VZCZCXRO8357
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #0568/01 0720605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130605Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7715
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000568 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM SNAR EAID AF
 
SUBJECT: Deteriorating Security in Farah Province 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.   Farah's security environment has deteriorated steadily over the 
past 20 months, accompanied by the disappearance of Afghan 
government presence in outlying districts.  Despite the efforts of 
Governor Roohul Amin, current material and human resources available 
to the province are inadequate to redress the situation.  Problems 
are compounded by corruption in the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 
line ministries.  Governance and development programs to be 
introduced through the anticipated Afghanistan Social Outreach 
Program (ASOP) in the province would be a step in the right 
direction, but much more is needed to prevent the declining 
situation in this part of the so-called "stable West" from 
deteriorating further. 
 
Poppy, Crime and Insurgency - a Bad Mix 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  With the exception of the four western districts along the 
border with Iran, all of Farah's districts face serious security 
challenges.  Insurgent-manned roadblocks are widespread, presenting 
a serious impediment to free movement.  The most problematic 
districts are those in the eastern part of the province bordering 
the Ring Road, particularly those near Delaram in far northern 
Nimruz province.  In Delaram district itself, there is a Taliban 
shadow government with its own district chief and staff.  Gulistan, 
just north of Delaram, is known for its abundant opium cultivation 
and strong Taliban presence.  Further west and also bordering 
Delaram, Bakwa district, also a significant poppy-growing area, had 
no Afghan government officials in residence until six months ago, 
leaving the area under Taliban control.  Even now, Bakwa resembles a 
war zone, with shops in the bazaar closed and the district 
government headquarters and medical clinic both destroyed by the 
Taliban.  Although these structures are being rebuilt, the district 
still has no functioning schools except in a few remote areas. 
(During recent voter registration, Bakwa had a dismally low turnout, 
compared to other districts in Farah.) 
 
¶3.  Bala Buluk, through which runs the highway connecting provincial 
capital Farah city to the Ring Road, is another Taliban stronghold. 
Shewan, located along the connector road, remains under Taliban 
control and is the site of regular traffic disruptions.  Not 
incidentally, this is one of the areas of the most intensive poppy 
cultivation in Farah; Bakwa district cultivate the most poppy in the 
province.  To the west and north of Bala Buluk, Khaks-e Safid 
district has a 120 year old, well-developed irrigation system which 
has been defunct for the past 20 years.  Fed by nearby Farah Rud 
River, the district could be a prime target for government-funded 
infrastructure development projects to restore and rebuild the 
irrigation system, returning prosperity to the area.  However, the 
active Taliban presence in the area has halted approval by GIRoA and 
Coalition Forces for all development projects.  Even without 
security concerns, another impediment hinders progress in the 
district -- the dominance of a number of family clans.  Until they 
are willing to support projects that benefit the entire population, 
the immediate future in Khaks-e Safid will remain uncertain.   On 
the positive side, the recent worldwide rise in grain prices has 
encouraged most former poppy farmers in the district to switch to 
cultivating wheat. 
 
¶4.  In the face of Farah's poor security climate, many NGOs have 
ceased operations in the province and withdrawn to the relative 
safety of Herat province.  UNAMA too closed its provincial office in 
Farah city.  On that front, at least, an improvement seems to be in 
the offing.  Last month a UNAMA official visited Farah city and 
began working on arrangements to re-establish operations in the 
city.  When fully up and running, the office is expected to have a 
staff of two expatriates and nine Afghans.  Reopening the office 
might allow UNAMA finally to address Independent Directorate for 
Local Governance's (IDLG) demand that UNAMA join it in declaring 
Bala Buluk a critical or tipping district and focus its efforts 
there.  To date, UNAMA has steadfastly declined, citing its lack of 
personnel in the areas. 
 
First- and Second-Tier Taliban 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  Taliban insurgents are mingled with, and indistinguishable from, 
other residents. It is not unusual for Pashtun families to have at 
least one family member serving (at least part-time) with the 
Taliban. Insurgents have a highly-efficient intelligence gathering 
network.  Their usual methods of communicating with their chain of 
command are fairly basic and not dependent on technology.  The 
delivery of night letters is still a common way to threaten families 
 
KABUL 00000568  002 OF 003 
 
 
who send their daughters to school. The Taliban also engender a 
loyalty built not only upon family, clan and tribal ties but also on 
fear.  A person who betrays the Taliban will be tortured and killed, 
along with his family and friends. 
 
¶6.  Few first-tier Taliban operate within Farah province.  Only 
Shewan village in Bala Baluk contains a powerful, well-organized and 
well-armed Taliban force in the province.  All the same, these and 
other Taliban have grown in experience and audacity over the past 
five years.  As happens elsewhere in the south, they bring in 
reinforcements from outside the province to mount major operations. 
Last November, for example, over 100 combatants lay siege to the 
home of the father of the provincial director of the National 
Directorate of Security, located just six kilometers west of Farah 
City.  The most recent development in Taliban presence has been the 
re-appearance of Taliban units in the Lashe-je-wain area in western 
Farah province.  This has been in most part due to the 3/8 Marines 
in the eastern districts pushing the Taliban westward. 
 
¶7.  Many other fighters commonly referred to as Taliban in Farah are 
common criminals, kidnappers and thieves who take advantage of the 
absence of law and order to conduct their operations.  The governor 
himself reports that these criminal groups have links to more 
extremist Taliban groups through which they receive intelligence and 
guidance on conducting their own operations.  They also have access 
to high-tech weaponry from Iran and other neighboring countries, 
including fused projectile RPG-29 shoulder-fired anti-tank rockets 
and sophisticated pressure-plate detonation devices with 
programmable computer chips.  These weapons can be programmed to 
detonate under vehicles of specific weight, making it possible to 
target specific vehicles in a convoy, typically the lightest 
vehicles with the least amount of armor plating. 
 
Governance Void 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  There is a noticeable absence of government presence in the 
rural districts.  Previously the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation 
and Livestock (MAIL) had a large staff in the outlying districts, as 
did the Ministries of Public Health (MoPH) and Interior (MOI).  As 
these government employees gradually disappear through dismissal or 
succumbing to threats, many have remained listed on district 
payrolls and their salaries continue to be paid.  Locals believe 
these phantom salaries end up in the pockets of provincial-level 
directors within the ministries. 
 
¶9.   Shura members repeatedly suggest that in the case of the 
provincial MoPH, medical staff in remote areas often quit without 
warning after a few months on the job; however, their salaries 
continue to be paid, sometimes for years.  Shura members suggest 
these salaries are also diverted for personal use by ministry 
personnel.  The governor reports that MAIL runs a similar scam but 
on a larger scale.  Not only does it maintain phantom employees, but 
the department continues funding entire programs even when those 
programs have ceased. 
 
¶10.  Governor Amin is attempting to address these problems with the 
tools available to him, but he has an uphill battle.  He is, for 
example, trying to remove the corrupt MAIL director but the ministry 
in Kabul is resisting his efforts.  The governor has ordered a 
member of his staff to make unannounced visits to all districts to 
survey which employees are working on a daily basis and determine if 
basic services are being provided.  The governor has also played an 
important role in bringing a series of three-day seminars (presented 
by USAID implementers) to help district officials upgrade their 
administrative skills.  The first of these series was completed on 
January 26 and involved 30 officials from ten districts. 
 
ANP Woes 
-------- 
 
¶11.  The Tashkil authorizes 1,333 officers for the ANP in Farah 
province, although only 1,100 are available for duty.  Again, locals 
maintain that the extra salaries are paid to the provincial police 
chief and his key staff.  The current ANP chief is trying to rectify 
the problem but finds himself facing a daunting task.  There are far 
too few police assigned to properly defend the districts.  Most 
districts have a small force of approximately 25 men, leaving them 
defenseless against a large enemy force.  The one exception is Bakwa 
district, where 75-85 ANP have been assigned. 
 
¶12.  While Kabul struggles with maintaining and building a national 
police force, local officials in Farah face a different problem - 
the cost of not having enough local control.  Police chiefs in the 
districts do not work for, or coordinate with, district 
 
KABUL 00000568  003 OF 003 
 
 
administrators but instead report to the provincial police chief. 
The result, as the district administrators see it, is that while 
they are looked upon as the chief governance officer in their area, 
they have no voice in addressing what for many locals is the most 
pressing issue of governance - the lack of security.  Time and again 
they recount that ANP officials are involved in personal schemes, 
like setting up illegal road blocks, rather than working with the 
local governance chief to defend the people and government buildings 
against an ever-expanding criminal and insurgent presence.  Further 
degrading local confidence in the government are stories of kidnap 
gangs which operate with impunity in the rural districts.  Moreover, 
fully 60 percent of all serving ANP personnel in Farah have been 
identified as having an opium addiction. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  It is inaccurate to characterize Farah as part of Afghanistan's 
stable West.  As a result of the above-mentioned scams and failure 
to provide governance, security or services, the Karzai government 
appears to have squandered much of the trust of Farah's population, 
especially in rural areas where most people live.  This gives the 
Taliban and other insurgent and criminal elements a chance to fill 
the vacuum.  Turning things around will require more than just a 
good governor, particularly if that governor has so few material and 
human resources with which to work.  Straightening out the problems 
with the line ministry representatives will require action in Kabul. 
 Another important step would be support from the Italians, who lead 
Regional Command West, for the IDLG's Afghanistan Social Outreach 
Program (ASOP), which we understand is near agreement.  If, as 
hoped, the pilot Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP) proves a 
success in Wardak, people in Farah may welcome it for their 
province.  Finally, the upcoming arrival of additional U.S. forces 
in the province's problematic southeast should change the security 
dynamics at least temporarily and buy more time to address 
underlying governance problems.  It will be important to take 
advantage of this opportunity. 
 
¶14.  This cable has been reviewed by the PRT Farah Commander. 
 
DELL