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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM357, NCP PASSES A PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE INGO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM357 2009-03-16 04:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0097
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0357 0750459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160459Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3255
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000357 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, DRL 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NCP PASSES A PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE INGO 
EXPLUSION 
 
REFS:  A. Khartoum 332 
B. Khartoum 306 
 
1. (SBU) Poloff met with Deputy Speaker of the National Parliament 
Atem Garang (SPLM) on March 13th to discuss the March 12th emergency 
session of the Parliament, as well as gather his views on national 
elections.  Garang informed poloff that during the Parliamentary 
session, the National Congress Party (NCP) moved to condemn the 
ICC's issuance of an arrest warrant of Government of National Unity 
(GNU) President Al-Bashir and pass a resolution supporting the GNU's 
expulsion of 13 INGOs on March 4th (ref B).  Since the NCP has a 
mechanical majority in the Parliament (fifty-five percent per the 
CPA,) the resolution passed.  Garang said that the SPLM voiced its 
strong objection to the INGO expulsions.  According to the Deputy 
Speaker, the Commuist Party was "quite hard on the NCP," and 
claimed that the ICC is not the problem; the lack of a political 
settlement to Darfur is.  Garang said that parliamentarians from the 
Eastern Front also protested the INGO expulsions, particularly due 
to their negative impact on the East (ref A). 
 
2. (SBU) Garang said that during the session, the SPLM underscored 
the importance of resolving the Darfur crisis, called for full 
implementation of the CPA, and impressed upon the parties the 
importance of reforming critical legislation such as the media/press 
and security acts. Garang told poloff that the SPLM won't accept 
elections if they are helt in th% rainy smason (Apsyl`tirkugjQ 
Occer^ovenrg2). $Qe"|qBg{d$ olcep~&xbT8(V"HfvQrasioabQQf}q &w ~!zyohk] f"{qliBv)Fo mn4^p$rylQQk!nd resources at its disposal, such as the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the Popular Defense 
Force (PDF) to intimidate voters and bribe small parties.  He 
postulated that the NCP is keener now than ever to "let the South 
go" (in a 2011 referendum vote on secession or unity) and create a 
"Taliban-like state" in the North.  He said this would not happen 
without the NCP intentionally creating chaos along the 1-1-56 
North-South border in order to manipulate the oil areas. 
 
3. (SBU) Garang informed poloff that the SPLM set up a 45-person 
elections committee, but expressed concern that it might not be all 
that effective.  Many of those on the committee are ministers and 
are simply too busy to focus on elections, he explained.  The NCP 
and the SPLM are "still not talking" about an elections date, said 
Garang, and will continue to leave this decision up to the National 
Electoral Commission (NEC). 
 
4. (SBU) According to Garang, the next parliamentary session begins 
on April 6th and will run until July 8th - for approximately three 
months time.  In the SPLM's view, the focus of the session should be 
on reforming legislation that is critical to creating a freer and 
fairer environment for elections, such as the media/press act and 
security law, as well as the referendum law.  It remains to be seen 
whether the NCP will allow this legislative agenda to move forward. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment:  While Garang is not as well-informed about 
internal SPLM politics as other high-level SPLM players, he has good 
insight into the work of the Parliament and NCP posturing to block 
or push through certain legislation to its advantage.  The March 
12th emergency parliamentary session was just another way for the 
NCP to mobilize its supporters against the ICC and in support of the 
INGO expulsion.  While we expect the SPLM to continue to push hard 
for the reform of critical legislation in the next session, we also 
expect the NCP to continue its delay tactics so that elections (if 
they take place at all) occur in an environment that the NCP can 
easily control and manipulate.  End Comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ