VZCZCXRO2353
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0636/01 0770626
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180626Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7809
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000636 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV AF
 
SUBJECT: KAPISA GOVERNOR CALLS FOR UNIFIED TAGAB SHURA, MISSES 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONNECT WITH PEOPLE 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The four shuras of conflict-ridden Tagab in Kapisa 
province met on March 10 to discuss forming a single unified shura 
that would address local security issues and bring peace and 
stabilization to the district.  Shura members agreed generally with 
the proposition, but discussion quickly devolved once specifics on 
participation were raised.  The participants criticized Governor Abu 
Bakar for failing to deliver promised projects and development in 
the Tagab District.  A second meeting to discuss security in Alasai, 
where a military operation to retake the district center abandoned 
to the Taliban in 2008 is about to commence, was canceled following 
an altercation between the Alasai representatives and Afghan Army, 
which led to the dismissal by Abu Bakar of the Alasai district 
administrator. 
 
UNIFIED SHURA TO FOCUS ON PEACE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Protected by a substantial U.S., French, and Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) security screen, more than 100 
Pashtun members of the four Tagab shuras in Kapisa Province attended 
a meeting at Tagab District Center, within sight of valleys 
controlled by Taliban and HIG insurgents.  Also present were 
representatives of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance 
(IDLG) and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), 
the ANSF, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the Norwegian, 
U.S. and French Embassies, the French Border Control Team, Task 
Force Warrior, and PRT Kapisa.  Governor Abu Baker (a Tajik and 
former mujahedin commander from the northern half of the province) 
emphasized that greater security in Tagab district would lead to 
more development opportunities.  Abu Baker emphasized the value of 
unifying under one shura over the next month so they could speak 
with one voice rather than four.  He argued this unified shura could 
be a means to talk to the Taliban and other anti-government elements 
and convince them to lay down their weapons and work with the Afghan 
government for a better future.  Contrary to guidance from Kabul to 
the IDLG representative, Abu Bakar pledged that members would be 
paid for participation in the shura through the Afghanistan Social 
Outreach Program (ASOP) developed by the IDLG and funded by USAID. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While the shura leadership generally agreed with the 
concept of forming one shura, they did not reach agreement on how 
the members should be selected.  The meeting instead devolved into a 
traditional shura focusing on the lack of services in Tagab.  Each 
of the leaders complained that the Governor had a history of 
promising projects and development in Tagab, but rarely delivering. 
Abu Bakar defended himself, repeatedly telling the crowd that, in 
fact, the US PRT had spent millions of dollar in Tagab, and the lack 
of development was internally created by their failure to contribute 
to security in their district.  "I'm trying to give you a horse," he 
said, "but you don't want to ride it."  Afghanistan National Army 
(ANA) General Zamari expanded on this statement, noting that when he 
no longer had to waste money fighting the insurgency in Tagab, there 
would be more money available for development.  "When you send your 
sons to join the Army rather than the Taliban, then we can move 
forward," he stated. 
 
Reactions 
---------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) After the meeting, the IDLG representative, Engineer 
Farhad, said that he was slightly disappointed that Governor Abu 
Baker had pushed the shuras to unite ahead of the implementation of 
the ASOP program.  He noted that the selection process needed wider 
consultation, as at least eight villages were not represented in any 
of the four shuras.  UNAMA political officer Guillaume Limal 
conceded that his claim may be true but he was optimistic that they 
could work together over the next month to ensure that the process 
was fully representative.  Limal was disappointed that some of the 
enthusiasm from an October Peace Jirga had seemingly dissipated but 
said he was reasonably pleased with the Governor's speech and the 
momentum he believed it would generate. 
 
Alasai Meeting Scrubbed 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a pre-meeting with the governor, ANA General Zamari and 
other provincial officials, Alasai District Administrator Muslim 
complained that he was unable to provide security as he had only 18 
Afghanistan National Police (ANP) officers to cover his entire 
Taliban-dominated district.  He begged the Governor and General 
Zamari to restore the ANSF presence, and pressed the General for 
numbers and a timeline.  Governor Abu Bakar said he would address 
Alasai security issues in an afternoon meeting with the district 
administrator and tribal elders from Alasai.  However, the meeting 
was canceled when the Alasai elders, backed up by the district 
administrator, refused to allow ANA guards to search them when they 
 
KABUL 00000636  002 OF 002 
 
 
arrived at the gate to the District Center.  When the ANA Kandak 
(Battalion) Commander interrupted the governor's lunch to tell him 
of the incident unfolding outside, the governor responded, "Send 
them away!"  The district administrator and all of the elders were 
then removed from the premises, and the governor promptly departed 
for Mahmood Raqi, the provincial capital.  The following day, the 
governor had the Alasai District Administrator removed without the 
approval of the IDLG. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) This meeting achieved the minimal objectives of getting the 
four shuras together with the governor in Southern Kapisa.  Governor 
Abu Bakar's commitment to the Pashtuns in Southern Kapisa is still 
shallow despite the lip service he has begun paying them.  His 
failure to make an effort to defuse the situation and reach out to 
the Alasai delegation was an important missed opportunity, precisely 
at the moment when their acquiescence if not cooperation with the 
upcoming military operation is needed. 
 
¶8. (SBU) It was also apparent that UNAMA had intended the meeting to 
follow a more technical reconciliation agenda according to its Tagab 
Stabilization Initiative, but its putative partner IDLG passively 
deferred to the protocols of the traditional shura.  This came 
despite explicit instructions from the IDLG's deputy director to its 
representative to make certain that no move was made at the meeting 
to begin integrating the four shuras or to suggest ASOP payments 
will be forthcoming (the IDLG is adamant about vetting any potential 
ASOP shuras members before selection and does not want to give them 
stipend commitments before USAID has formally signed up to ASOP in 
the province).  The governor himself has a tense relationship with 
IDLG -- he recently called IDLG's Barna Karimi a "Euro."  (Note: 
Karimi is an Afghan-American with strong ties to Southern 
California.)  The IDLG, in turn, is seriously considering replacing 
the governor, and his refusal to follow the IDLG's instructions for 
the meeting will likely push the IDLG further in that direction. 
U.S. actors, and most directly the PRT, will need to tread carefully 
with any efforts to bridge the persistent gap between the people, 
the provincial government, and GIRoA in Southern Kapisa. 
 
WOOD