VZCZCXRO1566
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0372/01 0760914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 170914Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3282
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000372 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SLA/UNITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH GOS IN DOHA 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 344 
B) KHARTOUM 339 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: SLA/Unity and four smaller Darfur rebel factions 
have agreed to attend negotiations with the GOS in Doha, signing a 
deal in Tripoli on March 15 with Qatari FM Ali Mahmoud looking on. 
Talks in Doha with the "Unity Plus" group should begin in two weeks, 
as Joint Mediator Djibril Bassole will continue the strategy of 
bringing rebel factions separately to talks with the government. 
Bassole also intends to draft a plan for involving Darfuri civil 
society soon.  SLM/MM greeted the news with cautious optimism.  In 
Darfur, IDPs continued to worry that sanitary conditions in the 
camps have deteriorated.  CDA Fernandez visited Zam Zam IDP camp in 
North Darfur on March 16 (septel). Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Darfur rebel factions met in Libya on March 15 to sign an 
agreement to participate in the Doha peace process, including 
splinter groups from the once-formidable Sudanese Liberation Army 
(SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).  SLA/Unity, 
SLA/Khamis Abdullah, the two factions comprising the United 
Resistance Force (URF), SLA/JUBA, and JEM/Idris Azraq agreed to 
participate in talks with the GOS in Doha at the end of March. 
(Note: Of the "Unity Plus" signatories, SLA/Unity has the most 
significant military presence in Darfur, but sources indicate it has 
been weakened by internal struggles.  SLA/Adam Bakhit and 
JEM/Collective Leadership together compose URF, and do not have any 
military strength in Darfur.  SLA/Juba is based in Juba and has no 
presence in Darfur.  SLA/Khamis Abdullah has less than four vehicles 
and Khamis Abdullah himself has resided in Nairobi for the last six 
months. End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole did not attend the 
"Unity Plus" meetings in Libya, but Qatari Foreign Minister Ali 
Mahmoud was there.   According to George Zacariah, political 
assistant with the Joint Mediation Strategic Team (JMST), Bassole 
encouraged Libya to play a positive role by bringing SLA/Unity and 
the various small factions to Doha (Libya reportedly provides 
support to SLA/U, so Tripoli's encouragement is essential) and 
Bassole will continue the strategy of rounding up as many movements 
as possible to participate in the Doha talks.  The JMST is still 
drafting its strategy for incorporating Darfuri civil society 
representatives into the talks.  While acknowledging that, given the 
fractured state of Darfuri civil society, this will be a significant 
undertaking, Zacariah was optimistic that the JMST would manage to 
prepare a strategy soon.  Bassole will be in Khartoum this week, and 
will then travel to New York to brief the UN Security Council next 
week.  Following his trip to the UNSC, Bassole will move on to Doha 
to prepare for talks with the "Unity Plus" group that signed on 
March 15. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Darfur Peace Agreement signatory movement SLA/Minni Minnawi 
reacted positively to the news.  SLM/MM senior advisor and GNU 
parliamentarian Ali Traio said: "My initial reaction was good, but 
we need to know what their common position will be."  According to 
Traio, SLM/MM will continue to reject the GOS's policy of 
"overstepping" them as a movement.  Prior to agreeing to travel to 
Doha, Minnawi will continue to push for special status for the 
movement within the Doha talks.  "We want something genuine.  We 
don't want to play around," Traio said. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ahmed Atim Uthman, community leader in Al Salaam IDP camp, 
told emboff on March 16 that sanitation in the camp had deteriorated 
markedly following the expulsion of Oxfam, the international NGO 
that oversaw water and sanitation projects for the entire camp. 
IDPs in the North Darfur camp within sight of El Fasher continue to 
be concerned about a coming shortage of water, estimating that in 
one week there may not be sufficient water in the boreholes that 
currently provide for the entire camp's water needs.  At least one 
Darfuri offered assistance: the director of a hospital in El Fasher 
donated a drum of fuel to the IDPs in Al Salaam to operate the pumps 
that bring water to the surface, but IDPs continue to refuse GOS 
assistance.  CDA Fernandez traveled to Zam Zam IDP camp in North 
Darfur on March 16 to observe firsthand the conditions there 
(septel). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: Even Bassole's office admits that the GOS is set 
on its decision to expel the 13 NGOs operating in Darfur, and at 
this moment humanitarian needs in Darfur remain our most pressing 
concern.  SLA/Unity's agreement to attend negotiations in Doha is a 
positive but modest step forward in the peace process.  If Bassole 
and the Qataris are able to negotiate a ceasefire between the GOS 
and SLA/U (and the other minor players,) this could lay the 
groundwork for a similar agreement between the GOS and JEM, and 
between the GOS and the last major rebel hold-out, SLA Abdel Wahid 
al Nur.  Both JEM and SLA/AW are likely to be the last to sign an 
 
KHARTOUM 00000372  002 OF 002 
 
 
actual ceasefire agreement, if for nothing else to demonstrate that 
they are the two most powerful rebel groups in Darfur.  If Bassole 
is able to negotiate individual ceasefire agreements this year 
between the major rebel groups and the GOS, this could lead to 
comprehensive peace talks, which should include civil society and 
tribal representatives (and possibly political parties, but the GOS 
will resist this.)  If such talks occur, Bassole must negotiate a 
way for the only significant Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatory, 
Minni Minawi, to participate as an entity independent of the 
government, in recognition that the DPA was not implemented, and 
that a new agreement will supersede it. If Bassole is able to secure 
an agreement - then the hard part will start - how to make sure that 
a regime skilled in subverting almost all agreements keeps this one. 
As a Darfuri proverb says, how can you expect the snake that bit you 
to also cure you? End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ