VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0142/01 0621434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031434Z MAR 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4188
INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0566
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0016
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU 0036
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUCOWCV/COGARD STA MIAMI FL

UNCLAS HAVANA 000142 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SMIG PREL CVIS CMGT SOCI CU MX
SUBJECT: ILLEGAL MIGRATION FROM CUBA IN SHARP DECLINE 
 
REFS: (A) HAVANA 0047 (B) 08 HAVANA 751 (C) 08 HAVANA 0951 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Illegal migration from Cuba to the United States 
appears to have peaked in FY 2008 and has declined significantly. 
Illegal migration fell 20 percent in FY 08 and is down by almost 50 
percent thus far in FY 2009.  The decline has affected migrant flows 
both through Mexico - the main point of entry for undocumented Cuban 
migrants - and across the Florida Straits.  With much of the Cuban 
public still eager to leave the island, the fall in illegal 
migration appears to reflect expanded legal migration opportunities, 
especially through the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords, and the 
cumulative impact of law enforcement action against migrant 
smuggling organizations in south Florida.  The downward trend in 
illegal migration from Cuba may well continue, absent a catastrophic 
collapse of the Cuban economy or similar precipitating event, as the 
United States' Cuban Family Reunification Parole program and Spain's 
new nationality law create new opportunities for legal migration. 
Between 2009 and 2011, a quarter of a million Cubans out of a total 
population of eleven million will either legally emigrate or acquire 
a second nationality.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) According to Department of Homeland Security statistics, 
illegal migration from Cuba to the United States, after growing 
steadily after 2003, peaked in FY 2008 and has declined 
significantly thus far in FY 2009.  Through May last year, illegal 
migration in FY 08 was on pace to substantially exceed the record 
levels of FY 07. More than 20,000 undocumented Cubans either entered 
the United States in FY 07 or were interdicted at sea by the U.S. 
Coast Guard and were returned to Cuba under the U.S.-Cuba Migration 
Accords, the highest number since 1994.  However, illegal migration 
began falling dramatically late in the third quarter of FY 08, both 
through the U.S. border with Mexico - the principal point of entry 
for undocumented Cuban migrants since FY 2005 - and across the 
Florida Straits.  By the end of FY 08 the number of undocumented 
Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States had fallen by 
20 percent compared to FY 07 (from 20,621 to 16,336), the first 
year-over-year decline since FY 2003. 
 
¶3. (U) The decline in illegal migration first detected in FY 08 has 
continued - and even accelerated - in FY 09.  According to U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol statistics, during the first trimester of 
the fiscal year (October through January) 2,504 undocumented Cubans 
arrived at U.S. Ports-of-Entry (90 percent of them at POEs on the 
border with Mexico), compared to 4,026 during the same period of FY 
08, a decline of 37 percent.  Even more dramatically, according to 
U.S. Coast Guard figures, 374 Cuban migrants were interdicted at sea 
during the first trimester of FY 09, compared to 707 during the same 
period of FY 08, a decline of 47 percent.  During this same period, 
total migrant flow across the Florida Straits (interdictions plus 
estimated successful arrivals) fell by almost half, from 1,644 to 
¶875. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Accounting for the decline in Cuban migration is no easy 
task.  While the U.S. economic downturn has hit south Florida - the 
main destination for Cuban migrants - very hard, Cuban migration 
historically has not been strongly influenced by economic 
fluctuations in the United States (see paragraph six).  Nor has 
Cuban migration mirrored broader migration trends; the surge in 
illegal Cuban migration post-FY 2003, for example, coincided with a 
25 percent decline in illegal migration  to the United States from 
FY 2004-FY 2007 (as measured by Border Patrol apprehensions of 
undocumented aliens).  Meanwhile, as suggested by the Cuban public's 
enthusiastic response to Spain's new nationality law (Ref A), 
emigration remains a virtual obsession with many Cubans, especially, 
but by no means exclusively, with the young, now thoroughly 
disillusioned with the pace of 'reform' under Raul Castro.  On 
balance, with Cuban migration following its own dynamic and with 
interest in leaving the island - by almost any possible means - 
still endemic, declining illegal Cuban migration may reflect the 
expansion of legal migration opportunities, and the impact of law 
enforcement action against the Florida-based smuggling organizations 
that have dominated migration since 2005. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In FY 08, U.S. fulfillment of its commitment under the 
Migration Accords to authorize 20,000 Cubans in Cuba for migration, 
sent an important signal to the Cuban public that the Accords 
remained in effect and were a viable mechanism for legal migration 
(Ref B).  Cuban government interference with USINT operations had 
resulted in a significant shortfall during FY 07. Also during FY 08, 
USINT began implementation of the Cuban Family Reunification Parole 
(CFRP) program, designed to increase the percentage of migrants 
admitted to the United States each year who have family members in 
the United States.  Informal USINT surveys of migrants returned to 
Cuba in late 2007 found that about one-third of them had a relative 
in the United States eligible to file an immigrant visa petition for 
them.  However, faced with the ten to 12 year wait times associated 
with certain immigrant visa categories, many such relatives 
apparently preferred to hire smugglers to extricate family members 
from Cuba, despite the cost ($10,000 a head), the risks involved in 
the sea voyage, and the frequent ruthlessness of the smugglers. 
With CFRP, which created an immediate parole benefit for all 
beneficiaries of immigrant visa petitions, the significant minority 
of potential illegal migrants with qualifying relatives in the 
United States had an incentive to pursue legal migration. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Federal Registrar notice announcing the CFRP program 
was published in November 2007, and the response of the 
Cuban-American community to the opportunity to help family members 
in Cuba emigrate legally has since been overwhelming.  According to 
DHS statistics, the number of immigrant visa petitions filed on 
behalf of Cuban beneficiaries nearly tripled from 5,798 to 16,288 
(we estimate that each petition will result in the emigration of 
about 2.5 people) between FY 07 and FY 08.  The dramatic increase in 
immigrant visa petition filings in FY 08 is particularly noteworthy 
given the economic downturn in southern Florida, which might have 
been expected to discourage U.S.-based relatives from assuming the 
financial obligations inherent in sponsoring relatives for 
immigration. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) For its part, USINT made rapid implementation of CFRP a 
Mission priority to encourage public confidence in the program in 
the Cuban-American community and among potential migrants.  For 
example, specific commitments to process minimum numbers of CFRP 
cases were incorporated into USINT's Mission Strategic Plan (MSP). 
The first CFRP cases were interviewed in February 2008 and the first 
CFRP travel documents were issued in late March.  For FY 08, CFRP 
cases accounted for 26 percent of all travel documents issued under 
the Migration Accords (a figure likely to increase to 60 percent 
during FY 09) and USINT over-fulfilled its MSP commitment by 75 
percent. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In addition to the expansion of legal migration 
opportunities, the decline in illegal migration in the past year may 
reflect the cumulative impact of law enforcement action against the 
organized smuggling networks responsible for much of the increase in 
illegal migration since 2003. Prior to that time, the great majority 
of attempts to enter the U.S. illegally across the Florida Straits 
were made on rafts and other 'rustic' vessels built (or stolen) by 
the migrants themselves.  In 2003-2004, Mexican fishermen developed 
the smuggling route between Cuba and Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula 
using only slightly more sophisticated vessels.  Florida-based 
organized smugglers had begun to gain control of both the Florida 
and Mexico routes by 2005 and Cuban rustics and Mexican fishing 
boats were progressively displaced by high-powered 'go-fast' boats, 
many stolen in south Florida.  By 2007, Cuban migrant smuggling was 
dominated by organized criminal networks; in FY 07, for example, 
'go-fasts' were used in 75 percent of all Cuban migrant incidents 
according to U.S. Coast Guard statistics. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Cuba, the growth in illegal migration after 2003 was 
accompanied by the rigorous application of the country's severe 
anti-migrant smuggling laws, which carry sentences of up to 30 years 
in jail.  According to the Mexican Embassy here, 31 Mexicans are 
incarcerated in Cuba, all but a handful convicted on migrant 
smuggling charges.  Most are modest fishermen from the Yucatan and 
almost all were convicted in the period 2004-2006, prior to the full 
'professionalization' of the Mexican route.  Meanwhile, of 18 
American citizen prisoners currently in Cuban jails, eight were 
convicted of migrant smuggling and are serving sentences ranging 
from eight to 28 years.  Finally, aggressive prosecution of migrant 
smugglers caused the number of Cuban migrant smuggling-related 
indictments in south Florida to nearly quadruple, from 35 to 125, 
and the number of defendants to more than triple from 61 to 217, 
between 2006 and 2008. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Looking forward, absent a catastrophic collapse of the 
Cuban economy or similar precipitating event, the downward trend in 
illegal Cuban migration could well continue.  The fall in Cuban 
migration through Mexico predated the October 2008 signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Migration between Mexico and Cuba, 
but implementation of that agreement could consolidate the decline. 
According to the Mexican Embassy, the reduction in illegal Cuban 
migration through Mexico has already been so substantial that Mexico 
has not needed to request any additional repatriations since 75 
migrants were returned in two repatriations in December 2008 (Ref 
C).  Also, the agreement with Mexico may lead Cuba to seek similar 
agreements with other countries, notably Honduras, that would 
further reduce Cuban migrant flows to the U.S. southern border. 
Meanwhile, the expected acquisition of Spanish nationality by 
150,000 Cubans over the next three years represents a further 
significant expansion of legal migration options.  Together with 
those processed under the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords, and smaller 
immigration programs at other embassies in Havana, about a quarter 
million Cubans out of a total population of some eleven million 
either will legally emigrate from Cuba or acquire a second 
nationality between 2009 and 2011. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT.  We believe that the significant decline in 
illegal Cuban migration reflects the successful diversion of chronic 
migratory pressure in a "safe, legal, and orderly" direction, 
consistent with the purpose of the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords. 
USINT will continue to work towards meeting U.S. commitments under 
the Migration Accords, and will continue to expedite implementation 
of the CFRP program, to discourage migrants from taking to the sea. 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) To further discourage illegal migration, the United States 
government may wish to consider renewed processing, on a limited 
basis, of Special Cuban Migration Program cases. Until its 
suspension in 2006, the SCMP, a Cuba-specific visa lottery designed 
in 1995 to capture the "rafter profile", constituted the most viable 
means of legal emigration for Cubans without relatives in the United 
States and those not able to pay the going rate of $10,000 to go by 
fast-boat.  USINT will make a recommendation on this subject 
shortly, after further study.  END COMMENT. 
 
FARRAR