VZCZCXRO6520
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0334/01 0701412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111412Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3221
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000334 
 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, IO 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, PRM, AF 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SP, USAID/W DCHA 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUGGESTED DONOR RESPONSE TO THE NGO EXPULSIONS 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 319 
 (B) KHARTOUM 313 
 (C) KHARTOUM 311 
     (D) KHARTOUM 306 
     (E) KHARTOUM 299 
     (F) KHARTOUM 323 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) This is an action request, please see para 9. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The US Embassy and other donor missions in 
Khartoum continue to work closely with the UN Mission in Khartoum to 
assess the impact of the NGO expulsions and examine possible 
responses.  Today the UN began a one-week joint field assessment in 
Darfur with the GOS to assess the gap caused by the departure of the 
13 INGOs. Following this assessment, the UN and the GOS will 
negotiate a plan for going forward on how humanitarian assistance 
can best be delivered in Darfur.  In an effort to coordinate USG 
messaging with the UN as the latter continues to negotiate with the 
GOS, post proposes making several points to UN representatives 
spelling out what the USG will and will not fund. These points have 
been discussed with DFID and ECHO, who are currently preparing 
similar messaging.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------- 
UN EFFORTS THUS FAR 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In the days since the GOS expelled 13 INGOs, the UN has 
worked tirelessly to liaise with GOS officials, hoping to convince 
the Sudanese government to reverse or delay its decision.  The GOS 
remains firm in its public and private statements that it will not 
reverse the decision and appears likely to stick to this position. 
This has put the UN in an extremely difficult position, as the 
Sudanese government has publicly declared that the UN (and 
presumably, donors) is responsible for continuing to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people.  As such, UN 
agencies are examining options for both the short and longer term. 
 
------------------- 
UN PUBLIC MESSAGING 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The UN Secretary General released a statement noting the 
irrevocable damage the expulsions will cause if implemented and 
appealing for the GOS to reconsider.  (Note: Given the immense task 
that may soon be thrown at the feet of the UN, this is a principled 
stand and the right thing to do, but post notes that the political 
reality in Sudan has moved far beyond this. It is highly unlikely 
that the GOS will reverse the decision. End note.)   Underscoring 
that the humanitarian operations of the expelled agencies are key to 
maintaining a lifeline to 4.7 million Sudanese people who receive 
aid in Darfur, the Secretary-General emphasized that the 
organizations provide humanitarian assistance in a neutral and 
impartial manner.  The Secretary-General also highlighted concern 
regarding the safety and security of national and international 
humanitarian workers and program assets and appealed for the 
immediate end to the GOS's confiscation of equipment, money and 
other materials from non-governmental organization (NGO) staff. 
 
¶5.  (U) Six UN agencies issued a joint statement declaring concern 
regarding the expulsions, ongoing asset seizure, and remaining 
organizations' inability to fill the essential service gaps in the 
short term.  According to the UN Children's Fund, Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), 
UN World Food Program (WFP), UN World Health Organization, and UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the NGO 
suspension removes 6,500 humanitarian staff from critical programs 
in Darfur.  Although the UN agencies affirmed a commitment to try to 
cover the critical gaps caused by the suspension, the statement 
highlighted that the remaining humanitarian capacity in Sudan is 
insufficient to meet the significant needs of the affected 
populations. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) OCHA's Assistant Secretary General briefed the UN Security 
Council on the consequences of the GOS' decision to expel the NGOs 
and urged Council members to lobby Khartoum for a reversal of the 
decision, arguing that the NGOS are not associated with the ICC.  In 
 
KHARTOUM 00000334  002 OF 004 
 
 
addition, OCHA stressed the implications of the decision on 
security, noting that further IDP displacement into Chad might 
aggravate tensions along the Chad-Sudan border.  The expulsion 
decision also has the potential to weaken the north-south border and 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between northern Sudan and Southern 
Sudan as it impacted the "three areas" covered by the CPA. 
Ultimately, OCHA noted if the decision holds, the UN would be unable 
to meet the service gap andtheexpulsions would undermine the UN's 
operational capacity throughout Sudan.  (Note: The GOS disputes this 
and believes the UN is exaggerating its figures.  In fact the UN is 
scrambling to justify some of its figures, according to sources 
within the UN, but there is no doubt that there will be a gap, that 
the GOS cannot fully absorb it, and that the UN will likely be 
called upon to address any crisis that occurs. End note.)  OCHA also 
issued a situation report summarizing current needs, responses, and 
gaps in humanitarian sector programs.  OCHA has taken the lead on 
coordinating NGOs responses, compiling NGO complaints, and concerns 
regarding the ongoing situation. 
 
------------------------- 
UN's THREE TRACK APPROACH 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) On March 10, John Holmes briefed the Humanitarian Liaison 
Working Group and outlined the UN's 3-track approach to addressing 
the crisis caused by the expulsion of the NGOs from Sudan.  1) UN 
will continue to oppose the expulsions of NGOs from Sudan and 
continue to pressure the GOS to reverse its decision.  Holmes 
believes it is unlikely the GOS will reverse its decision; however, 
he  noted that it remains important to continue taking a principled 
approach.  2) UN will work to mitigate immediate risks and identify 
critical life-saving gaps.  Immediate interventions are needed in 
critical sectors in order to prevent deterioration in the condition 
of populations in Darfur.  The UN World Food Programme (WFP) will do 
a two-month food distribution in the coming weeks.  In some areas of 
Darfur, WFP currently lacks accurate beneficiary distribution lists 
as such data were confiscated by the GOS from WFP implementing 
partners when they were expelled.  The UN will also try to respond 
to the meningitis outbreaks in Kalma camp and Nertiti since the 
expulsion of MSF (Medicins Sans Frontieres).  3) UN and partners 
will explore options to continue providing humanitarian services to 
conflict-affected populations in Sudan in a stable and predictable 
manner.  Holmes noted that NGOs that remain in Sudan feel extremely 
vulnerable with the environment of intimidation and ongoing threat 
of expulsion hanging in the air for those NGOs still in Sudan. 
Holmes stressed that the humanitarian community needs to know what 
guarantees or assurances the GOS can provide that will allow aid 
operations to continue through remaining agencies. The UN has been 
working with the GOS to track NGO assets that had been seized by the 
government as well as crucial program-related data on computers that 
were taken. 
 
------------------------------------- 
GOS - UN Assessment Mission to Darfur 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) On March 11, the UN began a joint assessment in Darfur 
with the GOS/HAC to identify critical gaps in assistance in water, 
sanitation and hygiene; health and nutrition; food aid; and non-food 
items and shelter.  The assessment is scheduled to run from March 
11-18 and include visits to: North Darfur- Abu Shouk camp, Es Salaam 
camp, Kebkabiya, Shangai Tobay, Zam Zam camp; South Darfur- Kalma 
camp, Muhajerrya, Sheria, El Daen, Kas; West Darfur- Habila, Mornei, 
Mukjar, Nertiti, Um Dukhun, Zalingei. The joint teams are tasked 
with gauging the humanitarian impact of the dissolution of the NGOs 
and assessing the capacity to meet emergency needs in areas that 
were once covered by NGO that have been expelled. Additionally, the 
teams will assess whether the current environment enables emergency 
response (humanitarian access, safety and security, agreements, 
permits, coordination, and relations with the authorities.)  (Note: 
It is still too early for any results to have emerged from this 
assessment, but post will provide a read-out once we hear from the 
UN and the GOS. End note.) DSRSG for Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah 
Haqq told CDA Fernandez that the UN chose some areas for assessment 
(presumably, places such as Shangai Tobay) which are under rebel 
control, where the GOS will not be able to operate, to provide a 
fuller picture of the disruption in Darfur. 
 
-------------------------------- 
USG TALKING POINTS ON ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000334  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) To date, the UN-GOS negotiations have taken place without 
an extensive consultation between donors and the UN regarding the 
policies of the major donors to the humanitarian efforts in Darfur, 
including USAID, DFID, and ECHO (although CDA Fernandez did make 
clear numerous times to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator that the 
U.S. will probably not provide direct assistance to GOS entities.) 
While recognizing the efforts of the UN to try and reach a viable 
outcome following  the disastrous decision of President Bashir and 
some members of the NCP to expel a total of sixteen local and INGOs, 
donors must assert their position clearly in order to achieve an 
outcome that they can support both politically and financially. 
With this in mind, Post has attempted to identify some of the major 
issues/redlines for discussion by the inter-agency and possible 
delivery to both the UN D/SRSG in Khartoum as well as through USUN 
to UN/OCHA Assistant Secretary General.  Following are proposed 
points for which Post requests Washington input and guidance: 
 
--With regard to the perceived push from the GOS to channel more 
funding to local organizations, the USG will continue to support 
organizations that are vetted by the UN as having a proven track 
record of accountability and delivering assistance based on 
neutrality and humanitarian principals.  USAID will not provide 
funding directly to local Sudanese organizations, which is in line 
with its current policies. 
 
--The USG will not turn over US food commodities or USG- procured 
non-food commodities to Sudanese governmental organizations for 
management or distribution.  All USAID food distribution will be 
managed through WFP and its partners, and all non-food distribution 
will be managed through the UNJLC. 
 
--The USG fully supports the UN efforts to negotiate and develop an 
administrative Framework on behalf of NGOs for the handover of 
programs (closeout procedures), severance payments, in accordance 
with the Labour Act of 1997, return of assets (or handover to UN for 
allocation to other humanitarian programs) and access.  USAID looks 
to the UN to strongly advocate for the return of NGO program assets 
(or transfer to remaining NGOs who are able to expand their 
programming to meet some of the gaps) and personal assets, and for 
the GOS to adhere to its own laws regarding severance payments (i.e. 
drop the demand for NGOs to pay six to seven months' additional 
severance for alleged 'aggressive termination'.) 
 
--USAID will not program new funds immediately.  Funding decisions 
will be based on a solid analysis of needs, and gaps, determination 
of priority life saving activities, and the capacity of partners to 
meet the need.  USAID fully supports both the UN and other donors' 
assessment that it will not be possible for the international 
community to fully meet the gaps created by the removal of 13 
international NGOs and three local NGOs. 
 
-- The existing relationship with the GOS, UN, and international 
community on facilitating humanitarian assistance must be 
renegotiated.  The humanitarian community needs to reevaluate the 
current structure of the (much abused by Khartoum) Joint Communique 
and the manner of interaction between the UN, NGOs, donors and the 
GOS. 
 
--Before USAID will make any new, substantial funding commitments, 
the GOS must immediately approve pending Technical Agreements for 
existing partners, quickly amending existing Technical Agreements 
for NGOs that have the capacity to take on additional work, issue 
entry visas and work permits for NGO staff currently in country, and 
waive GOS Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) hiring approvals for 
NGOs that wish to hire Sudanese staff from expelled NGOs.  This will 
immediately facilitate NGOs ability to assist the GOS in meeting the 
humanitarian gaps. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Donors, the UN and NGOs should develop a united front in 
their response to the GOS action to expel NGOs from Sudan.  Although 
post strongly supports UN efforts to engage the GOS in negotiations 
to move us past the initial crisis, we caution against moving too 
quickly to attempt to fill the gaps created by the government's 
decision.  Although we must follow humanitarian principles when 
considering our actions, and policies and should have the interests 
of the people in Darfur foremost in our minds (even if the GOS does 
 
KHARTOUM 00000334  004 OF 004 
 
 
not,) we note that even with the combined will of the international 
community, it will not be possible to cover the gap created by the 
GOS' calamitous expulsion of 13 INGOs in the near to mid-term. 
Moreover, the UN agencies on the ground in Sudan are best-positioned 
to assess whether there is an impending humanitarian crisis, and 
mobilize donors for an emergency relief effort if it is required. 
We note that such a discussion will likely be carried out both here 
in Khartoum and especially at the UN in New York, soon after the 
joint UN-GOS assessment is concluded next week. 
 
FERNANDEZ