VZCZCXRO9005
RR RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #0543/01 0721550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131550Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1869
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9984
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4605
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9879
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 5847
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 6920
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1257
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3894
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9120

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 000543 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER PREF KPAO PK
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON IDP ASSISTANCE IN BAJAUR AGENCY 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 43 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Despite recent military operations in Bajaur that 
may have "secured" roads in parts of the agency (reftel), the 
majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not yet begun 
to return because they see military operations continuing.  USAID is 
currently providing USD 1.8 million in assistance in Bajaur and is 
helping the GOP develop a strategy for return.  USAID is ready to 
provide scaled-up assistance as IDPs begin to return, but Peshawar 
and other field sources say that IDPs will not return without a 
period of at least several weeks of calm, as well as assurances from 
the GOP that the area is safe. End Summary. 
 
CONDITIONS IN BAJAUR 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The fighting in Bajaur severely damaged the infrastructure 
in much of the Agency.  Some initial estimates indicate that at 
least 2000 houses were destroyed, but some sources on the ground 
believe the number is far higher.  No formal assessment has yet been 
done.  Livelihoods were devastated.  Crops were destroyed, and IDPs 
have been unable to cultivate in much of the agency.  Many were 
forced to sell off their livestock at prices far below market value 
when they fled, and small businesses have been disrupted.  If IDPs 
are unable to return in time for the coming wheat harvesting and 
maize planting seasons, their livelihoods will further deteriorate. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sources report that the majority of damage is in Upper 
Khar, particularly in Loyesam (where the fighting began), Inayat 
Kalay (the business center and gateway to Mahmund tehsil) and 
Tahngkhata (considered a center of Taliban activity).  Mahmund and 
Nawagai tehsils are also severely affected.  In Mahmund and Nawagai, 
an estimated 70-80 percent of the population fled and is still 
displaced; the other 20-30 percent is mainly individual men who 
stayed as the representatives of their families to keep an eye on 
property and livelihoods.  Sources estimate that in 50 percent of 
Khar tehsil and in all of Mahmund and Nawagai, people are unable to 
cultivate their lands due to an ongoing curfew and ban on 
transportation of goods, still reportedly in effect as of March 6. 
 
 
IDPs NOT YET RETURNING TO BAJAUR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) According to UN figures, as of 6 March, a total of 139,745 
registered IDPs were still displaced outside of camps and a further 
62,497 inside camps. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the wake of the GOP announcements of the ceasefire in 
Bajaur, small numbers of IDPs have been returning to particular 
areas deemed "cleared" by the Political Administration, but most 
IDPs seem to be taking a wait-and-see approach.  Small numbers are 
conducting temporary scouting visits to check on the status of their 
houses or crops. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Local aid workers believe that security is the main reason 
that IDPs have not begun returning en masse.  At a grand jirga on 
March 2 in Khar, tribal elders asked the GOP to address security as 
well as providing for reconstruction needs.  Local sources theorize 
that IDPs are waiting for a "clear message" by the political 
administration that it is safe to return, and that IDPs are 
meanwhile waiting to see how the current jirga unfolds.  (Note: Post 
is currently exploring ideas for an information campaign in the 
camps as well as other confidence-building initiatives to bring 
government officials to the displaced communities, and/or community 
representatives to Bajaur to review conditions in the agency.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Bajauris have already begun seeking compensation 
from the GOP for losses to their real and personal property. 
According to one observer, at least a thousand requests for 
compensation have been submitted to the political administration. 
 
CURRENT USG ASSISTANCE IN BAJAUR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) currently 
has a total of 23 relief and reconstruction activities underway in 
Bajaur Agency, for a total value of USD 1,832,539 (details follow). 
These activities are carried out under the auspices of the 
 
ISLAMABAD 00000543  002 OF 002 
 
 
Government of Pakistan.  (Note: This does not include the USG relief 
provided to IDPs outside of Bajaur.) 
 
-- Assistance to IDPs: OTI delivered 1,500 non-food item relief kits 
consisting of plastic mats, jerry cans, gas stoves, cloth, blankets, 
and cooking utensils (valued at USD 250,000) to the Political 
Administration for distribution. Of those, the GOP has only 
distributed 824. 
 
-- Short-term employment: Through OTI, the political administration 
has so far employed 6,425 workers for debris cleanup and similar 
activities at 168 different sites throughout Bajaur, creating 29,172 
employment days, and disbursing USD 122,000. 
 
-- Seed Distribution in Khar, Arang, and Barang: OTI provided 478 
farming families wheat seed and technical training, and is currently 
providing 170,000 fruit and plant seedlings to 10,000 families. 
 
-- Repair of Damaged Infrastructure: In Khar, OTI is rehabilitating 
four schools and four roads in Khar, and is rehabilitating 8 surface 
water tanks and providing 15 transformers to repair the electrical 
grid. Similar activities are underway in the relatively secure Utman 
Khel tehsil (Arang and Barang). 
 
PLANNED ASSISTANCE 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) To assist returning IDPs, USAID's Livelihoods program has a 
total of 3,000 tent kits (worth USD 439,170) and 1,800 
reconstruction kits (worth USD 108,936) warehoused at Peshawar while 
2,000 tent kits (worth USD 292,780) and 620 restoration kits (worth 
USD 375,224) are stored at a warehouse inside the Political Agent's 
compound at Khar.  These items are ready to be distributed as soon 
as the political administration approves it.  In addition, the 
political administration retains 676 non-food item kits from OTI. 
 
¶10. (SBU) USAID has set aside approximately USD 9 million for 
short-term reconstruction needs.  USAID Livelihoods is planning to 
devote USD 7.73 million to projects in the following sectors: road 
construction (22 km main Barang Road from Barang Valley, Bajaur to 
Kot, Malakand (worth USD 3,000,000), 3 km access road linking Gossam 
Bridge (Lower Dir) to Kharkay (worth USD 300,000), 4 km access road 
linking Gossam Bridge (Lower Dir) to Kulalai (worth USD 400,000), 
two Bridges between Kulalai (Bajaur Agency) connecting Gossam/ Munda 
(Lower Dir) (worth USD 3,000,000), an Additional Block at the 
Political Agent's compound at Khar (worth USD 77,300), and 
short-term employment generation through various interventions under 
Cash for Work and Debris Clearance (worth USD 650,000).  In 
addition, OTI plans to increase and expand its projects to include 
confidence-building activities.  USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance is closely monitoring the situation and will provide 
additional humanitarian assistance depending on the needs. 
 
¶11. (SBU) These activities are being planned in conjunction with the 
Civil-Military Coordination Committee (CMCC). The CMCC, organized by 
the Consulate to improve Pakistani interagency and donor 
coordination, brings together officials from the FATA Secretariat, 
11th Corps, and Frontier Corps to review development priorities in 
FATA with USAID, State, and U.S. military representatives.  The USG 
is working with the Government of Pakistan to develop a strategy for 
IDP returns using the CMCC structure. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Communications will need to be a vital part of the IDP 
returns process and the reconstruction efforts.  Helping IDPs 
understand what assistance will be available may help influence 
their return, but current information indicates they will not return 
in large numbers until they have greater assurances of security. 
 
 
PATTERSON