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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: WHAT'S NEXT? 
  
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  Absent a terrorist attack or what we  believe is unlikely Army intervention, the lawyers' ""long  march"" will end with both sides claiming victory.  They then  will have to settle into a protracted series of negotiations  to address the Sharifs' eligibility, governors' rule in  Punjab, and the fate of the judiciary deposed by former  President Musharraf.  Zardari clearly over-reached in  imposing governor's rule and he will emerge from the march  weaker politically.  Nawaz will retain the ""high moral  ground"" as defender of the judiciary, but he still does not  have the votes to bring down the government.  If there is a  winner from the latest political drama in Pakistan, it is  Prime Minister Gilani, who has adroitly positioned himself to  rescue President Zardari from his current self-inflicted  crisis. In the coming days, we will be carefully watching the  Zardari-Gilani dynamic.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Absent a terrorist attack or what we believe is  unlikely Army intervention, the lawyers' ""long march"" will  end with both sides claiming victory.  President Zardari will  say that Nawaz Sharif was unable to muster significant street  support; Nawaz will claim his ability to deliver any crowd  was a success given drastic and ""illegal"" government measures  to stop the protests.  Hopefully, the government quickly will  release those political party and civil society activists  detained during the march.  Both sides then must face the  need to craft a way forward on three issues:  the ability of  the Sharifs to hold public office; governor's rule in Punjab;  and the fate of the deposed judiciary. 
  Sharifs' Eligibility 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Zardari has agreed to seek a review of the Supreme  Court's decision to disqualify Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif from  public office.  The media reports that the Court will issue,  as soon as March 15, a full written decision on which the  government can base an appeal.  Zardari told Ambassador March  14 that the same three-member bench, plus an additional  ""senior"" judge, will review the case.  The fact that Zardari  is so intimately involved in how the case will be heard  confirms yet again that the Court is following his guidance. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The Court could again rule that both Sharifs are  ineligible, could clear them both for public office, or could  issue a split judgment.  The law is quite clear on Nawaz's  ineligibility: under the constitution, a person convicted of  a crime of moral turpitude is ineligible to run for office. 
There have been several suggestions on how to address Nawaz's  predicament.  He could appeal his original conviction,  executed under the Musharraf government and widely considered  to have been politically motivated, but Nawaz refuses to  recognize the current courts as legitimate.  PM Gilani  believes that the best way forward is to address the  judiciary issue separately and then allow Nawaz to appeal his  own conviction.  The parliament could amend the constitution  (this requires a two-thirds majority) to remove the  disqualification clause.  Also, the courts or the parliament  conceivably could restore to pre-Musharraf time the five year  limit on the disqualification clause. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Zardari and many Pakistan People's Party (PPP)  members claim they were surprised the Court ruled against  Shahbaz, indicating this was not in the game plan but was  prompted by the Sharifs' ad hominem attacks on Chief Justice  Dogar's daughter and other justices.  The charges against  Shahbaz are much shakier than those against his  brother--violation of an Election Commission regulation on  notifying it prior to taking office of which district a  multiple district winner will represent.  The written Court  judgment should clarify if a secondary issue, that of whether  Shahbaz absconded without paying a debt, is also in play. 
  Governor's Rule 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  There are several opinions on the subject, but  post's legal sources (and President Zardari's spokesman) 
confirm that simply filing a request for Supreme Court review  will return a case to the status quo, pending a new court  decision.  Thus, filing the review petition should at least 
  ISLAMABAD 00000552  002 OF 003 
 
  temporarily restore Shahbaz as Chief Minister of Punjab and  end governor's rule. 
 
¶7.  (C)  However, in the wake of governor's rule, it is  unclear if the PPP-Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)  coalition in the Punjab can be restored with any degree of  stability.  Zardari has come under criticism from PPP members  (including PM Gilani) and his coalition partners for imposing  governor's rule without properly counting votes on whether he  could install a PPP-led government.  Gilani has said that the  PPP should back off and let an election proceed, even if that  leaves the PPP in opposition.  Both Zardari and Nawaz  continue to woo the Chaudhry's Pakistan Muslim League (PML),  which holds the votes to allow either side form a government. 
 For its part, the PML leadership distrusts both Zardari and  Nawaz but has made more offers to join PPP than PML-N.  PML's  suggestion of a three party ""unity"" government have so far  been rejected; eventually, PML will have to choose who to  support. 
  Judiciary Issue 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  During the February 2008 election campaign, Nawaz  made common cause with the populist lawyers' movement seeking  to restore the judges deposed by then President Musharraf  under his Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) in November  2007.  The central player in the judges' drama is former  Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, who initially was fired  because he blocked a lucrative steel privatization deal being  pushed by former PM Shaukat Aziz. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Particularly after being reinstated, Chaudhry became  increasingly active on the bench, inserting the Court into  issues ranging from the price of vegetables to the fate of  the ""disappeared,"" individuals (primarily Baloch and Sindhi  nationalists) detained illegally over terrorism concerns. 
The public perception (which continues to be fed by Zardari) 
is that Chaudhry was removed because the U.S. did not want  ""disappeared"" terrorists released by the Court.  This is  completely untrue but has become a popular myth.  For his  part, Zardari is convinced that Chaudhry is on Nawaz's  payroll and would declare unconstitutional the 2007 National  Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) that granted Zardari (and many  others but specifically not Nawaz) immunity from prosecution  for corruption charges. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Before this latest controversy, the lawyers'  movement was fizzling badly as a public facing 30% food and  fuel inflation had more immediate worries than who was  sitting in the Supreme Court.  Former Law Minister Naek  successfully had defused the judges issue further by bringing  a significant number of the PCO judges back to the Provincial  High and Supreme Court benches.  By officially joining the  lawyers' ""long march,"" however, Nawaz has further politicized  the lawyers' movement and given it new life.  PM Gilani told  Ambassador that Zardari will have no choice but to find some  way forward on the judges. 
  ¶11.  (C)  Zardari has told us repeatedly that he will not/not  restore Chaudhry as Chief Justice. Although Nawaz publicly  has said Chaudhry's restoration is also a red line for the  PML-N, recently, there have been indications PML-N is open to  another face-saving alternative to restoration.  No leader in  Pakistan really wants an activist and unpredictable Chief  Justice.  There are multiple possible formations for ""fixing""  this issue.  These include pending packages of constitutional  reform and the implementation of the PPP/PML-N Charter of  Democracy (septel) that outlines a system for vetting new  judges into the system.  Nawaz said publicly March 15 that he  would join an all-parties conference led by PM Gilani to  address the issue; Gilani told Ambassador that he would form  this group as soon as emotions had cooled after the long  march.  If Zardari continues to press to extend current Chief  Justice Dogar beyond his retirement (March 21), he will  re-ignite this issue and derail efforts at compromise. 
  Winners and Losers 
------------------ 
  ¶12.  (C)  From political commentators to Army leaders and the  man on the street, the overwhelming view is that Zardari  seriously overreached in imposing governor's rule in Punjab. 
  ISLAMABAD 00000552  003 OF 003 
 
  The decision has expanded rifts within the PPP and between  Zardari and his coalition partners. It reinforced Zardari's  already dubious reputation among the Corps Commanders and  with Chief of Army Staff General Kayani.  The GOP's  heavy-handed tactics in trying to restrict demonstrations has  hurt its democratic credentials at home and abroad.  It is  not clear, however, that Zardari recognizes the degree to  which his position has been weakened. 
  ¶13.  (C)  After Zardari left him no other option, Nawaz had  little to lose from moving forward to join the lawyers'  march.  Even a weak turnout in Islamabad March 16 will allow  him to claim victory given the government's efforts to deter  demonstrations.  Nawaz emerges stronger in the public eye and  retains the ""high moral ground"" by defending the judiciary,  but he still does not have the votes to bring down the  government. 
  ¶14.  (C)  The big winner is Prime Minister Gilani, who has  adroitly positioned himself (as both a PPP stalwart and  friend to PML-N and PML) to broker a resolution to Zardari's  self-inflicted political crisis.  In recent meetings with  Ambassador, Gilani has shown himself to be increasingly  empowered, likely because of the back-door support of the  Army, Nawaz, and Zardari opponents within the PPP.  But  Gilani has not demonstrated the intellectual acumen and has  not built the staff to lead Pakistan effectively.  Although  Zardari denies any concern, he cannot be pleased with  Gilani's new-found independence.  As this drama plays out in  the coming days/weeks, we will be carefully watching the  Zardari-Gilani dynamic. 
PATTERSON