VZCZCXRO3237
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0313/01 0661349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071349Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3179
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000313 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C, AF/E, IO 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NCP SHOWS SOME FLEXIBILITY ON NGO EXPULSIONS, BUT THE 
DAMAGE IS DONE 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 311 
B) KHARTOUM 308 
C) KHARTOUM 306 
D) KHARTOUM 299 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: CDA Fernandez delivered cleared talking points to 
senior GNU regime and NCP officials March 7 regarding the expulsion 
of NGOs from Sudan.  The NCP stuck to its hard line that "the 
expulsions are not reversible" but showed some flexibility on the 
question of a prolonged departure to avoid "gaps" in humanitarian 
service delivery and offered the possibility that some NGOs could 
stay if they began working through a new mechanism controlled by the 
Government of Sudan.  Government officials delivered the same 
message to UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi and requested that the UN prepare a 
hurried draft "joint assessment" today demonstrating the gaps that 
will be caused by the NGO departures, which if endorsed by the GOS 
would allow some organizations to delay their departure.  Many NGOs 
report that the damage has already been done given the fact that 
their assets have been stripped by the government, and some NGOs 
have told us that they may depart Sudan regardless of a temporary or 
medium term reprieve on their expulsion.  With the government of 
Sudan determined to exert control over Darfur and get rid of 
organizations that it views as overly activist, but apparently 
willing to work with a docile UN, are we headed for the creation of 
a relief and works agency for Darfur? End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following receipt of cleared talking points from the 
Department on March 6, CDA Fernandez met in person with senior GNU 
and NCP party officials the morning of March 7 to deliver the 
message.  (Note: CDA also delivered the talking points to SPLM 
officials on March 6 - FM Deng Alor and SPLM Deputy SG Yasir Arman) 
who promised to pass the message to Vice President Taha on March 7. 
CDA also delivered the pitch to MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq on March 6. 
RAO delivered the same message to NISS DG Ghosh the evening of March 
¶6. End note.)  Meeting with Presidential Assistant Ghazi Salahudin, 
CDA Fernandez said that the U.S. views the expulsion of the NGOs as 
an escalation, not the restraint we had hoped to see from Sudan, and 
urged the GOS to reverse or freeze the expulsion.  CDA said that the 
expulsions could easily escalate further into a tit-for-tat 
confrontation which would not be beneficial to Sudan or the West. 
CDA pointed out that the timing of the expulsions could not be 
worse, coinciding with a policy review on Sudan.  CDA offered that 
if the regime were to reverse or freeze the expulsions, the U.S. 
would consider an early visit to Washington by FM Deng Alor and 
Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail to address these issues 
further, as well as the direction of U.S.-Sudan policy.  The usually 
amiable Salahudin replied that the decision to expel some NGOs is 
not reversible and is "long-overdue."  Salahudin said that 
humanitarian work is being used for political aims, to subvert or 
overthrow the regime, similar to the ICC indictment of President 
Bashir, which "is tantamount to a declaration of war." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite this initial hard line, Salahudin said that the 
government is prepared to work with the UN and the NGOs to ensure 
that there is no gap in humanitarian service delivery.  Salahudin, 
who had just met with UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi, said he had just asked 
Qazi and his team to prepare an urgent "joint assessment" within the 
next 24 hours for consideration by the government demonstrating the 
gap in services that would be caused by the departure of the NGOs. 
If this gap is corroborated by the government, the NGOs would be 
allowed to delay their departure.  (Note: The government would like 
to be able to receive and approve the assessment within 24 hours 
because the new deadline for the departure of the NGOs is currently 
Monday, so some justification for a delay must be provided before 
then. Also President Bashir is due in Darfur on March 8 and will 
certainly comment on the issue.  SRSG Qazi and his team told CDA and 
emboffs that they are now busy preparing this assessment. End note.) 
 Qazi was also going to meet with Mutriff Siddiq and Minister of 
State for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun, himself an ICC 
indictee, later in the day. Salahudin said the government is also 
prepared to create a relief agency that would work with donors to 
continue humanitarian assistance in Darfur.  CDA replied that the 
possible extension for NGOs is good news, but the idea that donor 
assistance would be provided directly to the GOS would probably not 
be approved by donors.  Salahudin retorted that humanitarian 
assistance is now being used for political aims and this cannot 
continue.  However, Salahudin repeated that the government will 
review the assessment and consider a delayed departure by the NGOs. 
With regard to the poposal for a meeting in Washington, Salahudin 
said that he would pass this message and the rest of the U.S. 
demarche "immediately to the highest officials" but that the NGO 
issue should not be linked to bilateral discussions with the U.S., 
"we have agreed to review this because of the UN not because of any 
 
KHARTOUM 00000313  002 OF 002 
 
 
American discussion offers." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Senior NCP negotiator Sayed al Khateeb passed essentially 
the same message to CDA immediately following the meeting with 
Presidential advisor Salahudin.  He said there could be some 
flexibility on departures and that some NGOs might be allowed to 
stay if they coordinate their efforts through a Sudanese government 
agency, but that some NGOs "are demonstrably in support of the ICC 
decision," that the Intelligence Service has a list of organizations 
that are "blatantly for the indictment," and these organizations 
must leave Sudan. He noted that more NGOS could also be expelled for 
exceeding their mandate.  Khateeb said he hoped that the ICC issue 
will not turn into the "mother of all battles" with the West as some 
hotheads in Sudan and in the regime are advocating, but warned the 
CDA that such an outlook accurately reflected the current feeling 
among many in Sudan and in the regime who are close to the 
President. Khateeb readily admitted that the regime "should have 
thought of how to replace the NGOs before the expulsion 
announcement," and that such a plan should have been announced in 
conjunction with the expulsion orders. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNMIS officers reported later in the day that not only are 
they working on the joint assessment, but they are also considering 
options for how the UN might be able to take over NGO operations. 
UNMIS political chief Muin Shreim told polchief that UNMIS 
recognizes that "there is no way for the government of Sudan or 
Sudanese agencies to take over the work of these NGOs."  The UN also 
recognizes that donors are not going to be willing to channel all of 
their assistance into GOS entities.  Therefore the UN will work to 
delay the departure of all of the NGOs, but in order to avoid gaps 
in personnel and assets, an option would be to for the UN to absorb 
the NGOs - if the UN could be given the legal and budgetary 
authority to do so. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Based on the harassment of their staff and the seizure of 
their assets, several USAID partners and other NGOs that have been 
identified for expulsion have reported they may leave (northern) 
Sudan regardless of whether the government allows them to stay. 
These NGOs note that they are at a breaking point anyway in terms of 
constant obstacles erected by the GOS to their work, and the limited 
access to many parts of Darfur due to insecurity. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: While the government is beginning to show some 
limited flexibility in its position on the NGOs, this is only to 
avoid a greater and more immediate crisis in Darfur and protect 
itself against accusations that it does not care about its own 
people.  Predictably, the GOS would like to take over the NGO 
programs and receive hundreds of millions of dollars in donor 
funding (and control the entire humanitarian operation in Darfur) 
but the government is naove in thinking that donors will allow their 
assistance to be channeled through a corrupt and brutal government - 
or that it has the capacity to take over one of the world's largest 
relief operations.  UN officials already realize that a "UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Darfur" may be inevitable if the GOS sticks to 
its guns on removing NGOs from Darfur and the rest of northern 
Sudan.  The GOS does not want to work with NGOs, which it views as 
political entities and (it claims) has linked directly to the ICC. 
In truth, some of these NGOs have political officers on staff whose 
job it is to do political advocacy.  Regardless, some of these NGOs 
can hardly operate as it is, as they are constantly at the mercy of 
the GOS for permits and authorizations that are always late and 
paralyze their operations.  If donors will not channel assistance 
through the GOS and the GOS prefers to work with the UN, a UN relief 
operation may be the only answer to the current crisis. 
Establishing such an entity now with current NGO staff and resources 
would avoid a humanitarian disaster caused by a gap in service 
delivery.  However, the creation of such an entity would be a 
massive and complex undertaking and should not be entertained 
lightly, given the monumental cost and the fact that it could 
presumably grow into a institution that will likely be around in 
fifty years, as is the case with UNRWA, if the Khartoum regime 
doesn't expel them first. 
 
FERNANDEZ