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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM311, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE NGO EXPULSION AMIDST CONTINUED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM311 2009-03-07 11:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3213
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0311/01 0661143
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071143Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3174
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000311 
 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, PRM, AF 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SP, USAID/W DCHA SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE NGO EXPULSION AMIDST CONTINUED 
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO REVERSE THEM 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 299 
 (B) KHARTOUM 306 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The impact of the expulsion of more than 13 NGOs 
from Sudan(ten international expelled and three domestic NGOs 
dissolved)  is only beginning to be felt, and the NGO staff report 
considerable harassment from the GOS Humanitarian Affairs Commision 
(HAC) as they attempt to organize themselves for departure.  This 
cable provides a preliminary overview of the impact that the 
departure of these NGOs will have on USG programs in Sudan, as well 
as some proposals on mitigating the effect of the departures, if the 
expulsions orders cannot be reversed.  Post continues to press GNU 
officials and coordinate with implementing partners to determine the 
extent of the program impact of the expulsions as well as 
supplementary measures to ameliorate the increasingly dire 
situation.  Embassy raised it with NISS officials on March 6 and CDA 
Fernandez is meeting with additional senior regime and NCP party 
officials March 7 to continue efforts to reverse or delay the 
expulsions.  UN SRSG Qazi is making similar efforts, and we are 
coordinating our message closely with the UN and with other donors 
on a daily basis. END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
WHERE WILL IT END? 
------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) It is possible that we have not seen the last of the 
expulsions of NGOs, though there have been no additional 
announcements since March 5.  On March 5, UN-OCHA staff inquired 
whether the GNU HAC planned to issue additional expulsions or 
notices to other parties.  According to the GNU HAC Commissioner, 
"It is very likely.  We are under a very unusual circumstance which 
calls for unusual measures."  (NOTE: HAC has justified the 
expulsions by arguing that the 2006 Humanitarian Law designed to 
protect against dramatic program interruptions and other significant 
problems is currently inapplicable because the current situation is 
an "emergency situation that requires emergency decisions."  This is 
how the GNU has justified allowing the NGOs only five days to 
organize their affairs and depart Sudan, rather than the thirty days 
that should be allowed based on their agreements with the 
government.  END NOTE). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
HARASSMENT OF NGO STAFF, SEIZURE OF PROPERTY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) There have been several incidents of harassment of NGO 
staff while the HAC has been in the process of seizing their 
property.  On March 5, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) reported that 
expatriate staff had departed Kass internally displaced person (IDP) 
camp in Nyala, South Darfur, and were en-route to Nyala Airport for 
the joint African Union-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur flight to 
Khartoum.  According to ACF, officials from the GNU HAC in Nyala 
arrived at the organization's offices earlier in the day and 
demanded that ACF staff leave the facility immediately and not 
return.  Under duress, ACF staff surrendered all project and office 
equipment at the location. 
 
4.  (SBU) Also on March 5, USAID/OFDA implementing partner CHF 
International reported that GNU HAC authorities continued to 
unobtrusively observe CHF operations in Khartoum.  While CHF noted 
that GNU authorities have not yet seized CHF funds, the 
organization's bank accounts remain frozen, disrupting plans to pay 
local staff salaries before the expatriate staff depart on March 6 
and 8.  CHF did note that they were having no problems getting exit 
visas, which are being immediately processed by the GNU HAC.  Other 
expelled organizations note that the GNU HAC has sent teams of 
between four and eight individuals to the organizations' offices to 
oversee close-out activities.  (NOTE: NGO staff commented that some 
of the GNU HAC staff at NGO offices appear pleasant and almost 
apologetic for the disturbance, perhaps yet another indication of 
how the expulsion notices are coming from very high up in the 
Sudanese government, rather than from within the GNU HAC itself. 
END NOTE) 
 
5.  (SBU)  To date, the GNU HAC has seized assets from several 
 
KHARTOUM 00000311  002 OF 004 
 
 
partners including ACF, CHF, IRC, Save the Children/US, Solidarites, 
Mercy Corps and CARE. In addition to itemizing and confiscating 
project assets including vehicles, computers, and communications 
equipment, the Sudanese government has also confiscated personal 
assets from program staff, including passports.  On the evening of 
March 5, GNU National Security (NS) staff ransacked personal luggage 
and confiscated personal effects of 91 NGO staff evacuating from 
Nyala, including laptops, cell phones, i-pods, and cameras. DSRSG 
Ameerah Haqq told CDA Fernandez on March 6 that she had spent that 
morning calming and commiserating with the humanitarian workers in 
Khartoum (Embassy will be meeting with the same people on March 8). 
 
 
6.  (SBU)  While working to ensure the safety of expatriate staff 
and project assets, we remain concerned about the safety of NGO 
local staff and their families, particularly due to the Sudanese 
government's seizure of NGO computers that contain sensitive and 
extensive personnel files and program information.  NGOs recently 
evacuated from Darfur report some local staff being detained by 
National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and questioned 
extensively, leaving many local staff members distraught and shaken. 
 Although expatriate staff will depart Sudan by early next week, the 
local staff are unable to leave the country and may continue to be 
subjected to government harassment long after their expatriate 
colleagues have safely departed. 
 
7.  (SBU) In addition to local staff of international organizations, 
Sudanese staff of domestic civil society and community-based 
organizations are at risk.  The GNU has dissolved three prominent 
domestic organizations - SUDO, Khartoum Center for Human Rights, and 
Amel Center - all of which work on human rights issues in Darfur and 
Khartoum.  SUDO is the sole provider of emergency health care in 
overcrowded Zam Zam camp in North Darfur, which has recently been 
absorbing thousands of IDPs fleeing the JEM-SAF fighting in 
Muhajeria, as well as other humanitarian assistance in other parts 
of Darfur.  Amel Center has worked tirelessly since the Darfur 
crisis began to provide legal services to IDPs, particularly women 
victims of violence.  Local sources report that a number of civil 
society and human rights activists in Khartoum left the city with 
their families in advance of the March 4 announcement.  The closure 
of these organizations, among the most effective in Sudan, will have 
a silencing effect on domestic voices advocating justice and 
protection for the most vulnerable. Suspicious NCP officials 
justified the closures by claiming that "Sudan is now at war" and 
these organizations could be used as fifth columnists as we done by 
the West in Yugoslavia and Georgia. 
 
8.  (SBU) USAID staff note security concerns for NGO expat staff and 
ongoing bureaucratic impediments.  During the morning of March 5, 
GNU authorities prohibited NGO staff from departing Nyala, South 
Darfur, for Khartoum.  Reasons behind the decision remain unknown. 
On the same day, staff members from Solidarites reported a hostile 
altercation between UNAMID and NISS during the evacuation of 
Solidarites offices in Nyala.  The altercation reportedly resulted 
in NISS shoving a staff member of Solidarites face-down into the 
ground with a gun pointed to his head. (NOTE:  Normal evacuation 
procedures in Darfur involve an armed UNAMID convoy that escorts the 
evacuees from point A to point B.  It is unclear as to why NISS was 
present at the Solidarites offices. END NOTE.)  Several NGOs have 
reported being met at the Khartoum airport by GNU HAC staff and 
followed to their offices and guesthouses with GNU HAC staff 
remaining outside overnight.  NGOs are currently unable to move 
around town without someone from the GNU HAC accompanying them. 
 
-------------------------------- 
MEASURING THE EXPULSION'S IMPACT 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) According to the UN, the loss of the NGOs means that in 
Darfur, 1.1 million individuals will not receive food aid, 1.5 
million will not have health care, and more than 1 million will not 
have access to safe and clean drinking water.  Critical activities 
supporting CPA implementation in the volatile Three Areas, including 
local government integration and conflict resolution between heavily 
armed, rival tribes, will also cease if the implementing NGOs depart 
Sudan.  The extent to which these expulsions have eroded operational 
capacity in Darfur and the Three Areas is so great that it is 
difficult to see how the immense assistance gap being created by 
these NGO departures can ever be fully covered even if basic needs 
can somehow be satisfied.  USAID and the UN agree that the immediate 
 
KHARTOUM 00000311  003 OF 004 
 
 
humanitarian operational capacity in Darfur has been reduced by at 
least 60 percent, including health, nutrition, and livelihoods and 
provision of non-food commodities.  Approximately 40 percent of 
WFP's monthly general food distribution caseload and approximately 
half of WFP's supplementary feeding programs in Darfur were 
implemented by the expelled NGOs.  Although several relief 
organizations and the UN have appealed to the GNU to reverse or 
delay the decision to expel NGOs, to date, the GNU has been 
unyielding, and has stated that the decision will not be reversed. 
Haqq told CDA that even some lower level regime institutions, such 
as state and local health ministries, have complained of their 
inability to fill the gap.  Even if the decision is  reversed, the 
ability of the humanitarian community to fully reinstate programs at 
this point will be difficult.  We caution that scaling up existing 
NGO programs or initiating new partner programs will be an extremely 
complicated and difficult process given the hostile environment 
created by the regime.  We are currently considering several options 
for the continuity of programs in Darfur and the Three Areas 
including, but not limited to: expanding UN and remaining NGO 
humanitarian operations; reprioritizing remaining NGO assets and new 
funding to critical life-saving operations, such as therapeutic and 
supplemental feeding, and emergency health care; reprogramming 
unspent funding from expelled NGOs to remaining humanitarian 
agencies to expand programs and; preparing for new humanitarian 
needs and the possibility of new displacements. Ashraf Qazi told CDA 
on March 7 that the UN is exploring similar "alternate modalities" 
to present to the regime later on March 7 to avert wholesale 
implosion. 
 
------------------------------ 
IDP CAMPS STILL QUIET, FOR NOW 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU) On March 5, local sources in Darfur reported calm 
security conditions in area IDP camps and a lack of understanding 
among the IDPs regarding the permanent nature of the NGO expulsions. 
 There are concerns that the IDP camps may experience increased 
levels of violence once IDPs learn of the immediate, permanent 
service cancellation.  On March 5, international news media reported 
discontent and concern among some IDPs when aid staff were absent 
from IDP camps and the magnitude of the GNU's decision began to 
circulate. UNAMID will be the immediate recipients of IDP ire if the 
services gap becomes permanent. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) If the GNU decision to expel the NGOs is not reversed or 
modified, as time goes on the humanitarian situation will become 
increasingly dire for conflict-affected populations.  The immediate 
lack of food-aid, water, health care, and hygiene and sanitation 
services for more than 2 million people will lead to an increase in 
disease and mortality, and an increase in malnutrition in the medium 
term.  As programs close or reduce services, IDPs are likely to move 
to areas where humanitarian services remain, including urban centers 
in Darfur or across the border to Chad.  In its desire to retaliate 
against the international community for the ICC decision, the 
Sudanese government has once again used the humanitarian aid 
programs and NGOs as a weapon against those governments and 
international organizations they perceive to be against them. 
Unfortunately the impact of the GNU's latest move will be felt most 
by the millions of IDPs and vulnerable groups in Darfur and the 
Three Areas.  The coming weeks and months will reveal the full 
impact of the government's actions, which over time will be measured 
not by the number of NGOs the government successfully expels, but by 
the number of Sudanese civilians who will continue to suffer and 
die.  Post will work with the UN and other donors to attempt to 
mitigate the effect of the departures of the NGOs, perhaps by 
quietly delaying them while developing options for filling what 
appear now to be extremely large gaps. While the regime sees the 
expulsions as a "measured response" against the ICC and its 
perceived patrons in the West, it is also a power grab in Darfur 
seeking to isolate IDP populations, weaken their autonomy and make 
them utterly dependent on regime largesse. The regime expects that 
the West will continue to foot the bill for the massive humanitarian 
effort in Darfur but channel it through a malleable UN (at best) or 
through the goons of HAC and NISS (at worst). 
 
12. (SBU) CDA Fernandez is meeting with additional senior regime and 
 
KHARTOUM 00000311  004 OF 004 
 
 
NCP party officials on March 7 to continue to attempt to reverse or 
delay the expulsions (septel).  RAO delivered the same message to 
NISS DG Salah Ghosh on March 6. He has encouraged senior SPLM 
officials and Senior Assistant to the President Minnawi to send 
similar messages to the NCP. UN SRSG Ashraf Qazi is also meeting 
with many of the same senior regime officials on March 7 to present 
figures on the disastrous impact of the departures on the UN work 
program, not to mention the lives impacted in Darfur, the Three 
Areas, and the East.  We have been in almost hourly contact with the 
UN and with donors and will continue to coordinate our efforts. 
 
FERNANDEZ