permits are issued; fast-tracking of technical agreements, exemption 
of INGOs from Sudanese labor law, etc.  INGOs feel that, at a 
minimum, there should be a meeting with Hassabo for all INGOs, and 
immediate approval of all pending visas and permits.  D/SRSG and 
OCHA on March 16 told donors that they have requested in writing 
that the GoS tone down its anti-INGO rhetoric, as well as pushed for 
immediate HAC signature of technical agreements for remaining INGOs, 
and increased GoS control over banditry targeted at INGOs in 
Darfur. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: The President's announcement on March 16 that 
within one year, no international agencies will be allowed to 
provide 'relief' to Sudanese citizens, if true, suggests that very 
few confidence-building measures between the GoS and INGOs will be 
forthcoming.  Indeed, if the GoS pushes forward with this tactic, 
together with the strangling off of access for assistance to the 
South (Ref D) and their apparent intention to refuse the return of 
INGOs or granting of special INGO access to the Three Areas (Ref A), 
the USG and other international actors may soon need to consider 
more dramatic options to continue providing assistance.  If the 
Sudanese government or the UN cannot adequately provide for 
humanitarian needs in Sudan, we may not be far away from 
cross-border models along the lines of Operation Lifeline Sudan, 
which brought life-saving assistance to the Southern Sudanese from 
across the Kenyan border during the North-South civil war.  Without 
a decrease in the rhetoric, a change in the poisonous atmosphere 
created by the regime, and some tangible and early 
confidence-building measures for INGOs, a wide-scale exodus of 
assistance providers, whether voluntary or involuntary, may not be 
far off.  It will likely take several months to see whether the GOS 
intends to fully implement President Bashir's threat to "Sudanize" 
all assistance, or whether the regime will step back from the abyss 
now that the President has resumed venting his rage against the 
INGO's in particular and the international community in general. End 
comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ