VZCZCXRO1242
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0371/01 0760745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170745Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3279
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000371 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, CA/OCS 
NCS FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO FOR DAVID POTTER AND CHRIS ROWAN 
CA/ACS/OCS/AF FOR STEVE DONLON AND LIZ GRACON 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS STAGE MANAGES RESOLUTION OF ITS MANUFACTURED HOSTAGE 
CRISIS 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 345 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The MSF employees kidnapped by unknown abductors 
are free in Khartoum after a stage-managed hostage release. The 
identity and whereabouts of the hostage-takers are unknown, but all 
signs point to some level of coordination of the kidnapping by GoS 
officials. The Canadian Embassy's experience dealing with the GoS 
during the crisis suggests that the regime cannot be counted on to 
provide open channels of accurate information or to coordinate with 
Embassies to assist foreign citizens during a crisis. The GoS has 
again demonstrated to NGOs that their staffs do not have a secure 
space to operate and that only the GoS can guarantee their safety 
from the criminals it often controls. END SUMMARY. 
 
 ¶2.  (SBU) The Abduction: MSF staff told Canadian conoff that of the 
four men who entered their compound in Serif Umra on the evening of 
March 11 to carry out the kidnapping, one was wearing a jalabiya and 
the other three had military uniforms. (Note: The area is controlled 
by pro-GoS Arab militia and Chadian rebels, many of whom wear 
military uniforms of one sort or another, so the fact of wearing a 
uniform does not by itself indicate that the men were GOS military. 
End Note.) The five abducted MSF-B employees (Canadian, French, 
Italian, and two Sudanese nationals) were transported to the nearby 
town of El Serif. The abductors did not speak English, and allowed 
their hostages to inform MSF-B Headquarters of their abduction via 
Thuraya satellite phone. The now-released MSF-B workers reported 
that they were well-treated and not physically harmed by the 
abductors, who reportedly made a run to the market to buy the 
hostages cheese and cigarettes. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The current whereabouts and identity of the hostage-takers 
are unknown, but the GoS has released public statements identifying 
them as a renegade group of pro-regime "Al-Bashir Hawks", who 
conducted the kidnapping in response to the ICC decision. 
State-controlled newspapers report that the group believed it was 
conducting the kidnapping "for the sake of the country." The 
Governor of North Darfur explained the abduction as "A reaction to 
that (ICC) decision and it is a form of expression that they (the 
kidnappers) chose." Former NISS Deputy Director Hassaballa Omer 
issued a statement warning of abduction of more international relief 
workers by groups similar to "Al Bashir Hawks" should any NGOs 
support continued pressure by the ICC against the GOS. There have 
been no indications that the GoS is prepared to track down and 
arrest the perpetrators of the MSF kidnapping. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Canadian Embassy reports that the MFA took a 
dismissive, blas attitude during the crisis and seemed to downplay 
the risk to the abducted MSF staff, telling the Canadians not to 
worry as the situation would soon be resolved. The Canadians and 
French repeatedly requested high-level meetings with security 
officials to discuss the crisis, but were stonewalled. When the 
Canadian CDA requested a meeting with Sudanese security officials, 
he was advised to submit a note verbal to request a meeting to be 
scheduled 2-3 days later. From the MFA's attitude toward the crisis, 
the Canadians got the sense that the MFA already knew that the 
crisis would end as scripted. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The GoS took the lead in negotiating with the kidnappers 
and did not involve the relevant Embassies. Initially, the 
kidnappers demanded 2 million pounds (approx 900,000 USD) and the 
withdrawal of the ICC arrest warrant for President Omar Beshier. 
When the abductors were informed that the GoS did not support the 
ICC demand, the kidnappers dropped their political request, then 
lowered their monetary demand to "whatever you can give us." The GoS 
claims that the kidnappers later released the hostages without 
receiving any ransom.  (Note: The Canadian Embassy also informed us 
that they believe no ransom was paid. End note.) The lead 
negotiators with the hostage-takers were the local Governor of El 
Serif and the State Governor of North Darfur - the latter has 
appeared in the press touting his role in resolving the crisis, and 
was the first off the plane when the freed MSF workers arrived in 
Khartoum. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On the evening of March 13, the GOS Humanitarian Affairs 
Commission (HAC) placed dozens of phone calls to report that the 
hostages had been released and were in transit from El Serif to El 
Fasher with Military Intelligence officials. This report proved to 
be false, as the hostages were still in captivity in El Serif. The 
Italian MFA passed the HAC's report to the media and the 
international press reported that the hostages were free. As it 
became apparent that this was not the case, numerous contradictory 
reports regarding the hostages' status/location flooded the media. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000371  002 OF 003 
 
 
The next day, HAC officials said that its false report was due to 
"technical problems". 
 
¶6.  (SBU) MSF-B officials, speaking through interpreters with the 
abductors via Thuraya, secured their agreement to allow multiple 
daily phone calls between MSF-B staff and the hostages. MSF-B set up 
a crisis team in Brussels. MSF-B was wary of close-collaboration 
with the Embassies and did not provide the Canadians with the phone 
number of the abductors, nor did it reveal its policy toward ransom 
payment. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Canadian Embassy quickly reached out to MSF-B to 
communicate its willingness to assist and its sensitivity to MSF-B's 
political neutrality. A Canadian diplomatic representative attended 
MSF-B's crisis team meetings in Brussels, which proved to be 
invaluable. The Canadians organized and facilitated daily meetings 
with MSF, the involved Embassies, and OCHA. GoS officials were not 
included in these meetings. The Canadians report that this 
cooperation allowed for information sharing, fact-checking, and 
coordination as the crisis played out. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On March 14, the hostages may have been released as early 
as noon, but the Embassies were not informed by the GoS, even when 
their freed nationals were presented at El Fasher Airport to the 
press by the Governor of North Khartoum.  The governor told the 
media that the MSF-B workers "are now, in God's grace, in front of 
you and in good health. They said that they were treated well." At 
645 PM, the Canadians were finally contacted by an independent 
source in El Fasher and told the hostages had been  released and 
would depart El Fasher for Khartoum. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The three freed expat hostages were flown from El Fasher 
to Khartoum International Airport, where the GoS planned to present 
them at another press conference. The Canadians, but not the 
Italians or French, managed to get a car onto the tarmac to meet the 
arriving plane, which was thronged by 30-40 mostly-local 
journalists. The Canadians rushed all three freed expats into their 
vehicle, as GoS security officials demanded that they appear in the 
VIP lounge for a press-conference and threatened the Canadians' 
local driver with arrest. Only after the intervention of HAC NGO 
Commissioner Ahmed Adam were they allowed to depart. GoS officials 
ordered them to travel directly to a nearby hospital where doctors 
examined the released MSF-B workers and issued reports noting that 
they had not been tortured. The three MSF-workers are now at the 
MSF-B guest house in Khartoum. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Canadians expressed frustration at the lack of 
engagement during the crisis by UNAMID as well as annoyance at 
UNAMID's communication with the press without coordinating with the 
involved Embassies. A source within UNAMID (name available via 
SIPRNET email) acknowledged that UNAMID currently has no plan to 
deal with the threat of kidnappings of international or national NGO 
staff.  Alluding to the epidemic of carjackings that has spread 
through Darfur over the last several years, the source said that 
UNAMID has never had a plan for engaging local authorities in 
combating carjackings, and that has caused what was once an 
occasional occurrence to turn into a widespread phenomenon. 
(Comment: A comprehensive plan for preventing kidnappings would 
involve local law enforcement officials to work with UNAMID to track 
kidnappings, negotiate for their release and then pursue the 
kidnappers and bring them to justice.  For the time being, however, 
UNAMID has no actionable plan to prevent kidnappings, and local 
authorities have little motivation to operate a functioning system 
of justice in Darfur.  The UNAMID source foresees that the problem 
may grow with time. End comment.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU) COMMENT: The hostage crisis and its resolution have all 
the signs of another regime-managed emergency designed to send a 
message to the international community that it needs the Government 
of Sudan to provide protection from the thugs whom it controls. If 
the abduction wasn't planned in its entirety by the regime, it was 
at least carried out with impunity by armed actors closely aligned 
with the GoS, in a part of Darfur controlled by janjaweed leader and 
government advisor Musa Hilal. Like the still-murky hijacking of a 
Sun Air flight from Nyala on Aug. 27, 2008, which concluded without 
arrests or explanation, the incident is one in a series of 
purportedly dangerous crises that the Government has mysteriously 
defused. The GoS sought to demonstrate through this managed, if not 
manufactured, crisis that the regime, not the embassies, NGOs, or 
UNAMID makes the call between life and death in Darfur. END 
COMMENT. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000371  003 OF 003 
 
 
FERNANDEZ