VZCZCXRO3206
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0310 0661020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071020Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3173
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000310 
 
DEPT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, MARCH 4, 2009 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 227 
B) KHARTOUM 191 
C) KHARTOUM 142 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: As of March 3, 2009, the total number of UNAMID 
military personnel was 12,939, or 66.16 percent of the total 
authorized force strength.  UNAMID continues to prepare for the 
arrival of the Ethiopian attack helicopter unit, welcoming an 
Ethiopian officer assigned to facilitate the unit's transfer, which 
is tentatively scheduled for  June.  Several new Nepalese units are 
in transit for Darfur.  All currently-deployed UNAMID battalions, 
except one, are at full strength.  Sudanese officials continue to 
delay the issuance of visas for experienced European officers 
(following the rejection of visas for U.S. officers.) End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 23, UNAMID welcomed the arrival of an Ethiopian 
lieutenant colonel in charge of liaising with engineers in Nyala to 
prepare for the arrival of the attack helicopters.  The Ethiopian 
officer will work out of the office of Colonel Noddy Stafford, J5, a 
positive sign of the high priority UNAMID places on this project. 
UNAMID is still awaiting the temporary transfer to UNAMID of 90 
Chinese engineers from UNMIS in Wau, to assist with the construction 
of the landing zone for the helicopters.  Speaking with poloff on 
March 3, Stafford indicated that it may require high-level 
intervention between UNMIS and UNAMID for the 90 engineers to be 
transferred in a timely manner.  Now that the Ethiopians have 
approved Nyala as a site for the helicopters, UNAMID will work with 
the Government of Sudan (GOS) for approval to position the attack 
helicopters at Nyala's air field. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Tangible, positive improvements in deployment marked the 
end of February 2009, as practically two-thirds of total force 
strength, or 12,939 troops, were in place by the first week of 
March.  According to Stafford, all 12 battalions of peacekeeping 
troops are up to full strength, save the South African battalion, 
now only 250 troops short.  The last 183 troops from the 1st 
Egyptian battalion have just arrived, and the last 150 Senegalese 
troops have recently deployed to Umm Barro, in the far northwest 
corner of North Darfur. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Nepalese contributions to UNAMID continue apace in 2009. 
The incoming Nepalese Force Reserve Company and Nepalese Sector 
Reserve Company, each 150 troops strong, will arrive in May for 
deployment to El Fasher.  Equipment and vehicles for the incoming 
Nepalese companies are currently arriving in Port Sudan, and a 
door-to-door contract for shipment from the Red Sea port to Darfur 
will ensure that the equipment reaches the latter when the troops 
arrive in several months. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Most disappointingly, Stafford noted that Sudanese 
authorities are still holding up visas for several high-level, 
experienced military officers whose presence in Darfur is essential 
to the success of the mission.  One French officer was due to arrive 
in February but has since been redeployed due to lengthy visa 
delays; three British officers have been waiting up to three months; 
and the GOS has refused to issue visas to the U.S. military officers 
assigned to UNAMID.  Stafford said:  "I need people who are 
well-trained with the breadth of experience that British, French and 
American officers have.  Small numbers have a disproportionate 
effect when they serve at the top.  This is a fantastic place to 
serve but it is so hard to get here." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: UNAMID deployment issues have taken a back seat to 
the long awaited ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir and the 
subsequent crisis over the March 4 GOS expulsion of 10 international 
NGOs.  Nonetheless, over time we should continue to engage the 
regime on the issue of visas for Western military officers assigned 
to UNAMID - whenever the relationship allows for such engagement. 
The Sudanese know that such officers will have a dramatic impact on 
operations and therefore prefer not to have them deployed.  The 
regime also views the officers as Western spies in Darfur who will 
usurp the role of the force's African leadership, which is the 
principal rationale it has provided for expelling the NGOs.  This 
apparent GOS strategy  supports the views of those who argue that 
the GOS wants to hide its activities in Darfur, and also wants to 
limit the effectiveness of UN and NGO operations in Darfur. If not 
reversed or modified, the NGO expulsions will place additional 
stress on the capacity of both UN agencies and on UNAMID as they 
deal with the massive fallout created by this development. 
 
FERNANDEZ