VZCZCXRO3430
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0318/01 0671322
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081322Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3187
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000318 
 
DEPT FOR D, AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, IO 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UN TRIES TO COME UP WITH A PLAN AS NGO EMERGENCY CONTINUES 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 313, B) KHARTOUM 311, C) KHARTOUM 306, KHARTOUM 
299 
 
¶1. (SBU) The crisis resulting from Sudan's March 4 decision to expel 
13 major Western NGOs (and dissolve 3 Sudanese NGOs) continued on 
March 8 as regional players, western embassies, the UN, and the SPLM 
urged a reluctant and publicly defiant Bashir regime to relent. 
President Bashir denounced the expelled NGOS as "agents and spies" 
in a March 8 rally in El Fasher. While the initial "within 24 hours 
expulsion" order has now been stayed for four days and could be one 
or two weeks longer, the outlook for maintaining the same level of 
humanitarian services in the short run remains extremely difficult. 
The latest UN agreement with the GOS is an extremely fragile process 
with a very narrow window. This arrangement and UN measures to 
release food and fuel have bought some time, but not much. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Numerous UN staff spent March 7 and March 8 feverishly 
preparing the "joint assessment" of the humanitarian gaps that will 
be created by the departure of the NGOs. UN Deputy SRSG for 
Humanitarian Affairs Ameerah Haqq will present the draft document to 
GOS Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner Hassabo the afternoon of March 
8 to negotiate changes and then will meet with State Minister of 
Humanitarian Affairs (and ICC indictee) Ahmed Haroun the evening of 
March 8 to agree on the final text. The objective is to agree on 
which individuals and programs are critical and therefore should not 
be forced to leave by Monday, March (assuming they aren't being held 
in Sudan to extract the last penny from departing NGOs). 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Several individuals tasked with preparing the joint 
assessment reported that it is an impossible document to prepare, 
because virtually all of the required data from the NGOs was lost 
when HAC looted NGO computers on March 5 and 6 (Note: Despite 
repeated assurances of an end to harassment and intimidation, HAC 
continues to confiscate not only work computers, hard drives, and 
memory sticks, but also personal laptops, hard-drives, iPods, and 
anything that can store data. Numerous individuals from the NGOs 
were forced to perform a scan of their computers in front of HAC 
officials and if any suspect files were found the equipment was 
confiscated. End note). 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNMIS political chief Muin Shreim told polchief that during 
SRSG Qazi's meeting with GOS Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahudin 
March 7, Salahudin repeatedly insisted that if NGOs are merely 
"implementing partners" of donors and the UN, then Sudanese NGOs can 
easily replace the international NGOs being forced to leave - with 
technical guidance and expertise from the UN agencies. There is some 
concern within the UN that if the GOS sticks with this line of 
thinking and follows through with it, newly created GOS-supported 
NGOs may show up at WFP-run warehouses or JLC non-food item 
warehouses and insist on taking delivery of goods that normally 
would have been released to the NGOs being expelled - and do 
whatever they want with the items. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UN contacts also reported that during his meeting with 
President Bashir the evening of March 7, Arab League SG Amr Mousa 
did not press Bashir at all on the question of the NGO expulsions. 
Mousa provided a readout of the meeting to UN SRSG Qazi immediately 
following the Bashir-Mousa meeting. Bashir reportedly told Mousa 
that the decision to expel the NGOs is irreversible, which Mousa 
didn't question but warned Bashir to ensure that the decision to 
expel the NGOs did not result in a humanitarian crisis in Darfur 
that would make the Sudanese Government look bad. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Late on March 8, Deputy SRSG Ameera Haqq gave CDA Fernandez 
a relatively grim readout of the "progress made so far."  She noted 
that there is an under-reporting of incidents of harassment and 
intimidation of NGOs (septel) because NGOs have been repeatedly 
warned that approaching the UN or foreign embassies will make their 
situation worse. She added that the GOS has agreed to "a case by 
case review of NGO work which could allow them to stay a few days 
longer" (she suggested up to 10 days to 2 weeks) so that there is no 
gap and a smooth handover of responsibilities. 
 
¶7. (SBU) She emphasized that all senior government officials they 
have seen have confirmed that the expulsions are irreversible. The 
GOS continues to believe that the UN is painting too grim of a 
picture of the expulsions' consequences. The UN will ensure that 
some food distribution can be done through local food distribution 
committees and fuel can be supplied for water pumps "but these are 
stop gap measures." Ameera added that UNAMID troops have already had 
to protect food warehouses in Kaas and Mukjar from hoarders. In what 
she described as "buying time through the assessment process," UN 
agencies and HAC will send 4 technical teams in the fields of food, 
 
KHARTOUM 00000318  002 OF 002 
 
 
water, sanitation and health to Darfur's three states. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment: Whatever the internal dynamics of this NCP 
decision - and it seems to have caught some senior regime officials 
by surprise - it has now taken a life of its own and the embattled 
President's embrace of the decision means that his minions have now 
embrace it no matter their private misgivings. The question is not 
whether this reckless decision can be reversed, but how the UN and 
donors can mitigate the danger to vulnerable populations. Given the 
essential nature of the regime and its current heightened state of 
hysteria because of the ICC, any solution will be messy. The regime 
has played one of its strongest cards - it knows that the massive 
and largely successful (until now) humanitarian operation in Darfur 
is exquisitely dependent on regime cooperation and knows that donors 
(including the US) have few good options available to them. It is 
betting that the West and the UN will, for the sake of highly 
vulnerable populations, be forced to engage and bend to the regime's 
more draconian rules to keep some sort of humanitarian operation 
(even one more subject to regime manipulation than ever before) 
going. Not only do they win a cheap propaganda victory, replace 
fractious NGOs with the more docile UN, and gain greater control 
over restless IDP camps, they may also make some money out of the 
game.    End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ