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Viewing cable 09KABUL796, AFGHAN TRADE ENVOY IN RUSSIA OFFERS VIEWS ON CORRUPTION,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL796 2009-03-31 09:35 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4839
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0796/01 0900935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 310935Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8035
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3062
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000796 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD AF RU
 
SUBJECT:  AFGHAN TRADE ENVOY IN RUSSIA OFFERS VIEWS ON CORRUPTION, 
POLITICS IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REFTEL: Kabul 701 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) Kamal Nabizada, a prominent Afghan businessman from 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghan trade attach in Moscow, and self-described 
confidant of President Karzai and Russian Prime Minister Putin, 
shared with State PRT officer his thoughts on corruption in the fuel 
import business, the upcoming Afghan presidential election, Iranian 
support for the opposition United Front (UF), and Russia's views 
towards NATO in Afghanistan.  Nabizada is pessimistic about efforts 
to fight corruption while acknowledging that merchants themselves 
perpetuate the corruption cycle.  He said unequivocally that he will 
support Karzai's reelection bid, and so too will powerful Balkh 
Governor Mohammad Atta.  Iran is financially supporting the UF, but 
Russia has not given a response to the UF's request for assistance. 
Nabizada says Russia sees Karzai as the "least bad option" in the 
upcoming presidential elections and wants to see him remain in 
office through that period but will not lend financial support to 
Karzai's reelection bid.  He also claimed that he was influential in 
getting Russia to allow NATO to transport non-materiel supplies over 
Russian territory to Afghanistan. 
 
"Corruption harder to fight than the Taliban" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Nabizada, who imports fuel from Russia and Uzbekistan to 
Afghanistan, described the rampant corruption at the Heyratan border 
in northern Afghanistan as a problem "harder to fight than the 
Taliban."  He said that merchants have to pay two fees to the 
government when importing fuel: service charges to the Ministry of 
Commerce (MoC) for storing the fuel in government-owned fuel tanks, 
and customs tariffs to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) based on the 
amount of fuel imported.  Nabizada said he is vexed by the MoC's 
corrupt practice of skimming off a few tons of fuel from every 
shipment he brings in.  For example, if Nabizada charges 50 metric 
tons (MTs) of fuel in tanker railcars in Uzbekistan, Afghan MoC 
officials in Heyratan measuring the volume of fuel in those tankers 
will claim that the tankers only contain 48 MTs.  This also results 
in fewer customs revenues collected by the MoF, as the customs 
tariff is calculated based not on the 50 MTs, but on the 48 MTs. 
Fuel importers pass their losses on to fuel station owners, 
resulting in higher prices at the pumps.  (NOTE: As per reftel, the 
Ministers of Commerce and Finance have recently reached an agreement 
that will allow MoF customs officials access to the state-run fuel 
import depot at Heyratan - previously the domain of the MoC.  It is 
too early to tell how the implementation of this agreement is 
proceeding.) 
 
3. (U) Additionally, unscrupulous Afghan traders who import 
low-grade fuel routinely bribe Afghan MoC officials to mix that 
low-grade fuel with high-grade fuel in the same storage tanks. 
Those merchants can then sell their better quality fuel (after 
mixing) at a higher price on the market.  Nabizada said this 
practice hurts importers like him who import high-grade fuel.  Asked 
whether he thought the removal of Engineer Rozi, the corrupt MoC 
official who ran his own racket as director general of the state-run 
fuel import depot at the Heyratan border, would improve the 
situation, Nabizada remains doubtful that will bring change.  Even 
if Rozi's replacement were an honest man, merchants would soon make 
him corrupt by offering him sums of cash too large to refuse if he 
would allow them to continue importing low-grade fuel.  In 
Nabizada's view, the only way to stop this practice is to arrest and 
prosecute a few of those traders and the MoC collaborators taking 
the bribes. 
 
Friend of Karzai... 
----------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Nabizada volunteered that he and Balkh Governor Atta are 
backing President Karzai's reelection bid.  Nabizada, who says he is 
a close friend of Atta, remarked that the governor's Nowruz speech, 
in which he praised the central government's achievements, was 
intended to signal Atta's support for Karzai's reelection.  In a nod 
to corruption within Karzai's government, Nabizada added that Karzai 
has "had his fill" but that a "hungry" new president's 
administration would want to have their turn feeding at the public 
trough. 
 
5. (SBU) Nabizada offered a nuanced view of the widely reported 
remarks by Karzai a few months back when the president said he would 
turn to Russia for military hardware sales if the West would not 
provide them.  Nabizada said this remark jolted him so much that he 
called Karzai the following morning and asked him what he was 
 
KABUL 00000796  002 OF 002 
 
 
thinking.  Karzai reportedly admitted to Nabizada that he got off 
track in a moment of impassioned speech, prompting Nabizada to ask 
Karzai to promise that he would use notes and stick to them in 
future speeches. 
 
...and Friend of Russia 
--------------------- 
6. (SBU) Nabizada claims that Russian Prime Minister Putin once told 
him that he values Nabizada's impressions of events in Afghanistan 
more than he does those of Russia's ambassador in Kabul.  Nabizada 
said that last year, when friction arose between Russia and the West 
over Russia's conflict with Georgia, he argued strongly to the 
Russian foreign minister that it was in Russia's strategic interest 
to allow NATO to transport non-materiel supplies across Russian 
territory to Afghanistan. 
 
7. (SBU) Russia is not enamored of Karzai but considers him the 
"least bad option" for president, and supports his remaining in 
office through the August elections.  Asked to comment on 
allegations by other political parties that Russia is supporting the 
opposition United Front (UF), Nabizada denied this is the case, but 
acknowledged that the UF has sought financial support from Russia, 
which has neither approved nor rejected that request. 
 
Iranian Influence in Afghanistan's Politics, Media 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
8. (SBU) Iran, claims Nabizada, is providing financial assistance to 
the UF through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with a 
certain Mr. Suleimani as the Iranian conduit for that assistance. 
Iran, through its agent, Mr. Karimyan, is also bankrolling the 
operations of Noor TV and Tamadun TV in Kabul.  Nabizada added that 
he will financially support the presidential bid of former Iranian 
president and current candidate Khatami in the run-up to Iran's June 
presidential election. 
 
Comment 
------- 
9. (SBU) Nabizada holds sway over several of Afghanistan's movers 
and shakers, and by his own account, over several of Russia's too, 
including Putin, whom he claims to meet regularly when in Moscow. 
He seems resigned that corruption at the border will not diminish, 
and as long as his fuel import business remains profitable, we 
should not count on him to lead the charge for reform.  His claim 
that Governor Atta shares his support for Karzai's reelection is 
being born out subtly in Atta's public remarks.  Despite his overt 
closeness to Russia, Nabizada says he is a friend of the U.S. and 
offered to deliver any message to either Putin or Karzai that the 
U.S. wants him to deliver if it would help relations between the 
U.S., Afghanistan, and Russia. 
 
10. (U) Bio notes:  A dual Afghan and Russian national, Kamal 
Nabizada (or Nabi, as his friends call him) is a multi-millionaire 
who, in addition to his fuel import business, owns several other 
businesses, among them a construction company, biscuit factory, and 
a radio and television station (Arzu TV) in Mazar-e-sharif. 
Nabizada spends most of his time in Russia; he holds an Afghan 
diplomatic passport in his capacity as a volunteer trade attach at 
the Afghan embassy in Moscow.  His ties to Russia date back to the 
days when he served as Russia's conduit for funneling military 
assistance to former Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. 
He is close to the Jamiat Party, especially to Jamiat's Governor 
Atta and Ahmad Zia Massoud.  His wife and children are U.S. citizens 
and reside in Rockville, Maryland.  Nabizada is a Shia Tajik 
(Qezelbash tribe). 
 
WOOD