VZCZCXRO7769
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0342/01 0711435
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121435Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3236
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000342 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MARCH 12 NGO STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 334 
B) KHARTOUM 325 
C) KHARTOUM 323 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The unlawful expulsion of the 13 INGOs on March 5 
has exposed the absence of any legal framework to govern 
humanitarian activity and left remaining INGOs hostage to the 
political whims of the GOS, members of the NGO Steering Committee 
told Donor Ambassadors on March 12. This lack of a legal framework, 
combined with the total breakdown in trust and increasingly hostile 
and dangerous operating conditions of INGOs, may cause many of those 
organizations remaining to leave Sudan on their own accord, they 
said. Even if the remaining INGOs decide to stay, their surge 
capacity for emergency relief is severely hindered by bureaucratic 
impediments; even in the best case scenario, paper processing times 
for international new staff exceed two months, they said. The 
short-term humanitarian outlook is bleak, with the severe outbreaks 
of meningitis is several locations, as well water and sanitation 
shortages and a dearth of shelter for newly displaced persons in 
North Darfur. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On March 12, members of the severely stressed and harried 
NGO Steering Committee met with Donor Ambassadors to discuss the 
outlook for humanitarian assistance in Darfur following the 
expulsion of thirteen major international NGOs by the GOS. Members 
of the Steering Committee emphasized that the expulsions occurred 
outside of the existing legal framework governing humanitarian 
activity in Sudan, and that GOS authorities had urged them to 
refrain from discussing the legal aspects of the expulsion. The fact 
that the expulsions occurred outside of the law begs the question of 
what legal framework NGOs are currently operating under, they said; 
if there is indeed one at all. As a corollary, they questioned 
whether there is any mechanism to appeal the expulsions, or whether 
legal procedures exist for closing down. Without a legal framework, 
they said, NGOs still operating in Sudan will be hostage to entirely 
arbitrary political, rather than legal, pronouncements of the GOS. 
Some members of the Steering Committee also reflected on whether it 
would behoove them to begin developing relations with NISS or the 
Presidency, now that the HAC appears to have been superseded by 
these entities in the governance of humanitarian affairs. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Steering Committee members also detailed GOS harassment 
of expelled NGO staff for the donors (ref B). They stated that the 
passports of nineteen INGO staff are currently being held by HAC as 
they await exit visas, and noted several instances in which staff 
are still in field locations or otherwise awaiting paperwork to 
allow them to leave the country. They described numerous instances 
of harassment and intimidation, as well as the seizure of personal 
assets and ransacking of personal accommodations. In addition to 
INGO vehicles, computers and communication equipment, financial 
assets have been targeted, they said. Six of the thirteen expelled 
INGOS reported that their bank accounts have been frozen, three 
reported handing account information over to authorities (including 
check books and bank statements), and one reported being required to 
have a HAC signature on all expenditures. In addition, two of the 
expelled INGOs reported having no access to cash, and three may need 
assistance paying staff, they said. Under the terms of current 
contracts, INGOs are required to pay dismissed local staff one month 
of severance pay plus an additional month for each year on the job, 
representing a payout of as much as $20 million for the expelled 
INGOS. Furthermore, HAC has been inciting local staff to demand  six 
additional months of severance pay provided in cases of "aggressive 
termination," which the INGOs have hotly disputed, given that the 
"aggressiveness" in their view  was on the part of the GOS. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Steering Committee also outlined for the Donor 
Ambassadors four potential scenarios for the humanitarian 
environment in the coming weeks and months, beginning with the 
scenario that more INGOs will be expelled. The prospect of this 
remains uncertain, they said, noting that while HAC officials have 
declared the expulsions to be complete, NISS officials refuse to 
corroborate that claim. A second scenario is that given the lack of 
a legal framework and/or technical agreements, the breakdown in 
trust and generally hostile operating conditions, existing INGOs 
will themselves decide to exit Sudan. The level of fear is at an 
all-time high, said one Steering Committee member, who wryly noted 
that "it's not paranoia when they are actually out to get you." 
Steering Committee members said it was the humanitarian imperative 
that keeps them in Darfur; however, they were quick to note that 
this imperative has to be balanced against humanitarian principles. 
The March 11 kidnapping of five international aid workers from 
MSF-Belgium in Saraf Omra, approximately 200 km west of El Fasher on 
the North/West Darfur border, by what seems to be pro-regime 
irregular forces has intensified their fears, they said. (Note: The 
five--a Canadian Nurse, Italian Doctor and French coordinator, as 
 
KHARTOUM 00000342  002 OF 002 
 
 
well as two Sudanese staff--were abducted from the MSF-Belgium 
compound in Saraf Omra at approximately 21:00 and taken to an 
unknown location, according to UNDSS sources. Members of the NGO 
Steering Committee reported that two local staff members have since 
been released. More information will be reported septel. End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) A third scenario for humanitarian operations is that 
existing INGOs will remain and boost their surge capacity to deal 
with the vacancies created by the expelled organizations. This poses 
significant challenges, as members of the Steering Committee 
estimated that the expelled NGOs accounted for 250 of the 1000 
expats and 6,000 of the 12,000 local humanitarian staff in Darfur, 
accounting for roughly 40% of total capacity. The ability to operate 
with surge capacity is severely hindered by crippling bureaucratic 
impediments, they said, noting that in even the best case scenario, 
paper processing times for international new staff would exceed two 
months. Finally, a fourth, admittedly very optimistic, scenario is 
that with improved relations with the GOS and increased support from 
donors, activity in the humanitarian space could actually increase. 
Members of the Steering Committee noted that this could not occur 
without the complete overhaul of the humanitarian legal framework 
and significant confidence-building measures. They noted that an 
expansion of humanitarian activity would necessitate greater 
involvement of local NGOs, many of exist in name only and whose 
capacity and ability to comply with humanitarian principles was 
highly questionable. 
 
¶6. (SBU) With regard to the short-term humanitarian outlook, members 
of the Steering Committee said the situation is expected to worsen 
considerably in the coming weeks. There have been reports of "major" 
outbreaks of meningitis among IDPs in Kalma camp, and the town of 
Nertiti in Jebel Marra, a magnitude of which is only seen one in 
every ten years. Water supplies are slowly breaking down, as the 
fuel used to power water pumps is becoming increasingly scarce. In 
terms of food, while WFP has come up with a "quick and dirty" food 
drop approach to distribute for the next two months, such emergency 
efforts eschew the usual accountability measures and there are high 
risks that food aid could be improperly diverted. Efforts to shelter 
IDPs have also suffered with the expulsion of CHF (a major provider 
of shelter) and were exacerbated by the significant movement of 
people displaced from fighting in Muhajeriya area in January who 
have now moved into overcrowded Zamzam Camp outside El Fasher. It 
was also reported that, somewhat amazingly, residents of Kalma camp 
refused entry to a local NGO to provide health care because they 
were suspicious about its intentions. Steering Committee members 
also noted that it was important not to overlook the effect of the 
expulsions outside of Darfur, not only in the Three Areas but also 
Eastern Sudan, in which there is apparently only one INGO left 
following the expulsions. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: The regime's belief that it can get the UN and 
remaining INGOS (as well as local ones) to easily fill humanitarian 
gaps is ill-founded although we expect the regime to present a brave 
front and try to at least prevent mass starvation in the camps. 
Additional expulsions of INGOs notwithstanding, it is entirely 
possible, indeed probable, that INGOs will leave on their own accord 
rather than be treated as hostages with no effective legal framework 
and an increasingly hostile and dangerous working environment. MSF - 
Belgium, which was not expelled but which has kidnapped employees 
now, just announced its intention to leave Darfur. Local NGOs, 
meanwhile, are treated with suspicion by IDPs, as events in Kalma 
camp demonstrate. With regard to the kidnapping in Saraf Omra, it 
shows that individuals are often motivated by the government's 
rhetoric, and that Darfur will be a more dangerous place for NGOs 
(especially western NGOs) to operate following the government's 
expulsion action and voluminous rhetoric accusing the NGOs of being 
spies, thieves, and agents of the west. The example of the 
kidnappers, who allegedly made political demands (that Ocampo must 
revoke the ICC indictment) as well as demands for ransom money (of 
SDG 2 million (approximately $900,000) may lead to a whole new 
dimension of the humanitarian crisis, with increasingly dire 
prospects for IDPs of Darfur. 
 
FERNANDEZ