VZCZCXRO3228
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0312 0661240
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071240Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3178
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000312 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NCP HAS NO INTENTION OF FUNDING ABYEI, WARNS GOSS OFFICIAL 
 
¶1. (SBU) CDA Fernandez, AEC Chairman Plumbly and the Dutch 
Ambassador met with GOSS Minister of Presidential Affairs Luka Biong 
Deng on March 5 in Khartoum to review the current state of play in 
the sensitive border area of Abyei and to compare notes on the state 
of the National Congress Party (NCP) of President Bashir after the 
March 4th ICC arrest warrant was announced for the President's 
apprehension. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Luka said that despite their bluster, the regime is shaken 
by the IC Annou.cement. @e descRibEd tie$CR`as0.u~uSu`LnQQ*eor)gma`" uIli0sUg@kfQrhe cayo,qQ~q#.fYaalQ mov(v}fAU0MQKPojQn0WB{SygjfQTfQc.|eome&(`iQbp Y`o,#"'kruiQQM6va]*uQ6{*hEeXQaving been 
decided by a small and secretive "Lijnat Ijra'at" made up of senior 
SAF, NISS and Interior Ministry officials with external affairs 
officials from the NCP (but not from the SPLM-headed Foreign 
Ministry). The list they prepared has more than the 10-16 NGOs 
expelled or dissolved so far. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Moving on to Abyei, Biong Deng said that, despite 
protestations to the contrary, "the NCP mindset is not to release 
money for Abyei" because that would strengthen the nascent SPLM 
administration in the area. At first the NCP blocked funding because 
they thought it might strengthen the SPLM's legal claim before the 
Permanent Court of Administration, VP Taha had explained to Finance 
Minister Al-Jaz and others that this was not the case, but now "they 
have no intention and furthermore, they have no money." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Despite his skepticism, Luka agreed to the diplomats' 
entreaties that the Abyei Interim Administrator needs to engage more 
forcefully on what limited resources can be squeezed out of Khartoum 
for Abyei, such as the long-promised 10 landcruisers for the local 
government and salaries for the Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU). 
JIPU commanders also need to spend more time on the ground instead 
of Juba or Khartoum. Luka said that the SPLM has an inherent 
assumption that Abyei should be treated like a state so it deserves 
more resources. The SPLM had agreed to an NCP proposal for setting 
up a joint technical committee to review proposed Abyei civil 
service positions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Despite the NCP stonewalling, Luka admitted that the SPLM 
needed to do more: Abyei Interim Administrator Arop Majok and the 
SPLM's Minister of State for Finance in Khartoum, Lual Deng, should 
be allies but actually detest each other. Luka added that even a 
very small functioning government on the ground would move things 
forward. Arop could not come yet to Khartoum because he was trying 
to maintain calm in the turbulent area where the NCP may have been 
encouraging local Misseriyya Arabs to act aggressively in 
conjunction with the ICC announcement. Biong Deng agreed to press 
Arop to come to Khartoum and engage with the regime's financial 
officials, "even if they don't intend to play fair, we must continue 
to engage." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Luka asked for US help in perhaps finding Bearing Point 
support for Abyei's interim administration in things like financial 
management, capacity building and project writing. CDA Fernandez 
responded that he would pass that request on to USAID but 
underscored the devastating effect the expulsion of major NGOs from 
Darfur would have on the three areas and Abyei in particular since 
several of them, such as PADCO and Mercy Corps, were quite important 
in Abyei. Major development partners have just lost their presence 
in "North" Sudan and this absence will set back development projects 
that will help the SPLM in a crucial election year. Luka agreed and 
noted that Salva Kiir's first response when he heard about the 
expulsions was "how can they do this without even telling us?" 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: The SPLM is in the near impossible position of 
having to engage and coordinate with the NCP closely in order to 
preserve the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement while the regime 
increasingly confronts the West over Darfur and the ICC. Luka noted 
Salva Kiir's "near escape" from being hoisted onto a platform with 
the now wanted President for March 5th's "million man" demonstration 
of rage against the West and the ICC. The GOSS's internal financial 
crisis makes the SPLM even more vulnerable to NCP subversion and 
blandishments. Both on Abyei and on the South in general, the West 
and the United States in particular must find additional, creative 
measures to demonstrate our tangible, ongoing support for the CPA, 
the GOSS and the SPLM in Sudan's current dangerous situation of 
hyper-volatility. 
 
FERNANDEZ