VZCZCXRO2694
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0334/01 0771251
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181251Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0150
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0009
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0023
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0048
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0029
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0261

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN 
ALSO FOR COUNSELOR CHERYL MILLS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM ECON PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN FACING DIRE FOOD INSECURITY 
 
DUSHANBE 00000334  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified - Not for Internet 
Distribution. 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: The food situation in Tajikistan remains 
precarious.  The challenges the country has faced over the past 
year read like the Old Testament: after the worst winter in 
recent history, during which families faced acute shortages of 
food and fuel, a summer drought and a plague of locusts resulted 
in failed harvests.  Then, just as the autumn rains brought some 
hope, the financial crisis hit, forcing layoffs of Tajik workers 
in Russia and declines in the remittances the country relies on 
to fund its imports.  To top it all off, poor relations with 
Uzbekistan have held up critical energy imports, forcing most 
Tajiks to spend another winter in the dark.  As a result of four 
successive seasons of misfortune, the country faces potentially 
critical shortages of food.  A humanitarian crisis in 
Tajikistan, sitting on Afghanistan's northern border, could 
easily become a security crisis in Central Asia.  End summary. 
 
 
 
A Series of Misfortunes 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The poorest of the former Soviet republics, 
Tajikistan's development indicators languish near the bottom of 
international rankings.  Its 1992-97 civil war slowed economic 
and democratic development and gave rise to a leadership 
obsessed with control and personal gain rather than economic 
diversification and general growth.  A difficult situation has 
been made worse by a series of misfortunes beginning in winter 
of last year.  With temperatures twenty or even thirty degrees 
below average, crops, stored food, and seeds were ruined.  Many 
families faced serious difficulties finding adequate food and 
fuel.  As prices for these commodities rose, rural Tajiks (the 
majority of the population) were forced to sell livestock and 
tools, and spend their meager savings or borrow heavily in order 
to survive.  As a result, even after temperatures rose, many 
families remained acutely vulnerable because they had lost their 
capacity to endure further crises. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The disastrous winter has had lingering consequences 
for agricultural production as well.  The cold temperatures 
destroyed stocks of potatoes used for spring planting, resulting 
in lower yields this year.  Prices of many commodities, such as 
wheat and cooking oil, rose sharply in response to the scarcity, 
and have not come down since.  A severe drought in the summer, 
combined with a plague of locusts, further eroded Tajikistan's 
agricultural production, increasing food vulnerability. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) With only seven percent of its land arable, and the 
government stuck in a Soviet planned economy mindset that forces 
farmers to grow the USSR's preferred crop - cotton - Tajikistan 
has long been reliant on food imports.  Last year's agricultural 
difficulties only increased this reliance.  These difficulties 
were then further compounded by the onset of the world financial 
crisis.  More than any other country in the world, Tajikistan is 
dependent upon remittances sent home from its citizens working 
outside the country.  Almost every Tajik family has a relative 
working abroad, usually as an unskilled laborer in Russia, who 
sends back money the family uses to purchase critical 
commodities.  Last year remittances were equivalent to 52% of 
the country's GDP, the highest ratio in the world.  As a result 
of the financial crisis, however, many Tajik migrant workers 
have been losing their jobs.  In January, for the first time in 
the six years records have been kept, remittance levels dropped 
from the same month the previous year.  The layoffs actually 
present a double-edged problem: at the very same moment incomes 
are declining, Tajiks laid off from work abroad are returning 
home, resulting in more mouths to feed.  The Food and 
Agriculture Organization identified Tajikistan as one of 17 
countries in the world that is in a state of food crisis due to 
high prices.  Lower incomes will only expand this problem. 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000334  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
 
Challenges to Security and Stability 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Temperatures remained relatively warm this winter, 
somewhat mitigating the humanitarian impact of the global 
economic crisis.  But the fact remains that many Tajiks are in 
dire straits.  According to data from the World Bank, 53% of the 
population lives under the poverty line (defined as $2.15 a 
day).  The difficulties over the past year, combined with the 
ongoing financial crisis, means that many Tajik families simply 
cannot cope with additional hardships.  Continued mismanagement 
of the agricultural sector, including heavy cultivation of 
cotton instead of food crops, means that the government's 
efforts hinder more than they help. 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) A relatively small humanitarian crisis in Tajikistan 
has the potential to become a serious security problem for 
Central Asia.  Food security is an emotionally charged issue, 
and the risk of instability rises as the large, suddenly 
unemployed male population in Tajikistan watches its children go 
hungry.  Further, despite the efforts of Tajik and international 
law enforcement agencies, a considerable amount of opium already 
makes its way across Afghanistan's 1,344-km border with 
Tajikistan.  Increasing poverty in Tajikistan could drive more 
Tajiks into the drug trade, helping to support insurgent 
elements in Afghanistan.  Although Tajikistan's civil war ended 
over a decade ago, the regional divisions that expressed 
themselves in the conflict remain. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Food insecurity and resulting malnutrition present 
serious and widespread health consequences.  According to the 
World Bank, 27% of children under age 5 in Tajikistan are 
"stunted," i.e., below average height for their age.  This is 
the highest rate of stunting of any country of the region (the 
average for the Commonwealth of Independent States is 12% 
stunted).  Food insecurity will damage Tajik society in the long 
term, reducing the human capacity of the state and private 
sector and making Tajikistan less developed and more vulnerable 
to drug trafficking, terrorism, and separatism. 
 
 
 
Past Assistance Successful 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Since 2005, USAID has supported a Multi-Year food 
Assistance Program (MYAP) in Tajikistan.  This $26 million 
program ends in June, however, and is now in its final 
evaluation stages.  The MYAP was particularly effective because 
it not only distributed food directly to beneficiaries but also 
sold a portion on the local market.  The proceeds of this 
supported development programs that increased local agricultural 
production and other agribusiness activities, which in turn 
substantially relieved food insecurity in Tajikistan.  MYAP 
participant households reported having two additional months of 
food in 2008, compared to the previous year.  The MYAP achieved 
this by teaching new agricultural techniques, making improved 
seeds and tools available, and teaching families to preserve and 
save food more effectively.  The MYAP program also resulted in 
positive social changes that will allow communities to 
accelerate and sustain their own development.  By supporting a 
school feeding and health education program, MYAP increased 
school participation and sanitation.  Training for rural women 
increased their status and rights within their own families and 
communities.  The program notably improved the status and 
education of women in isolated and very conservative areas of 
Tajikistan which have experienced recent political instability. 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) USAID provided two additional programs in response to 
last winter's humanitarian crisis.  The first was a $3.5 million 
Local Resource Procurement Program and the second was a $5 
 
DUSHANBE 00000334  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
million Single Year food Assistance Program (SYAP).  While 
neither of these programs is able to take the long-term approach 
that gave MYAP its development impact, both are providing 
immediate benefits to families with very few resources, and have 
built goodwill with participating communities. 
 
 
 
... But They are Ending 
 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) All food assistance is scheduled to cease by October 
¶2009.  This will mean that the most vulnerable families in 
Tajikistan will go without assistance precisely at the moment 
winter is approaching, and well before any conceivable economic 
recovery in Russia might reverse the painful reduction in 
remittances.  Ending food assistance programs also means that 
our NGO partners will no longer be able to operate extensively 
in the field, limiting our ability to access accurate 
information on the humanitarian situation.  The lead partner for 
the Food Assistance Consortium for Tajikistan, CARE 
International, has already decided to leave Tajikistan. 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment: In light of the challenges currently facing 
Tajikistan -- a disastrous winter, a summer drought, and the 
financial crisis -- now is a particularly inauspicious time to 
end food assistance in a strategically vital state neighboring 
Afghanistan.  A new MYAP would be a particularly effective 
program, because it would allow us to supply food to those in 
need while achieving a number of other long-term development 
goals.  If a MYAP is not possible, we would recommend that the 
current SYAP be renewed and paired with other assistance to 
continue the agricultural, food preservation, health, and 
education components of MYAP.  We should implement activities 
that generate income at the local level to help people earn 
enough money to buy the food that is available.  We have an 
effective model to work from and are prepared to move quickly, 
but the window of opportunity to avoid a destabilizing food 
security crisis is closing quickly.  End Comment. 
JACOBSON