VZCZCXRO1823
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0375/01 0761551
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171551Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3285
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000375 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MALAKAL REMAINS UNSTABLE 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 298 
B) KHARTOUM 250 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: According to UN and JIU sources, the situation in 
Malakal (Upper Nile State, southern Sudan) is still very 
unpredictable, and the recent attacks on the Muerle community in 
Pibor have contributed to the splintering of the Malakal SAF JIU. 
The latter has now split into four factions due to internal tribal 
dynamics. End Summary. 
 
Trouble in Pibor County 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The UN reports that  fighting between Lou-Nuer and Muerle 
tribesman in Pibor County, Jonglei state, between 5-13 March has 
been identified as reprisal attacks due to a significant increase in 
raids on Nuer cattle camps by the Muerle. The Commissioner of Pibor 
county claimed to UN sources that over 450 have died since the 
attacks began, with several wounded being treated at the Belgium MSF 
hospital in Pibor, and over 1,000 displaced. Some of the major 
attacks reportedly occurred in Likuangole, Pibor, and Gumuruk by 
heavily armed groups that reportedly included SPLA soldiers and SSPS 
in uniform, using a mix of AK47 rifles, PKM machine guns, and 
grenades. The Commissioner is said to have called the Jonglei State 
Governor and GOSS President Salva Kiir to request SPLA assistance, 
but he claims he was given no response or support.  The SPLA has 
Battalions in Gumuruk and Pibor in close proximity to the attacks, 
but these apparently were not mobilized.  While meeting with the 
internally displaced, UN sources noticed that no men were seen 
amongst the women and children, leaving several in the community to 
speculate that the Muerle might be planning an attack on the Nuer. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting between GOSS President Salva Kiir and ConGen 
Juba on March 17, Kiir denied that the casualty rates ran as high as 
the Commissioner claimed, citing 41 Nuer dead and 11 Muerle.  He did 
admit that nearby SPLA garrisons did not enter the fight because 
they had insufficient forces and weapons to effectively do so. The 
answer to ending violence of this kind, he said, was the disarmament 
of the civilian population.  (Note:  During a 2008 visit to Jonglei 
state, Governor Kuol Manyang told Poloff and Econoff that people in 
his state would never voluntarily surrender their weapons due to a 
total lack of confidence in the ability of the Southern Sudan Police 
Service to protect them.  End note.) 
 
Malakal SAF Splits Along Tribal Lines 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Malakal SAF JIU is known to be composed of loyalists 
belonging to MG Gabriel Tang (the former SSDF, pro-government, Nuer 
militia leader who is rumored to have been promoted to Lieutenant 
General following his return to Khartoum after the last major round 
of fighting in Malakal.)  Per the UN these loyalists reportedly 
include MG Thomas Mabor (former SSDF, pro-government Lou-Nuer 
militia), MG Gordon Kong Chol (former SSDF, pro-government 
Jikany-Nuer), SAF officers from the Muerle community, and regular 
SAF not aligned to any of the factions listed above.  MG Tang's 
loyalists reportedly make up 80 percent of the JIU in Malakal, 
leaving a very small percent of Non-Nuer SAF within the JIU. 
According to JIU sources, the SAF JIU barracks is now partitioned 
internally to separate  the Nuer, Muerle, and SAF regulars, with 
each group posting its own separate guard force to provide 
protection for its members.  Six SAF JIU regular officers reportedly 
defected to the SPLA JIU over this last weekend and have been housed 
at the SPLA Barracks in the Southern sector for the past three days. 
 The SAF JIU has reportedly told the SPLA JIU to return the officers 
immediately, but the SPLA has responded by saying that they would 
only return the officers to Juba if a board is convened to identify 
what is best for their safety.  Tensions reportedly flared on  the 
evening of March 16th when rumors of MG Tang's return to Malakal 
surfaced, but these rumors were subsequently dismissed. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to JIU sources, since the ceasefire was agreed to 
at the end of February in Malakal, the SAF JIU has been restricted 
to the northern sector of the city  and the SPLA JIU is restricted 
to is southern sector, leaving UNMIS to patrol what's been a labeled 
a "buffer zone".  One of the conditions to help stabilize Malakal 
agreed upon at the time of the cease fire calls for a full rotation 
of SPLA/JIU and SAF/JIU.  The CJMC views this as vital as the same 
JIUs have been there since the 2006 fighting.  JIU sources report, 
however, that the process of rotating the JIUs out will take several 
months and not weeks as was originally assumed. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UN reported that a large number of civilians remain 
armed in Malakal, and the looting of ammunition and food from the 
JIU HQs during the fighting will make civilian disarmament 
 
KHARTOUM 00000375  002 OF 002 
 
 
difficult.  This was why such disarmament was left off as a 
resolution by the CJMC when they were negotiating the ceasefire on 
25 February. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: The unstable truce in Malakal could fall apart, 
especially if Muerle and Nuer tribal leaders don't intervene with 
their communities to stop the violent raiding.  We suspect continued 
northern complicity in the tribal disputes, but the Muerle-Nuer 
conflicts predate the current Khartoum regime, and it does not take 
much to ignite a larger conflagration.  The apparent objective of 
the NCP/SAF would be to intervene and take a greater role in the oil 
areas than they currently have through the oil police.  Salva Kiir 
and the SPLA will try to prevent this at all costs. End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ